The MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) Framework provides a rich and actionable repository of adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures. Its innovative approach has been broadly welcomed by both vendors and enterprise customers in the industry. Its usage extends from adversary emulation, red teaming, behavioral analytics development to a defensive gap and SOC (Security Operations Center) maturity assessment. While extensive research has been done on analyzing specific attacks or specific organizational culture and human behavior factors leading to such attacks, a holistic view on the association of both is currently missing. In this paper, we present our research results on associating a comprehensive set of organizational and individual culture factors (as described on our developed cyber-security culture framework) with security vulnerabilities mapped to specific adversary behavior and patterns utilizing the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Thus, exploiting MITRE ATT&CK’s possibilities towards a scientific direction that has not yet been explored: security assessment and defensive design, a step prior to its current application domain. The suggested cyber-security culture framework was originally designed to aim at critical infrastructures and, more specifically, the energy sector. Organizations of these domains exhibit a co-existence and strong interaction of the IT (Information Technology) and OT (Operational Technology) networks. As a result, we emphasize our scientific effort on the hybrid MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise and ICS (Industrial Control Systems) model as a broader and more holistic approach. The results of our research can be utilized in an extensive set of applications, including the efficient organization of security procedures as well as enhancing security readiness evaluation results by providing more insights into imminent threats and security risks.

This paper presents a cyber-security culture framework for assessing and evaluating the current security readiness of an organization’s workforce. Having conducted a thorough review of the most commonly used security frameworks, we identify core security human-related elements and classify them by constructing a domain agnostic security model. We then proceed by presenting in detail each component of our model and attempt to quantify them in order to achieve a feasible assessment methodology. The paper thereafter presents the application of this methodology for the design and development of a security culture evaluation tool, that offers recommendations and alternative approaches to workforce training programs and techniques. The model has been designed to easily adapt on various application domains while focusing on their unique characteristics. The paper concludes on applications of our instrument on security-critical domains, and its contribution to current research by providing deeper insights regarding the human factor in cybersecurity.

Insider threat has been recognized by both scientific community and security professionals as one of the gravest security hazards for private companies, institutions, and governmental organizations. Extended research on the types, associated internal and external factors, detection approaches and mitigation strategies has been conducted over the last decades. Various frameworks have been introduced in an attempt to understand and reflect the danger posed by this threat, whereas multiple identified cases have been classified in private or public databases. This paper aims to present how a cyber-security culture framework with a clear focus on the human factor can assist in detecting possible threats of both malicious and unintentional insiders. We link current insider threat categories with specific security domains of the framework and introduce an assessment methodology of the core contributing parameters. Specific approach takes into consideration technical, behavioral, cultural, and personal indicators and assists in identifying possible security perils deriving from privileged individuals.

Recent studies report that cybersecurity breaches noticed in hospitals are associated with low levels of personnel’s cybersecurity awareness. This work aims to assess the cybersecurity culture in healthcare institutions from middle- to low-income EU countries. The evaluation process was designed and performed via anonymous online surveys targeting individually ICT (internet and communication technology) departments and healthcare professionals. The study was conducted in 2019 for a health region in Greece, with a significant number of hospitals and health centers, a large hospital in Portugal, and a medical clinic in Romania, with 53.6% and 6.71% response rates for the ICT and healthcare professionals, respectively. Its findings indicate the necessity of establishing individual cybersecurity departments to monitor assets and attitudes while underlying the importance of continuous security awareness training programs. The analysis of our results assists in comprehending the countermeasures, which have been implemented in the healthcare institutions, and consequently enhancing cybersecurity defense, while reducing the risk surface.

The coronavirus pandemic led to an unprecedented crisis affecting all aspects of the concurrent reality. Its consequences vary from political and societal to technical and economic. These side effects provided fertile ground for a noticeable cyber-crime increase targeting critical infrastructures and, more specifically, the health sector; the domain suffering the most during the pandemic. This paper aims to assess the cybersecurity culture readiness of hospitals’ workforce during the COVID-19 crisis. Towards that end, a cybersecurity awareness webinar was held in December 2020 targeting Greek Healthcare Institutions. Concepts of cybersecurity policies, standards, best practices, and solutions were addressed. Its effectiveness was evaluated via a two-step procedure. Firstly, an anonymous questionnaire was distributed at the end of the webinar and voluntarily answered by attendees to assess the comprehension level of the presented cybersecurity aspects. Secondly, a post-evaluation phishing campaign was conducted approximately four months after the webinar, addressing non-medical employees. The main goal was to identify security awareness weaknesses and assist in drafting targeted assessment campaigns specifically tailored to the health domain needs. This paper analyses in detail the results of the aforementioned approaches while also outlining the lessons learned along with the future scientific routes deriving from this research.