To study the pricing and coordination problem of dual-channel green supply chain (DGSC) considering products green degree and the distinctive of channel environment sustainability, a DGSC with one manufacturer and one retailer is chosen as the study object, here, the manufacturer sells products through the direct channel and the retailer sells products by the traditional channel. Then, the market demand is revised considering products green degree and the channel environment sustainability. Based on these, effects of products green degree and the level of channel environment sustainability on supply chain members’ pricing strategies are analysed in both decentralised and centralised models, meanwhile, the effects of the cross-environmental-sustainability sensitivity coefficient on pricing strategies also are analysed. A new two-part compensation contract is proposed to coordinate the DGSC. Results shows that effects of the products green degree on pricing strategies in both decentralised and centralised models are same; however, its effects on supply members’ benefits are different. Influences of the level of channel environment sustainability on supply chain members’ pricing strategies and benefits in both decentralised and centralised models are different. Meanwhile, when the compensation fee meet a certain range, the two-part compensation contract can coordinate this supply chain.

To stimulate the development and application of blockchain technology, Chinese government put forward subsidy strategy. To explore the subsidy policies under the new background, we chose a fresh supply chain with one producer, one blockchain-based traceability service provider, and one retailer as the research object, and government subsidy strategies were divided into a fixed strategy and a varying strategy. Afterward, considering the trust level of blockchain-based traceability information and consumers’ preference to the blockchain-based traceability information, we revised the demand function, and three subsidy models were proposed and analyzed. Findings: (1) the varying subsidy will help the retailer, the producer, and the traceability service provider set lower prices. (2) Meanwhile, the varying subsidies offered to the blockchain-based traceability service provider and the producer will help the whole supply chain members obtain more revenues.

Competitive agri-food supply chain (hereafter, AFSC) is an important component of AFSC. In a competitive environment, more and more AFSCs use blockchain-based traceability services (hereafter, BBTS) to improve the traceability level of agricultural products. The investment rules concerning BBTS and the coordination rules in an AFSC are vital issues for many firms who want to adopt BBTS. To explore these laws, we constructed two competitive AFSCs, each of which included a supplier and a retailer. Considering the new changes in consumers’ perception of product quality and safety after using the BBTS, the demand function was modified. Then we built the income functions of chain members under three situations of investment. The research found that: (1) the improvement of customers’ perceived quality by using the BBTS can increase their benefits; (2) when decision-makers want to invest in the BBTS, they should pay attention to consumers’ perceived quality safety factor for their competitive products; (3) when the investment cost is greater than its threshold value, two competitive AFSCs should invest in the BBTS together.