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Current electricity markets do not efficiently achieve policy targets i.e., sustainability, reliability, and price efficiency. Thus, there are debates on how to achieve these targets by using either market mechanisms e.g., carbon and capacity markets, or non-market mechanisms such as offer-caps, price-caps, and market-monitoring. At the same time, major industry changes including demand response management technologies and large scale batteries bring more elasticity to demand; such changes will impact the methodology needed to achieve the above mentioned targets. This work provides market solutions that capture all three policy targets simultaneously and take into account the above-mentioned industry changes. The proposed solutions are based on: (i) a model of electricity markets that captures all the above mentioned electricity policy targets; (ii) mechanism design and the development of a framework for design of efficient auctions with constraints (individual, joint homogeneous, and joint non-homogeneous). The results show that, within the context of the proposed model, all policy targets can be achieved efficiently by separate capacity and carbon markets in addition to efficient spot markets. The results also highlight that all three policy targets can be achieved without any offer-cap, price-cap, or market monitoring. Thus, within the context of the proposed model, they provide clear answers to the above-mentioned policy debates.
Mohammad Rasouli; Demosthenis Teneketzis. Economizing the Uneconomic: Markets for Reliable, Sustainable, and Price Efficient Electricity. Sustainability 2021, 13, 4197 .
AMA StyleMohammad Rasouli, Demosthenis Teneketzis. Economizing the Uneconomic: Markets for Reliable, Sustainable, and Price Efficient Electricity. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (8):4197.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMohammad Rasouli; Demosthenis Teneketzis. 2021. "Economizing the Uneconomic: Markets for Reliable, Sustainable, and Price Efficient Electricity." Sustainability 13, no. 8: 4197.
Consider a remote estimation problem where a sensor wants to communicate the state of an uncertain source to a remote estimator over a finite-time horizon. The uncertain source is modeled as an autoregressive process with bounded noise. Given that the sensor has a limited communication budget, the sensor must decide when to transmit the state to the estimator who has to produce real-time estimates of the source state. In this article, we consider the problem of finding a scheduling strategy for the sensor and an estimation strategy for the estimator to jointly minimize the worst-case maximum instantaneous estimation error over the time horizon. This leads to a decentralized minimax decision-making problem. We obtain a complete characterization of optimal strategies for this decentralized minimax problem. In particular, we show that an open-loop communication scheduling strategy is optimal and the optimal estimate depends only on the most recently received sensor observation.
Mukul Gagrani; Yi Ouyang; Mohammad Rasouli; Ashutosh Nayyar. Worst-Case Guarantees for Remote Estimation of an Uncertain Source. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 2020, 66, 1794 -1801.
AMA StyleMukul Gagrani, Yi Ouyang, Mohammad Rasouli, Ashutosh Nayyar. Worst-Case Guarantees for Remote Estimation of an Uncertain Source. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 2020; 66 (4):1794-1801.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMukul Gagrani; Yi Ouyang; Mohammad Rasouli; Ashutosh Nayyar. 2020. "Worst-Case Guarantees for Remote Estimation of an Uncertain Source." IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 66, no. 4: 1794-1801.
We consider electricity wholesale markets with multiple strategic users that possess localized information about the electricity network and can be either producers or consumers. The objective is to design a mechanism that maximizes the social welfare (the sum of the users' utilities) and has the following additional features. It satisfies the users' informational constraints along with the constraints imposed by the lines' thermal capacity limit and the network's physical laws (Kirchhoff's laws); furthermore it is budget balanced, individually rational, and price efficient. Using ideas from the theory of local public goods and auctions, we construct a social welfare maximizing mechanism that possesses all of the above features. We present an intuitive interpretation of the mechanism and discuss possible extensions of the model considered in the paper.
Mohammad Rasouli; Demosthenis Teneketzis. An Efficient Market Design for Electricity Networks With Strategic Users Possessing Local Information. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems 2019, 6, 1038 -1049.
AMA StyleMohammad Rasouli, Demosthenis Teneketzis. An Efficient Market Design for Electricity Networks With Strategic Users Possessing Local Information. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems. 2019; 6 (3):1038-1049.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMohammad Rasouli; Demosthenis Teneketzis. 2019. "An Efficient Market Design for Electricity Networks With Strategic Users Possessing Local Information." IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems 6, no. 3: 1038-1049.