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Stakeholders play vital roles in the implementation of sustainable last mile logistics solutions. Therefore, the first step in setting up successful sustainable last mile logistics is to conduct stakeholder analysis. This paper analyzes the goals of the stakeholders in the Heijendaal living lab, a city logistics project that uses two hubs for bundling goods to be delivered to the Heijendaal campus in The Netherlands. We use the Theory of Planned Behavior and Policy Deployment to present a qualitative case study, which examines the goals of stakeholders in relation to their roles in the supply chain and in the organization, and if these goals lead to their expected participation behavior. Results show that stakeholders have economic, social, and environmental goals and that some of these goals are prominent within certain groups of stakeholders along the supply chain and within the organization. In addition, the set goals do not always lead to participation behavior of stakeholders due to identified disruptions and habits. This study identifies the importance of information sharing and collaboration within the supply chain, the leading role of middle-level managers in translating strategic to operational goals, and the stimulation of behavioral factors to increase participation of stakeholders in the living lab.
Frazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Enide Bogers; Luc van de Sande. A Managerial and Behavioral Approach in Aligning Stakeholder Goals in Sustainable Last Mile Logistics: A Case Study in the Netherlands. Sustainability 2021, 13, 4434 .
AMA StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan, Enide Bogers, Luc van de Sande. A Managerial and Behavioral Approach in Aligning Stakeholder Goals in Sustainable Last Mile Logistics: A Case Study in the Netherlands. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (8):4434.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Enide Bogers; Luc van de Sande. 2021. "A Managerial and Behavioral Approach in Aligning Stakeholder Goals in Sustainable Last Mile Logistics: A Case Study in the Netherlands." Sustainability 13, no. 8: 4434.
This paper assesses the effect of Marine Stewardship Council certification on the allocation of fishing effort by Filipino purse seine fishers operating in the waters of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. Targeting skipjack tuna, these purse seiners allocate effort under a vessel day scheme to either MSC certified free school fishing or non-MSC certified fishing on fish aggregating devices (FADs). Based on historical catch and price data, the optimal set of fishing activities are determined in terms of the mean and variance of fishers’ gross margin at given levels of risk aversion. The results show that MSC certification stimulates fishers to reduce their allocation of effort on non-MSC compliant FADs, and consequently convert this effort to MSC compliant free school purse seining. In general, the MSC also increases the yearly gross margin of fishers as compared to the situation without MSC certification. The MSC therefore appears to be effective to a certain extent in promoting a transition to more sustainable fishing practices. However, the results also indicate that the risk profile of fishers is a key but underexplored dimension of assessing the potential impact of MSC certification on effort allocation.
Frazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Paul Berentsen; Simon Bush; Alfons Oude Lansink. FAD vs. free school: Effort allocation by Marine Stewardship Council compliant Filipino tuna purse seiners in the PNA. Marine Policy 2018, 90, 137 -145.
AMA StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan, Paul Berentsen, Simon Bush, Alfons Oude Lansink. FAD vs. free school: Effort allocation by Marine Stewardship Council compliant Filipino tuna purse seiners in the PNA. Marine Policy. 2018; 90 ():137-145.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Paul Berentsen; Simon Bush; Alfons Oude Lansink. 2018. "FAD vs. free school: Effort allocation by Marine Stewardship Council compliant Filipino tuna purse seiners in the PNA." Marine Policy 90, no. : 137-145.
Frazen Tolentino-Zondervan. Towards sustainable tuna fishing: understanding the role of private incentive mechanisms. Towards sustainable tuna fishing: understanding the role of private incentive mechanisms 2017, 1 .
AMA StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan. Towards sustainable tuna fishing: understanding the role of private incentive mechanisms. Towards sustainable tuna fishing: understanding the role of private incentive mechanisms. 2017; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan. 2017. "Towards sustainable tuna fishing: understanding the role of private incentive mechanisms." Towards sustainable tuna fishing: understanding the role of private incentive mechanisms , no. : 1.
This study identifies the capabilities needed by small-scale fishers to participate in Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) for yellowfin tuna in the Philippines. The current literature provides little empirical evidence on how different models, or types of FIPs, influence the participation of fishers in their programs and the degree which FIPs are able to foster improvements in fishing practices. To address this literature gap, two different FIPs are empirically analysed, each with different approaches for fostering improvement. The first is the non-governmental organisation-led Partnership Programme Towards Sustainable Tuna, which adopts a bottom-up or development oriented FIP model. The second is the private-led Artesmar FIP, which adopts a top-down or market-oriented FIP approach. The data were obtained from 350 fishers surveyed and were analysed using two separate models run in succession, taking into consideration full, partial, and non-participation in the two FIPs. The results demonstrate that different types of capabilities are required in order to participate in different FIP models. Individual firm capabilities are more important for fishers participation in market-oriented FIPs, which use direct economic incentives to encourage improvements in fisher practices. Collective capabilities are more important for fishers to participate in development-oriented FIPs, which drive improvement by supporting fishers, fisher associations, and governments to move towards market requirements.
Frazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Paul Berentsen; Simon R. Bush; Larry Digal; Alfons Oude Lansink. Fisher-Level Decision Making to Participate in Fisheries Improvement Projects (FIPs) for Yellowfin Tuna in the Philippines. PLOS ONE 2016, 11, e0163537 .
AMA StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan, Paul Berentsen, Simon R. Bush, Larry Digal, Alfons Oude Lansink. Fisher-Level Decision Making to Participate in Fisheries Improvement Projects (FIPs) for Yellowfin Tuna in the Philippines. PLOS ONE. 2016; 11 (10):e0163537.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Paul Berentsen; Simon R. Bush; Larry Digal; Alfons Oude Lansink. 2016. "Fisher-Level Decision Making to Participate in Fisheries Improvement Projects (FIPs) for Yellowfin Tuna in the Philippines." PLOS ONE 11, no. 10: e0163537.
This paper analyzes the influence of three private incentive mechanisms over decision making related to improved sustainability of fishing practices in Filipino tuna fisheries. The three mechanisms compared are the World Wildlife Fund for Nature’s fishery improvement project model, Marine Stewardship Council certification, and the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation Pro-Active Vessel Register. The main question addressed in this paper is how and to what extent the private incentive mechanisms support the development of fisher capabilities to respond to the requirements set out by these mechanisms. Applying a global value chain approach to analyze results collected from key actors involved in Philippine tuna fishers contributing to both domestic and regional economic development in the Western Pacific, we explore the structure and function of these private incentive mechanisms in achieving both environmental and economic development outcomes. Our results show that these private incentive mechanisms deliver different direct and indirect incentives for changing to more sustainable fishing practices, and that the success of these mechanisms is dependent on the extent to which the mechanisms support the development of target fisher capabilities to comply with their sustainability requirements. We conclude that the future success of these incentive mechanisms depends for a large part on stricter sustainability requirements, but also on the capacity of the mechanisms to incentivize the inclusion of more developing country fishers. These findings contribute to a wider understanding of how the capabilities of developing country producers are influenced by their relationship with chain and non-chain actors, and with the wide institutional arrangements that the producers operate in.
Frazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Paul Berentsen; Simon Bush; Joseph Idemne; Ricardo Babaran; Alfons Oude Lansink. Comparison of Private Incentive Mechanisms for Improving Sustainability of Filipino Tuna Fisheries. World Development 2016, 83, 264 -279.
AMA StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan, Paul Berentsen, Simon Bush, Joseph Idemne, Ricardo Babaran, Alfons Oude Lansink. Comparison of Private Incentive Mechanisms for Improving Sustainability of Filipino Tuna Fisheries. World Development. 2016; 83 ():264-279.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrazen Tolentino-Zondervan; Paul Berentsen; Simon Bush; Joseph Idemne; Ricardo Babaran; Alfons Oude Lansink. 2016. "Comparison of Private Incentive Mechanisms for Improving Sustainability of Filipino Tuna Fisheries." World Development 83, no. : 264-279.