We prove the existence of a pure‐strategy trembling‐hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure‐strategy strictly perfect a...
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We further show that truthful revelation is an approximate ex post equilibrium. Lastly, we show that in replicated settings aggregate payments sufficient to induce truthful revelation go to zero
11 June 2010 in International Journal of Game Theory
This paper provides a three-fold generalization of the Gale–Nikaido–Kuhn–Debreu lemma, a fundamental result for classical Walrasian general equilibrium theory. It weakens the (i) convexity assumption on the given (excess demand) correspondence, and (ii) the continuity assumption by synthesizing both the majorization and inclusion approaches, and uses these results to derive a (iii) theorem on the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with externalities, and non-ordered, non-convex, price-dependent preferences under a weaker continuity assumption that is assumed in the literature. It also highlights a trade-off between the weakened continuity and convexity assumptions.
In this paper, we provide alternative proofs of fundamental results of Walrasian general equilibrium theory, and of cooperative game theory, by viewing them as results pertaining to a two-person qualitative or a one-person generalized game: in short, by giving them a game-theoretic underpinning. Under the first category, we have the Gale–Nikaido–Kuhn–Debreu (GNKD) lemma in mind, and under the second, the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz–Shapley (KKMS) lemma.