SYNOPSIS: An extensive literature of empirical research over the past 50+ years provides important insights into the role of accounting information in the equity capital markets. But how has the role of accounting information changed, given advancements in the dissemination and processing of accounting information, as well as changes in corporate governance, securities regulations, and trading? In this paper, we use recent data to examine whether seminal findings from prior studies in the following three major areas of research still hold: the earnings-returns relation, earnings management, and market efficiency. We also introduce some new findings that were not in the original studies. We use a framework that maps firms’ business activities into share prices and provide straightforward descriptions of the research methodologies, empirical findings, and important implications from the evidence to benefit accounting students, instructors, practitioners, and others who may not yet have been exposed to this research. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D22; D80; G10; G12; G14; M41.
What incentives do managers face that might give rise to inefficient investments in leases? If managers make inefficient investments in leases, what economic consequences arise for those managers and their firms? We develop a model of expected investments in leased assets and use the residuals from the model as proxies for inefficient investments. We find that, in contrast to investments in capital expenditures, leasing appears to be a mechanism through which managers can seemingly over-invest, even among firms with high quality financial reporting and negative free cash flows. Examining economic consequences, we predict and find that unexpected investments in leased assets trigger increasing future sales growth but declining future earnings growth for as long as three years ahead. We also find a negative relation with contemporaneous stock returns, suggesting investors view unexpected investments in leases as value destructive. Finally, despite negative returns consequences, we find that unexpected investments in leases are associated with higher CEO compensation driven primarily by future sales growth. Our study suggests that compensation contracts that reward growth may give managers’ incentives to drive sales growth with larger-than-expected investments in leased assets, which lead to slower future earnings growth and negative share price consequences for investors. Our results should inform managers and board members, investors, and researchers interested in investment efficiency, corporate governance, and leases.