In China, the housing bubble is not only an economic issue but also an important social and political issue. According to game theory, the housing bubble is an equilibrium result of the interaction between policy environment and participants’ behavior. In this process, due to the interaction between speculation, regulation, and emotions, the development and evolution of the housing bubble are faced with uncertainty. Different from traditional econometric analysis, this article adopts the evolutionary game analysis method in order to establish a multi-stage evolutionary game analysis framework for the housing bubble. Firstly, by analyzing the emotional perceived value of related subjects under optimism, pessimism, and uncertainty, this article explores the mechanism of emotional perceived value on the housing bubble under the condition of inconsistent policy objectives. Secondly, it introduces emotional perceived value into the evolutionary game analysis framework of housing bubbles and analyzes the strategic combination and game equilibrium between investors and local governments under different emotions. Finally, taking Hainan province as an example, it conducts a MATLAB numerical simulation on the uncertain evolution of the housing bubble and proposes a staged strategy combination to deal with the housing bubble. The results show that: (1) emotional perceived value is affected by policy environment; (2) changes in the strength of policy effects make emotional perceived value change, which has different incentive effects on investors’ speculation and local governments’ regulation; (3) there are differences in emotional perceived value in different stages, which improves the uncertainty of the game equilibrium result between investors and local governments; and (4) considering the evolutionary characteristics of the housing bubble in different stages, its countermeasures should not only prevent insufficient regulation but also avoid excessive regulation. The above conclusions can provide theoretical and practical references for predicting the behavior of real estate investors, identifying the evolution mechanisms and rules of real estate bubbles and formulating relevant regulatory policies.

Multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation originate from the game of multidimensional interests between the local government and farmers. The strategy choices and equilibrium results of the two sides have evolved with changes to the situation and policy adjustments. Focusing on different types of farmland expropriation conflicts, this paper constructs a multistage Van Damme’s model of multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation, analyzes the stable equilibrium point of the behavior evolution of the local government and farmers under litigation settlement and nonlitigation settlement, and conducts simulation analysis on the behavior evolution and conflict resolution of both sides at different stages through MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that (1) the interests’ game between the local government and farmers has changed periodically due to the evolution of the farmland expropriation system; (2) under litigation settlement, there is only the “government rent-seeking” conflict: in order to resolve the conflict, the cost of litigation for farmers can be reduced, while other policy interventions, such as controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increasing the rent-seeking costs of the local government, can be implemented; (3) under nonlitigation settlement, there are three types of conflicts: to resolve the “government rent-seeking” conflict, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increase the rent-seeking costs of the local government or its positive social externality benefits under reasonable expropriation; to resolve the “nail household dilemma” conflict, we should increase the rent-seeking costs of farmers or their positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation; to resolve the “extreme controversy” conflict, on the one hand, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of farmers, and on the other hand, while controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government, we should increase the farmers’ positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation or negative social externality losses of both sides under rent seeking.

Inclusive urban renewal requires balancing the interests of multiple stakeholders; however, many renewal projects stall due to interest conflicts, rooted in the long-standing marginalization of residents’ subjective fairness perceptions. This study introduces the Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion model to characterize residents’ fairness preferences, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, developers, and residents, and uses MATLAB numerical simulations to reveal the influence of key parameters on system steady states. The findings show that: (1) the system admits eight pure-strategy equilibrium solutions, seven of which can evolve into evolutionarily stable strategies within specific parameter ranges; (2) the intensity of higher-level government accountability, residents’ policy-based compensation and subjective fairness perception, and penalties for developer violations all exert significant influence on the smooth implementation of inclusive urban renewal; and (3) various regulatory policies exhibit complementary and synergistic attributes, whereas any single governance instrument has inherent limitations. This study provides a reference for multi-stakeholder collaborative governance in inclusive urban renewal.

Against the backdrop of urban renewal and transformation in China, conflicts of interest among local governments, developers, and residents have become increasingly prominent. Traditional game models often rely on assumptions of complete rationality, making them inadequate for explaining residents’ resistance behaviors. This study integrates prospect theory with evolutionary game analysis to construct a three-party game model incorporating state-dependent gain, loss, and mixed perception modes among residents. By employing replicator dynamics, eigenvalue analysis of the Jacobian matrix, and MATLAB simulations, we systematically examine equilibrium conditions and evolutionary pathways. The results show: (1) the system has seven pure-strategy equilibria satisfying evolutionary stability; (2) local government strategy selection depends on the relative costs between compliant negotiation and forced promotion; (3) developer benefit sharing becomes a stable strategy only when penalty intensity exceeds the difference between benefit sharing cost and price suppression cost; (4) when loss aversion coefficients and loss perception sensitivity cross critical thresholds, steady-state transitions occur, becoming key psychological factors triggering conflict; (5) achieving an ideal win-win steady state requires coordinated efforts from multiple governance mechanisms. This research uncovers the underlying mechanism through which residents’ psychological cognition influences game equilibrium, providing theoretical support for optimizing government negotiation governance, improving developer regulation, and mitigating residents’ loss aversion.