Peripersonal space (PPS) is the space surrounding us within which we interact with objects. PPS may be modulated by actions (e.g. when using tools) or sense of ownership (e.g. over a rubber hand). Indeed, intense and/or prolonged use of a tool may induce a sense of ownership over it. Conversely, inducing ownership over a rubber hand may activate brain regions involved in motor control. However, the extent to which PPS is modulated by action-dependent or ownership-dependent mechanisms remains unclear. Here, we explored the PPS around the feet and the sense of ownership over lower limbs in people with Paraplegia following Complete spinal cord Lesions (PCL) and in healthy subjects. PCL people can move their upper body but have lost all sensory-motor functions in their lower body (e.g. lower limbs). We tested whether PPS alterations reflect the topographical representations of various body parts. We found that the PPS around the feet was impaired in PCL who however had a normal representation of the PPS around the hands. Significantly, passive mobilization of paraplegic limbs restored the PPS around the feet suggesting that activating action representations in PCL brings about short-term changes of PPS that may thus be more plastic than previously believed.

Background: Studies in animals and humans indicate that the interruption of body-brain connections following spinal cord injury (SCI) leads to plastic cerebral reorganization. Objective: To explore whether inducing the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) via synchronous multisensory visuo-tactile bodily stimulation may reveal any perceptual correlates of plastic remapping in SCI. Methods: In 16 paraplegic, 16 tetraplegic and 16 healthy participants we explored whether RHI may be induced by tactile stimuli involving not only the left hand but also the left hemi-face. Touching the participant’s actual hand or face was either synchronous or asynchronous with tactile stimuli seen on a rubber hand. We assessed two components of the illusion, namely perceived changes in the real hand in space (indexed by proprioceptive drift) and ownership of the rubber hand (indexed by subjective responses to an ad-hoc questionnaire). Results: Proprioceptive drift and ownership were found in the healthy group only in the condition where the left real and fake hand were touched simultaneously. In contrast, no drift was found in the SCI patients who, however, showed ownership after both synchronous and asynchronous hand stroking. Importantly, only tetraplegics showed the effect also after synchronous face stroking. Conclusions: RHI may reveal plastic phenomena in SCI. In hand representation-deprived tetraplegics, stimuli on the face (represented contiguously in the somatic and motor systems), drive the sense of hand ownership. This hand-face remapping phenomenon may be useful for restoring a sense of self in massively deprived individuals.

Vision is known to be shaped by context, defined by environmental and bodily signals. In the Taylor illusion, the size of an afterimage projected on one's hand changes according to proprioceptive signals conveying hand position. Here, we assessed whether the Taylor illusion does not just depend on the physical hand position, but also on bodily self-consciousness as quantified through illusory hand ownership. Relying on the somatic rubber hand illusion, we manipulated hand ownership, such that participants embodied a rubber hand placed next to their own hand. We found that an afterimage projected on the participant's hand drifted depending on illusory ownership between the participants' two hands, showing an implication of self-representation during the Taylor illusion. Oscillatory power analysis of electroencephalographic signals showed that illusory hand ownership was stronger in participants with stronger α suppression over left sensorimotor cortex, whereas the Taylor illusion correlated with higher β/γ power over frontotemporal regions. Higher γ connectivity between left sensorimotor and inferior parietal cortex was also found during illusory hand ownership. These data show that afterimage drifts in the Taylor illusion do not only depend on the physical hand position but also on subjective ownership, which itself is based on the synchrony of somatosensory signals from the two hands. The effect of ownership on afterimage drifts is associated with β/γ power and γ connectivity between frontoparietal regions and the visual cortex. Together, our results suggest that visual percepts are not only influenced by bodily context but are self-grounded, mapped on a self-referential frame.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTVision is influenced by the body: in the Taylor illusion, the size of an afterimage projected on one's hand changes according to tactile and proprioceptive signals conveying hand position. Here, we report a new phenomenon revealing that the perception of afterimages depends not only on bodily signals, but also on the sense of self. Relying on the rubber hand illusion, we manipulated hand ownership, so that participants embodied a rubber hand placed next to their own hand. We found that visual afterimages projected on the participant's hand drifted laterally, only when the rubber hand was embodied. Electroencephalography revealed spectral dissociations between somatic and visual effects, and higher γ connectivity along the dorsal visual pathways when the rubber hand was embodied.