Michael A. Goldstein

Dr. Michael A. Goldstein


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 May 2017 in Water Resources Research
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MSMatthew Sturm
Matthew Sturm
MGMichael A. Goldstein
Michael A. Goldstein
CPCharles Parr
Charles Parr

1 July 2006 in The Review of Financial Studies
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MGMichael A. Goldstein
Michael A. Goldstein
EHEdith S. Hotchkiss
Edith S. Hotchkiss
ESErik R. Sirri
Erik R. Sirri
This article reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the impact of last-sale trade reporting on the liquidity of BBB corporate bonds. Overall, adding transparency has either a neutral or a positive effect on liquidity. Increased transparency is not associated with greater trading volume. Except for very large trades, spreads on newly transparent bonds decline relative to bonds that experience no transparency change. However, we find no effect on spreads for very infrequently traded bonds. The observed decrease in transaction costs is consistent with investors’ ability to negotiate better terms of trade once they have access to broader bond-pricing data. (JEL codes: G14, G18, G23, G24, G28)

1 April 2000 in Journal of Financial Economics
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MGMichael A. Goldstein
Michael A. Goldstein
KKKenneth A. Kavajecz
Kenneth A. Kavajecz

24 October 2009 in The Review of Financial Studies
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Journal Article
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MGMichael A. Goldstein
Michael A. Goldstein
PIPaul Irvine
Paul Irvine
EKEugene Kandel
Eugene Kandel
ZWZvi Wiener
Zvi Wiener
The institutional brokerage industry faces an ever-increasing pressure to lower trading costs, which has already driven down average commissions and shifted volume toward low-cost execution venues. However, traditional full-service brokers that bundle execution with services remain a force and their commissions are still considerably higher than the marginal cost of trade execution. We hypothesize that commissions constitute a convenient way of charging a prearranged fixed fee for long-term access to a broker’s premium services. We derive testable predictions based on this hypothesis and test them on a large sample of institutional trades from 1999 to 2003. We find that institutions negotiate commissions infrequently, and thus commissions vary little with trade characteristics. Institutions also concentrate their order flow with a relatively small set of brokers, with smaller institutions concentrating their trading more than large institutions and paying higher per-share commissions. These results are stable over time, are consistent with our predictions, and cannot be explained by cost-minimization alone. Finally, we discuss the evolution of the institutional brokerage market within the proposed framework and make informal predictions about future developments in the industry.

1 June 2004 in Journal of Financial Markets
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Journal Article
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MGMichael A. Goldstein
Michael A. Goldstein
KKKenneth A. Kavajecz
Kenneth A. Kavajecz

27 May 2011 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
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MGMichael A. Goldstein
Michael A. Goldstein
PIPaul Irvine
Paul Irvine
APAndy Puckett
Andy Puckett
We find direct evidence that institutions increase round-trip stock trades, increase average commissions per share, and pay unusually high commissions on some trades in order to send abnormally high commissions to the lead underwriters of profitable initial public offerings (IPOs). These excess commission payments are a particularly effective way for transient investors to receive lucrative IPO allocations. Our results suggest that the underwriter’s concern for their long-term client relationships limits the payment-for-IPO practice. We estimate that abnormal commission payments are large for the most profitable issues, and that an additional $1 excess commission payment to the lead underwriter results in $2.21 in investor profits from allocated shares.