The contour maps of the error of historical and parametric estimates of the global minimum risk for large random portfolios optimized under the Expected Shortfall (ES) risk measure are constructed. Similar maps for the VaR of the ES-optimized portfolio are also presented, along with results for the distribution of portfolio weights over the random samples and for the out-of-sample and in-sample estimates for ES. The contour maps allow one to quantitatively determine the sample size (the length of the time series) required by the optimization for a given number of different assets in the portfolio, at a given confidence level and a given level of relative estimation error. The necessary sample sizes invariably turn out to be unrealistically large for any reasonable choice of the number of assets and the confidence level. These results are obtained via analytical calculations based on methods borrowed from the statistical physics of random systems, supported by numerical simulations.

We consider the problem of mean-variance portfolio optimization for a generic covariance matrix subject to the budget constraint and the constraint for the expected return, with the application of the replica method borrowed from the statistical physics of disordered systems. We find that the replica symmetry of the solution does not need to be assumed, but emerges as the unique solution of the optimization problem. We also check the stability of this solution and find that the eigenvalues of the Hessian are positive for r = N/T < 1, where N is the dimension of the portfolio and T the length of the time series used to estimate the covariance matrix. At the critical point r = 1 a phase transition is taking place. The out of sample estimation error blows up at this point as 1/(1 − r), independently of the covariance matrix or the expected return, displaying the universality not only of the critical exponent, but also the critical point. As a conspicuous illustration of the dangers of in-sample estimates, the optimal in-sample variance is found to vanish at the critical point inversely proportional to the divergent estimation error.

The peer-to-peer (P2P) economy relies on establishing trust in distributed networked systems, where the reliability of a user is assessed through digital peer-review processes that aggregate ratings into reputation scores. Here we present evidence of a network effect which biases digital reputation, revealing that P2P networks display exceedingly high levels of reciprocity. In fact, these are much higher than those compatible with a null assumption that preserves the empirically observed level of agreement between all pairs of nodes, and rather close to the highest levels structurally compatible with the networks’ reputation landscape. This indicates that the crowdsourcing process underpinning digital reputation can be significantly distorted by the attempt of users to mutually boost reputation, or to retaliate, through the exchange of ratings. We uncover that the least active users are predominantly responsible for such reciprocity-induced bias, and that this fact can be exploited to obtain more reliable reputation estimates. Our findings are robust across different P2P platforms, including both cases where ratings are used to vote on the content produced by users and to vote on user profiles.

We consider the variance portfolio optimization problem with a ban on short selling. We provide an analytical solution by means of the replica method for the case of a portfolio of independent, but not identically distributed, assets. We study the behavior of the solution as a function of the ratio r between the number N of assets and the length T of the time series of returns used to estimate risk. The no-short-selling constraint acts as an asymmetric regularizer, setting some of the portfolio weights to zero and keeping the out-of-sample estimator for the variance bounded, avoiding the divergence present in the non-regularized case. However, the ban on short positions does not prevent the phase transition in the optimization problem, only shifts the critical point from its non-regularized value of to 2, and changes its character: at the out-of-sample estimator for the portfolio variance stays finite and the estimated in-sample variance vanishes, while another critical parameter, related to the estimated portfolio weights and the condensate density, diverges at the critical value . We also calculate the distribution of the optimal weights over the random samples and show that the regularizer preferentially removes the assets with large variances, in accord with one's natural expectation.

We reverse engineer dynamics of financial contagion to find the scenario of smallest exogenous shock that, should it occur, would lead to a given final systemic loss. This reverse stress test can be used to identify the potential triggers of systemic events, and it removes the arbitrariness in the selection of shock scenarios in stress testing. We consider in particular the case of distress propagation in an interbank market, and we study a network of 44 European banks, which we reconstruct using data collected from banks statements. By looking at the distribution across banks of the size of smallest exogenous shocks we rank banks in terms of their systemic importance, and we show the effectiveness of a policy with capital requirements based on this ranking. We also study the properties of smallest exogenous shocks as a function of the parameters that determine the endogenous amplification of shocks. We find that the size of smallest exogenous shocks reduces and that the distribution across banks becomes more localized as the system becomes more unstable.