Richard McLean

Prof. Richard McLean

Department of Economics, Rutgers University–New Brunswick, New Brunswick, NJ, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2014 in Theoretical Economics
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OCOriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
RMRichard McLean
Richard McLean
We prove the existence of a pure‐strategy trembling‐hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure‐strategy strictly perfect a...

1 September 2015 in Theoretical Economics
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RMRichard McLean
Richard McLean
APAndrew Postlewaite
Andrew Postlewaite
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We further show that truthful revelation is an approximate ex post equilibrium. Lastly, we show that in replicated settings aggregate payments sufficient to induce truthful revelation go to zero

11 June 2010 in International Journal of Game Theory
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MVMark Voorneveld
Mark Voorneveld
ANA. van Den Nouweland
A. van Den Nouweland
RMRichard McLean
Richard McLean

6 November 2012 in Economic Theory
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OCOriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
RMRichard McLean
Richard McLean

15 March 2025 in Economic Theory
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MKM. Ali Khan
M. Ali Khan
RMRichard McLean
Richard McLean
MUMetin Uyanik
Metin Uyanik
This paper provides a three-fold generalization of the Gale–Nikaido–Kuhn–Debreu lemma, a fundamental result for classical Walrasian general equilibrium theory. It weakens the (i) convexity assumption on the given (excess demand) correspondence, and (ii) the continuity assumption by synthesizing both the majorization and inclusion approaches, and uses these results to derive a (iii) theorem on the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with externalities, and non-ordered, non-convex, price-dependent preferences under a weaker continuity assumption that is assumed in the literature. It also highlights a trade-off between the weakened continuity and convexity assumptions.

24 February 2025 in Economic Theory Bulletin
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MKM. Ali Khan
M. Ali Khan
RMRichard McLean
Richard McLean
MUMetin Uyanik
Metin Uyanik
In this paper, we provide alternative proofs of fundamental results of Walrasian general equilibrium theory, and of cooperative game theory, by viewing them as results pertaining to a two-person qualitative or a one-person generalized game: in short, by giving them a game-theoretic underpinning. Under the first category, we have the Gale–Nikaido–Kuhn–Debreu (GNKD) lemma in mind, and under the second, the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz–Shapley (KKMS) lemma.