BACKGROUND: With the spread of COVID-19 and the worsening global prevention and control situation, the risk of infection faced by health workers has been unprecedented. It is necessary to fully understand the occupational risks of health workers to protect them and reduce their risk of infection. OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to obtain comprehensive and detailed information on occupational risk factors of infectious diseases for HWs in different dimensions and to propose control strategies for three risk dimensions to protect HWs who are at high risk of infection during the pandemic. METHODS: A total number of 619 articles published from 2010 to 2021 were searched to conduct bibliometric analysis, which were retrieved in the Web of Science database with defined search terms. There were 26 articles met the criteria, and they were screened to identify occupational risk factors. RESULTS: We conducted an analysis of cited institutions, co-citation network analysis of journals, and references from bibliometric analysis. Nine risk factors were extracted, and they were classified and sorted into three dimensions. Infection control strategies for each dimension were proposed. CONCLUSIONS: The risk of infection faced by HWs is unprecedented. Medical institutions should pay more attention to the nine risk factors that we identified and use the three risk dimensions to carry out risk identification and infection control to reduce the infection risk of HWs and protect them better.
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has been proposed to shift the burden of end-of-life (EoL) collection and recycling from the public sector to manufacturers, aiming to incentivize sustainable product design. Yet, as firms increasingly rely on product differentiation to compete for heterogeneous consumers, recycling complexity rises and reshapes design incentives in unexpected ways. We develop a stylized model with two competing manufacturers and one shared recycler whose recycling cost increases in product differentiation. We first analyze a centralized benchmark and show that EPR overturns conventional wisdom on product differentiation: firms may deliberately reduce differentiation to alleviate recycling costs, and when recycling costs are sufficiently high, product cannibalization can even emerge as the optimal design strategy. We then examine the impact of recycling structure on the EPR implementation. When recycling is outsourced to an independent recycler, market coverage declines, product segmentation increases, and overall profitability decreases relative to the centralized benchmark. Paradoxically, this structure improves environmental performance by limiting excessive differentiation and total output. When recycling is vertically integrated, coordination frictions are eliminated and profitability is restored, but the resulting expansion in differentiation and market coverage generates the highest environmental burden. Since direct EPR implementation cannot reconcile the tension between economic efficiency and environmental performance, we further explore government intervention schemes that reshape the economic–environmental frontier. Government-intervened individual producer responsibility (GIPR) flexibly balances profitability and environmental impact, whereas government-operated collective producer responsibility (GCPR) is more effective at curbing environmental impact. As a result, the regulator’s preferred intervention format depends critically on the environmental priority: GIPR is preferred when environmental concerns are limited, while GCPR becomes dominant when environmental priority is high. Furthermore, we establish a one-to-one mapping between environmental priorities and policy parameters, providing implementable guidance for regulators. Our study underscores the importance of incorporating differentiation-induced recycling costs into product design under EPR and highlights the fundamental economic–environmental tension that should inform effective policy design.
The growing use of remanufactured-parts in collision insurance creates new opportunities for insurers to reduce repair costs and improve environmental performance; however, consumers' acceptance of remanufactured parts is heterogeneous and implicit claim contracts may cause insurers reputational losses. Designing a mechanism that balances economic profit, reputational risk, and sustainability becomes an important question. We develop a game-theoretic model with a manufacturer, a remanufacturer, and an insurance company, examining how insurers choose opaque remanufacturing (OR), where remanufactured-parts are used without explicit disclosure, or a transparent option (TO), where consumers choose new-part or discounted remanufactured-part insurance. Our results show that a higher claim probability paradoxically reduces insurance demand and insurer profit under OR through price escalation and reputational penalties, while under TO, it may shift demand toward remanufactured-part insurance when cost savings are high. Transparency is not always optimal: OR is more profitable when reputational penalty cost or discovery probability is low, whereas TO becomes more attractive when environmentally conscious consumers are more prevalent or remanufacturing brings greater cost savings. Claim probability affects model choice non-monotonically: OR is preferred at its moderate levels, while TO is preferred at its low or high levels. Although profitability and environment are not always aligned, TO is more likely to generate a win-win outcome when claim probability or environmental consciousness is high. These findings suggest that remanufacturers should enhance the cost advantage and reliability of remanufactured-parts, while insurers and policymakers should promote sustainable claim settlement through adaptive contract disclosure, insurance price discounts, and improved environmental awareness.