Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá

Dr. Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 August 2023 in Journal of Mathematical Economics
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LALuis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
AMAna Meca
Ana Meca
JPJusto Puerto
Justo Puerto

23 December 2024 in TOP
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ABAnjeza Bekolli
Anjeza Bekolli
LALuis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
AMAna Meca
Ana Meca
In this paper, we focus on decentralized agricultural supply chains consisting of multiple non-competing distributors satisfying the demand of their respective markets. These distributors source a single product from a farmer through an agricultural cooperative, operating in a single period. The agents have the ability to coordinate their actions to maximize their profits, and we use cooperative game theory to analyze cooperation among them. The distributors can engage in joint ordering, increasing their order size, which leads to a decrease in the price per kilogram. Additionally, distributors have the opportunity to cooperate with the farmer, securing a reduced price per kilogram at the cost price, while compensating the farmer for any kilograms not acquired in the cooperation agreement. We introduce multidistributor-farmer games and we prove that all the agents have incentives to cooperate. We demonstrate the existence of stable allocations, where no subgroup of agents can be better off by separating. Moreover, we propose and characterize a distribution of the total profit that justly compensates the contribution of the farmer in any group of distributors. We also explore the conditions under which the farmer can be compensated to maximize their revenues when cooperating with all players. Finally, we include a case study demonstrating the application of the model using data gathered from local distributors and farmers.

2 May 2021 in Annals of Operations Research
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LALuis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
AMAna Meca
Ana Meca
JPJusto Puerto
Justo Puerto

15 April 2021 in Mathematics
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LALuis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
AMAna Meca
Ana Meca
JPJusto Puerto
Justo Puerto
This paper analyzes cost sharing in uncapacitated lot-sizing models with backlogging and heterogeneous costs. It is assumed that several firms participate in a consortium aiming at satisfying their demand over the planning horizon with minimal operating cost. Each individual firm has its own ordering channel and holding technology, but cooperation with other firms consists in sharing that information. Therefore, the firms that cooperate can use the best ordering channels and holding technology among members of the consortium. This mode of cooperation is stable. in that allocations of the overall operating cost exist, so that no group of agents benefit from leaving the consortium. Our contribution in the current paper is to present a new family of cost sharing allocations with good properties for enforcing cooperation: the unitary Owen points. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the unitary Owen points to belong to the core of the cooperative game. In addition, we provide empirical evidence, through simulation, showing that, in randomly-generated situations, the above condition is fulfilled in 99% of the cases. Additionally, a relationship between lot-sizing games and a certain family of production-inventory games, through Owen’s points of the latter, is described. This interesting relationship enables easily constructing a variety of coalitionally stable allocations for cooperative lot-sizing models.

10 December 2023 in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
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Nizar AllouchNizar Allouch
Nizar Allouch
LALuis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
AMAna Meca
Ana Meca

9 September 2021 in TOP
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LALuis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
Luis Antonio Guardiola Alcalá
AMAna Meca
Ana Meca
JPJusto Puerto
Justo Puerto
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of cooperation works as follows: ordering channels and holding and backlogging technologies are shared among the members of the coalitions. This implies that each firm uses the best ordering channel and holding technology provided by the participants in the consortium. That is, they produce, hold inventory, pay backlogged demand and make orders at the minimum cost of the coalition members. Thus, firms aim at satisfying their demand over the planing horizon with minimal operation cost. Our contribution is to show that there exist fair allocations of the overall operation cost among the firms so that no group of agents profit from leaving the consortium. Then we propose a parametric family of cost allocations and provide sufficient conditions for this to be a stable family against coalitional defections of firms. Finally, we focus on those periods of the time horizon that are consolidated and we analyze their effect on the stability of cost allocations.