Software-defined networking (SDN) emerged as an attempt to introduce network innovations faster, and to radically simplify and automate the management of large networks. SDN traditionally leverages Open Flow as device-level abstraction. Since OpenFlow permits the programmer to “just” abstract a static flow-table, any stateful control and processing intelligence is necessarily delegated to the network controller. Motivated by the latency and signaling overhead that comes along with such a two-tiered SDN programming model, in the last couple of years several works have proposed innovative switch-level (data plane) programming abstractions capable to deploy some smartness directly inside the network switches, e.g., in the form of localized stateful flow processing. Furthermore, the possible inclusion of states and state maintenance primitives inside the switches is currently being debated in the OpenFlow standardization community itself. In this paper, after having provided the reader with a background on such emerging stateful SDN data plane proposals, we focus our attention on the security implications that data plane programmability brings about. Also via the identification of potential attack scenarios, we specifically highlight possible vulnerabilities specific to stateful in-switch processing (including denial of service and saturation attacks), which we believe should be carefully taken into consideration in the ongoing design of current and future proposals for stateful SDN data planes.

Since the purchase of Siri by Apple, and its release with the iPhone 4S in 2011, virtual assistants (VAs) have grown in number and popularity. The sophisticated natural language processing and speech recognition employed by VAs enables users to interact with them conversationally, almost as they would with another human. To service user voice requests, VAs transmit large amounts of data to their vendors; these data are processed and stored in the Cloud. The potential data security and privacy issues involved in this process provided the motivation to examine the current state of the art in VA research. In this study, we identify peer-reviewed literature that focuses on security and privacy concerns surrounding these assistants, including current trends in addressing how voice assistants are vulnerable to malicious attacks and worries that the VA is recording without the user’s knowledge or consent. The findings show that not only are these worries manifold, but there is a gap in the current state of the art, and no current literature reviews on the topic exist. This review sheds light on future research directions, such as providing solutions to perform voice authentication without an external device, and the compliance of VAs with privacy regulations.

The Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging with the pace of technology evolution, connecting people and things through the Internet. IoT devices enable large-scale data collection and sharing for a wide range of applications. However, it is challenging to securely manage interconnected IoT devices because the collected data could contain sensitive personal information. The authors believe that attribute-based encryption (ABE) could be an effective cryptographic tool for secure management of IoT devices. However, little research has addressed ABE's actual feasibility in the IoT thus far. This article investigates such feasibility considering well-known IoT platforms--specifically, Intel Galileo Gen 2, Intel Edison, Raspberry Pi 1 Model B, and Raspberry Pi Zero. A thorough evaluation confirms that adopting ABE in the IoT is indeed feasible.