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In China, the housing bubble is not only an economic issue but also an important social and political issue. According to game theory, the housing bubble is an equilibrium result of the interaction between policy environment and participants’ behavior. In this process, due to the interaction between speculation, regulation, and emotions, the development and evolution of the housing bubble are faced with uncertainty. Different from traditional econometric analysis, this article adopts the evolutionary game analysis method in order to establish a multi-stage evolutionary game analysis framework for the housing bubble. Firstly, by analyzing the emotional perceived value of related subjects under optimism, pessimism, and uncertainty, this article explores the mechanism of emotional perceived value on the housing bubble under the condition of inconsistent policy objectives. Secondly, it introduces emotional perceived value into the evolutionary game analysis framework of housing bubbles and analyzes the strategic combination and game equilibrium between investors and local governments under different emotions. Finally, taking Hainan province as an example, it conducts a MATLAB numerical simulation on the uncertain evolution of the housing bubble and proposes a staged strategy combination to deal with the housing bubble. The results show that: (1) emotional perceived value is affected by policy environment; (2) changes in the strength of policy effects make emotional perceived value change, which has different incentive effects on investors’ speculation and local governments’ regulation; (3) there are differences in emotional perceived value in different stages, which improves the uncertainty of the game equilibrium result between investors and local governments; and (4) considering the evolutionary characteristics of the housing bubble in different stages, its countermeasures should not only prevent insufficient regulation but also avoid excessive regulation. The above conclusions can provide theoretical and practical references for predicting the behavior of real estate investors, identifying the evolution mechanisms and rules of real estate bubbles and formulating relevant regulatory policies.
Yang Tang; Kairong Hong; Yucheng Zou; Yanwei Zhang. Impact of Emotional Perceived Value on the Uncertain Evolution of the Housing Bubble. Mathematics 2021, 9, 1543 .
AMA StyleYang Tang, Kairong Hong, Yucheng Zou, Yanwei Zhang. Impact of Emotional Perceived Value on the Uncertain Evolution of the Housing Bubble. Mathematics. 2021; 9 (13):1543.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYang Tang; Kairong Hong; Yucheng Zou; Yanwei Zhang. 2021. "Impact of Emotional Perceived Value on the Uncertain Evolution of the Housing Bubble." Mathematics 9, no. 13: 1543.
Multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation originate from the game of multidimensional interests between the local government and farmers. The strategy choices and equilibrium results of the two sides have evolved with changes to the situation and policy adjustments. Focusing on different types of farmland expropriation conflicts, this paper constructs a multistage Van Damme’s model of multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation, analyzes the stable equilibrium point of the behavior evolution of the local government and farmers under litigation settlement and nonlitigation settlement, and conducts simulation analysis on the behavior evolution and conflict resolution of both sides at different stages through MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that (1) the interests’ game between the local government and farmers has changed periodically due to the evolution of the farmland expropriation system; (2) under litigation settlement, there is only the “government rent-seeking” conflict: in order to resolve the conflict, the cost of litigation for farmers can be reduced, while other policy interventions, such as controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increasing the rent-seeking costs of the local government, can be implemented; (3) under nonlitigation settlement, there are three types of conflicts: to resolve the “government rent-seeking” conflict, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increase the rent-seeking costs of the local government or its positive social externality benefits under reasonable expropriation; to resolve the “nail household dilemma” conflict, we should increase the rent-seeking costs of farmers or their positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation; to resolve the “extreme controversy” conflict, on the one hand, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of farmers, and on the other hand, while controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government, we should increase the farmers’ positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation or negative social externality losses of both sides under rent seeking.
Yang Tang; Kairong Hong; Yucheng Zou; Yanwei Zhang. Equilibrium Resolution Mechanism for Multidimensional Conflicts in Farmland Expropriation Based on a Multistage Van Damme’s Model. Mathematics 2021, 9, 1208 .
AMA StyleYang Tang, Kairong Hong, Yucheng Zou, Yanwei Zhang. Equilibrium Resolution Mechanism for Multidimensional Conflicts in Farmland Expropriation Based on a Multistage Van Damme’s Model. Mathematics. 2021; 9 (11):1208.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYang Tang; Kairong Hong; Yucheng Zou; Yanwei Zhang. 2021. "Equilibrium Resolution Mechanism for Multidimensional Conflicts in Farmland Expropriation Based on a Multistage Van Damme’s Model." Mathematics 9, no. 11: 1208.