I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views on consciousness that still predominate within cognitive science. If Nagel-Chalmers-Block-style non-reductive naturalism about first-person consciousness (h-consciousness) holds true, then, eventually we should be able to understand how such consciousness operates and how it gets produced (this is not the same as bridging the explanatory gap or solving Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness). If so, the consciousness it involves can in principle be engineered.
Standard computing will be characterized as a functional extension of syntax. Using BICA claim of continuity between human-animal-robot cognitive architectures, we will define strong semantics as the ability of a cognitive architectures to consult cognitive maps, in particular phenomenal content maps (Damasio, 2010). This follows the work on semantic maps, yet the maps we postulate are based on phenomenal markers not syntax and predicative logic. We define extra strong semantic maps (and extra strong computing in general) as those that go beyond human capabilities. The goal of strong semantic computing in autonomous robotics should be to ‘know what is going on’ (Sanz, 2012) before engaging in detailed logical analysis. Such sort of Gestalt computing is needed in advanced autonomous robotics, especially robots functioning in human environments.
1 March 2020 in Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness