Akihiro Satoh

Dr. Akihiro Satoh

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 September 2019 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ASAkihiro Satoh
Akihiro Satoh
YNYutaka Nakamura
Yutaka Nakamura
YFYutaka Fukuda
Yutaka Fukuda
KSKazuto Sasai
Kazuto Sasai
GKGen Kitagata
Gen Kitagata
Some of the most serious security threats facing computer networks involve malware. To prevent this threat, administrators need to swiftly remove the infected machines from their networks. One common way to detect infected machines in a network is by monitoring communications based on blacklists. However, detection using this method has the following two problems: no blacklist is completely reliable, and blacklists do not provide sufficient evidence to allow administrators to determine the validity and accuracy of the detection results. Therefore, simply matching communications with blacklist entries is insufficient, and administrators should pursue their detection causes by investigating the communications themselves. In this paper, we propose an approach for classifying malicious DNS queries detected through blacklists by their causes. This approach is motivated by the following observation: a malware communication is divided into several transactions, each of which generates queries related to the malware; thus, surrounding queries that occur before and after a malicious query detected through blacklists help in estimating the cause of the malicious query. Our cause-based classification drastically reduces the number of malicious queries to be investigated because the investigation scope is limited to only representative queries in the classification results. In experiments, we have confirmed that our approach could group 388 malicious queries into 3 clusters, each consisting of queries with a common cause. These results indicate that administrators can briefly pursue all the causes by investigating only representative queries of each cluster, and thereby swiftly address the problem of infected machines in the network.

1 April 2015 in Journal of Information Security and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAkihiro Satoh
Akihiro Satoh
YNYutaka Nakamura
Yutaka Nakamura
TITakeshi Ikenaga
Takeshi Ikenaga

28 April 2021 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ASAkihiro Satoh
Akihiro Satoh
YFYutaka Fukuda
Yutaka Fukuda
GKGen Kitagata
Gen Kitagata
YNYutaka Nakamura
Yutaka Nakamura
Computer networks are facing serious threats from the emergence of malware with sophisticated DGAs (Domain Generation Algorithms). This type of DGA malware dynamically generates domain names by concatenating words from dictionaries for evading detection. In this paper, we propose an approach for identifying the callback communications of such dictionary-based DGA malware by analyzing their domain names at the word level. This approach is based on the following observations: These malware families use their own dictionaries and algorithms to generate domain names, and accordingly, the word usages of malware-generated domains are distinctly different from those of human-generated domains. Our evaluation indicates that the proposed approach is capable of achieving accuracy, recall, and precision as high as 0.9989, 0.9977, and 0.9869, respectively, when used with labeled datasets. We also clarify the functional differences between our approach and other published methods via qualitative comparisons. Taken together, these results suggest that malware-infected machines can be identified and removed from networks using DNS queries for detected malicious domain names as triggers. Our approach contributes to dramatically improving network security by providing a technique to address various types of malware encroachment.

17 November 2020 in IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ASAkihiro Satoh
Akihiro Satoh
YFYutaka Fukuda
Yutaka Fukuda
THToyohiro Hayashi
Toyohiro Hayashi
GKGen Kitagata
Gen Kitagata
Some of the most serious security threats facing computer networks involve malware. To prevent malware-related damage, administrators must swiftly identify and remove the infected machines that may reside in their networks. However, many malware families have domain generation algorithms (DGAs) to avoid detection. A DGA is a technique in which the domain name is changed frequently to hide the callback communication from the infected machine to the command-and-control server. In this paper, we propose an approach for estimating the randomness of domain names by superficially analyzing their character strings. This approach is based on the following observations: human-generated benign domain names tend to reflect the intent of their domain registrants, such as an organization, product, or content. In contrast, dynamically generated malicious domain names consist of meaningless character strings because conflicts with already registered domain names must be avoided; hence, there are discernible differences in the strings of dynamically generated and human-generated domain names. Notably, our approach does not require any prior knowledge about DGAs. Our evaluation indicates that the proposed approach is capable of achieving recall and precision as high as 0.9960 and 0.9029, respectively, when used with labeled datasets. Additionally, this approach has proven to be highly effective for datasets collected via a campus network. Thus, these results suggest that malware-infected machines can be swiftly identified and removed from networks using DNS queries for detected malicious domains as triggers.

20 April 2018 in IEEE Communications Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAkihiro Satoh
Akihiro Satoh
YNYutaka Nakamura
Yutaka Nakamura
DNDaiki Nobayashi
Daiki Nobayashi
TITakeshi Ikenaga
Takeshi Ikenaga
Bots are some of the most serious threats. Although administrators must remove bots that reside in their networks, many bots have domain generation algorithms (DGAs) to avoid detection. A DGA is a technique for hiding the callbacks of bots by frequently changing the domain name of a command-andcontrol server (C&C). In this paper, we propose an approach for detecting the callbacks based on the randomness of domain names. Our evaluation indicates high performance, with a recall of 0.9960 and a precision of 0.9029. By enabling one to swiftly address various bots, our approach contributes to dramatically improving network security.

1 July 2019 in IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ASAkihiro Satoh
Akihiro Satoh
YNYutaka Nakamura
Yutaka Nakamura
DNDaiki Nobayashi
Daiki Nobayashi
KSKazuto Sasai
Kazuto Sasai
GKGen Kitagata
Gen Kitagata
TITakeshi Ikenaga
Takeshi Ikenaga
Some of the most serious threats to network security involve malware. One common way to detect malware-infected machines in a network is by monitoring communications based on blacklists. However, such detection is problematic because (1) no blacklist is completely reliable, and (2) blacklists do not provide the sufficient evidence to allow administrators to determine the validity and accuracy of the detection results. In this paper, we propose a malicious DNS query clustering approach for blacklist-based detection. Unlike conventional classification, our cause-based classification can efficiently analyze malware communications, allowing infected machines in the network to be addressed swiftly.