Jeroen Klomp

Prof. Dr. Jeroen Klomp

1. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, Utrecht, The Netherlands
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 September 2011 in Applied Economics
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JKJeroen Klomp
Jeroen Klomp
JHJakob De Haan
Jakob De Haan
Most recent cross-country studies on election-motivated fiscal policy assume that the data can be pooled. As various tests suggest that our data for some 70 democratic countries for the period 1970–2007 cannot be pooled, we use the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator to test whether Political Budget Cycles (PBCs) exist in our sample. We find that fiscal policy is only affected by upcoming elections in the short run. Our results suggest that the occurrence of a PBC is conditional on the level of development and democracy, government transparency, the country's political system, its membership of a monetary union and its degree of political polarization.

1 July 2013 in Agricultural Economics
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JKJeroen Klomp
Jeroen Klomp
EBErwin Bulte
Erwin Bulte

15 May 2013 in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
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JKJeroen Klomp
Jeroen Klomp
JHJakob de Haan
Jakob de Haan

19 March 2019 in The Journal of Development Studies
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JKJeroen Klomp
Jeroen Klomp
In this study, I explore whether the public spending provided in response to a natural disaster is affected by upcoming elections. The theory on retrospective voting argues that politicians are kept responsible by the electorate for the damage caused by a natural catastrophe. At the same time, voters reward government officials when they react promptly by taking actions that limit the negative consequences. Thus, disaster support in the aftermath might not always only be provided to improve the economic situation after a disaster, but also for political purposes. My estimates seem to confirm this idea since roughly 10 per cent of the disaster related public spending provided in an election year is attributed to rent seeking rather than need. It turns out that the existence of these election cycles can partly be explained by cross-country differences. For instance, elections have a stronger effect in countries that are characterised by fewer checks and balances, presidential system and majority elections. One interesting result is that the role of media in electoral manipulation changes when a disaster has happened in the year before.

20 March 2012 in Social Indicators Research
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JKJeroen Klomp
Jeroen Klomp
JHJakob de Haan
Jakob de Haan
We examine the relationship between different dimensions of the political regime in place and human capital using a two-step structural equation model. In the first step, we employ factor analysis on 16 human capital indicators to construct two new human capital measures (basic and advanced human capital). In the second step, we estimate the impact of our political variables on human capital, using a cross-sectional structural model for some 100 countries. We conclude that democracy is positively related to basic human capital, while regime instability has a negative link with basic human capital. Governance has a positive relationship with advanced human capital, while government instability has a negative link with advanced human capital. Finally, we also find an indirect positive effect of governance and democracy on both types of human capital through their effect on income.

25 August 2020 in Open Economies Review
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JKJeroen Klomp
Jeroen Klomp
JSJohn Sseruyange
John Sseruyange
This study explores whether the degree of central bank independence influences the economic performance in the period immediately following an earthquake. Earthquakes create a classic monetary policy challenge: how to accommodate the real shock in the short run with the objective of low inflation. The ultimate outcome of this dilemma depends for a large part on the degree of delegation of the monetary powers to an independent central bank and the inflation averseness of the central bank governors. Our main empirical findings clearly indicate that the increase in the inflation rate after an earthquake is significantly smaller when monetary policy is conducted by a more independent central bank. At the same time, countries with an independent central bank are confronted with a wider output gap after an earthquake suggesting a slower economic recovery.