Since Nassim Taleb coined black swan as an event that occurred as a complete surprise for everybody, the metaphor of the black swan has been applied to a much wider variety of events. Black swan events now comprise events that are a surprise for some but not for others, events that have a low likelihood, events that were not believed to be possible but still proved to be possible, events that were dismissed as being too improbable to worry about but happened anyway. For a decision maker the black swan problem is choosing where to put effort to prevent, or mitigate events for which there are warnings, or for which the possibility has been put forward. Does the fact that there are thousands of books written about fire breathing dragons warrant the development of an Anti-Dragon Defense Shield? The black swan may have been a surprise for Willem de Vlamingh in 1697, it was not a surprise for the inhabitants of Australia, for which the appearance of tall white humans was their "black swan event". In this paper we explore the options available to decision makers when confronted with the various sorts of swan (or dragon) events.

Even in a pandemic there seem to be inherent conflicts of interest between the individual and societal consequences of remedial actions and strategies. Actions taken in the sole interests of patients, as required by the Hippocratic oath, can have broadly inconvenient economic implications for the State. (“Average” benefits for a population can impose individual inconveniences for the vulnerable.). Understandably these decisions are not normally made explicitly and transparently by governments. This leads to seemingly illogical and inhumane strategies which are not understood and hence mistrusted and often ignored by the public. Vaccination sentiments on social media are often an unwanted symptom of this dilemma. This article outlines and discusses a number of examples of such situations with a focus on ethical aspects. It concludes that each case must be considered individually as to the issues that need to be weighed in these difficult decisions; and that there are no clear and universally acceptable ethical solutions. What can be learned from the COVID-19 crisis is that short term utilitarianism has consequences that in the eyes of the population are unacceptable. This lesson seems equally valid for cost benefit evaluations regarding other risks, such as from hazardous industries, flood defenses, and air transport. Decisionmakers and politicians can learn that persuasion only goes so far. In the end the people appear to prioritize in terms of deontology.

Big Data can help overcome various problems that exist in present risk analysis practices. By analysing systems as a whole, it is no longer necessary to define in advance what a failure is and what a success is. It is also possible to evaluate how factors that are considered to promote success can combine into catastrophic failures. Big in Big Data is relative. What was called big data 25 years ago is now called small. The continuous development of analysis techniques over the years have resulted in several operational models that use the concept of Big Data. They will become better as the technology and the accessibility of data further improves. With this new generation of systems models, accidents and incidents do not have to wait for analysis to after the fact. They can be studied beforehand in a model. Replacing hindsight by foresight can help to make the world safer, if we desire to do so.

The assumption that risk, represented as an expected value of the loss could be implied to be a measure of safety, in a cost benefit analysis, is firmly entrenched in economic risk analysis. However, this does not mean that without a marker, the value of a loss, can be established with any necessary level of certainty to make such a cost balancing act ethically possible. The appropriateness of using the Value of a Statistical Life (VOSL) at all in a safety analysis, is a matter of perspective, which renders attempts to establish a uniform value of a statistical life questionable. This makes it questionable whether decisions from which values for a VOSL were evaluated, really were based on consideration of saving lives, or whether other arguments, such as available budget, were much more dominant. Ethical considerations do not seem to be in the frame of corporate risk management, where loss-of-life catastrophes appear to be simply the cost of doing business. Because there is no real basis for any estimate of the value of a statistical life, the values employed in cost-benefit analyses therefore only seem to serve the purpose of dissembling, concealing that the decision is taken on grounds other than saving human lives, or even that potential harm to humans was not even considered. The strict meaning given to resilience as at most to make a plan for recovery and see if we can live with the consequences, seems just another step towards putting the economy before people.

Legacy risks from infrastructures and industrial installations often reveal themselves when a potential for failure has been discovered much later than at the stage of the design and construction of a structure. In which case, there might already be a problem with the legacy installation, or even a crisis, without having had an accident. When the hazard cannot be taken away, the question arises as to how much effort, if any, should be spent on improving the situation. The usefulness of the three archetypical approaches to this problem: setting a standard, the as low as reasonably practicable approach and a case-by-case discourse approach are discussed for their applicability for these legacy risks. Although it would be desirable to retrofit legacy risks to previously set legal requirements as is the case when acceptability limits are set in law or demonstration of ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) is demanded, it may be impossible to reduce the residual risk to an otherwise acceptable level without taking away or replacing the infrastructure, which is not acceptable either. Therefore in conclusion the only available solution to persistent legacy risk problems seems to be to have a thorough discussion with all relevant stakeholders until an agreement is in some way found.