The paper shows how a state controlled religious institution used religion, fear, trauma, insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories to dehumanise a religious community, and presented it as an existential threat to the nation, the global community of believers and religion, by investigating the case of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (the Diyanet) securitizing role under the authoritarian Islamist Erdoğanist rule. The article provides an empirically rich analysis of the Diyanet’s construction of the Gülen Movement (GM) as a source of sedition (fitne), corruption (fesat), mischief, a social disease, and finally, as a traitor and puppet of the West that constantly conspires against Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World. By securitising the movement, the Diyanet legitimised the authoritarian and violent actions of the Erdoğanist regime against the alleged movement members.

While victimhood has been studied from very different perspectives, the question how secular nation states have instrumentalised religion for the politics of victimhood has not been studied. This paper addresses this gap in the literature on victimhood by analysing the empirical case of Turkey. As is well known, the constitutionally secular Turkish state, first under the rule of the Kemalists and now Erdoganists, has been using the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) to propagate the state ideology to the faithful. This paper shows that the Turkish state has recently been using Islam to construct and disseminate a religious victimhood narrative, mainly based on conspiracy theories via the Diyanet’s Friday sermons. To do this, the article investigates the texts, such as the sermons produced by the Diyanet that are read verbatim, in every mosque in Turkey during Friday prayers that are attended by more than half of the adult male population. The paper contributes to the victimhood literature by showing how religion, i.e., Islam, has been instrumentalised by a secular state in the construction of an Islamist populist and civilisationist victimhood narrative. Further studies are needed to see if and to what extent the Islamist victimhood narrative of the Turkish state has been impactful on the mosque-goers in the country.

Blame avoidance has been one of the most applied strategies by policy makers in both democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure and tragic events. It is also known that politicians have used religion for Machiavellian purposes, as exactly advised by Machiavelli. However, a systematic empirical analysis of how religion is used for blame avoidance by politicians has not been conducted. In this article, we aim to address this gap by examining the empirical data derived from the weekly Friday sermon texts produced by Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs and delivered in more than 90 thousand mosques every week to a large segment of the population in Turkey, where the majority claims to be religious. Starting with its violent response to the peaceful Gezi protests in 2013, the ruling AKP has opened up a new phase in Turkish political history by resorting to civilizational populism: it blamed the Western world for financing and masterminding the protests, using the protestors as internal pawns to attack Turkey and the Muslim World, suppressed the protests brutally and entered into a populist authoritarian regime. Our paper shows, following this turn, how the Diyanet sermons started using religion to help with the AKP’s blame avoidance. The Diyanet either parroted the AKP’s conspiratorial narrative or tried to convince the citizens that all negativities are works of God and with these humans are being tested by God. The AKP’s use of religion to avoid blame is a text-book case of how both a religious institution and religious discourse can be used to help the incumbent avoid responsibility. Whenever, there was a problem that would the AKP votes, the Diyanet’s sermons tried to shift the blame to either God or citizens or conspiratorial enemies.

The cyber world affects many aspects of personal and communal life in our modern world. One significant form of this influence is the growing digitisation of religious understanding. This article will focus on one facet of this virtual religious discussion, namely the religious rulings of organ donation and transplantation in Islam. This study will emphasise that discussion of the credibility of online fatwas is a neglected area that deserves significant scholarly attention. It will examine the diversity and complexity of 50 online fatwas on organ donation and transplantation selected from various fatwa organisations, government bodies, and councils across 16 countries, which differ linguistically, ethnically, socio-culturally, and by religious orientation. This article has three main arguments. First, it argues that state appointed and controlled religious authorities who work under close scrutiny of the state lack credibility in their fatwas. This has especially been the case in the post-colonial period where authoritarian states have deprived many Muslim scholars of their scholarly freedom to produce independent fatwas. Secondly, the paper asserts that an absence of field experts in the fatwa-making process in such areas as medicine, psychology, law, and public policy has weakened the credibility of online fatwas. Finally, the online fatwas evidenced in this study shows little, if any, consideration of opposing views on organ donation and transplantation, further damaging the reliability of the rulings produced. Finally, the online fatwas evidenced in this study shows little, if any, consideration of opposing views on organ donation and transplantation, further damaging the reliability of the rulings produced.

The 19th and 20th centuries were times of great change and transformation for the Muslim world. The salvation of the ummah—which is getting politically, militarily, and economically more backward against the West, terms such as revival (ihya), renewal (tajdid) and reform and reconstruction (islah)—have occupied almost all intellectuals and ulama. Many prescriptions have been proposed on this subject, the most vivid examples of which are mainly related to new approaches to the Qur’an and its interpretation. This article deals with the innovations put forward by reformist–revivalist leaders in different Muslim geographies regarding the interpretation of the Qur’an under the influence of modernism. We see that these approaches, which are basically based on the assumption of the inadequacy of classical methods and understandings, open up to questions and discussions for many hermeneutical devices that have become entrenched in the classical period and even argue that they are now unnecessary. Contrary to classical Qur’anic exegesis, reformist tajdid-centered suggestions of polyphonic modern Qur’an interpretations, the theological reflections of these suggestions, and most importantly their effect (or ineffectiveness) on Muslim societies are among the main topics of the article. In the beginning, the pressure of modernity, which should not be ignored in the perception and interpretation of the Qur’an, has become an indispensable element in the course of time. This new phenomenon and changing conditions have forced many Muslim intellectuals to compromise on principles that have become norms. The result, instead of a healthy reform, consisted of eclectic innovations and only saved the day and could not find a serious ground for itself in the grassroots.

In this article, I discuss the topic of Divine preservation of the Qur’an in the context of exegesis verse 15:9: ‘Indeed, it is We who sent down the reminder (dhikr) [i.e., the Qur’an], and indeed, We will be its guardian’. First, I will briefly examine Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions regarding authentic transmission of the Qur’an. I question some Western researchers, who problematise Muslims’ approaches to the history of the Qur’an with various polemics, and the Muslim perception, which compresses the notion of Divine preservation of the Qur’an into the narrow meaning of verse 15:9 with dogmatic and apologetic reflexes. Then, I chronologically analyse interpretations of the verse from linguistic, historical, theological and sociological aspects of the exegeses from the classical period to the modern times. The main argument of this article is centred on verse 15:9, which, in my opinion, deals with the first route of Qur’anic revelation from God to the Prophet through Angel Gabriel, and the Prophet’s perfect memorisation of it together with his flawless transmission to the Companions. The next processes (post-Prophetic developments in transmission of the revelation) were left to the foresight of the Muslim community, ummah. I believe, while the vertical process (revelation from arsh to farsh (heaven to earth) is guaranteed by God, responsibility for the horizontal process (from the Companions to the following generation and so on) is left to the Muslim community. The use of the same Qur’anic text by Sunnis, Shi’ites, Ibadis, etc., from northern Kazakhstan to West Africa, from Asia Pacific to the Balkans, is the clearest proof that Muslims are preserving the book entrusted to them. They demonstrate the reflection of their understanding of tawhid (Oneness of God) in their faith on the Qur’an by their consensus on a single mushaf.