In public decisions with long-term implications, decisions of the present generation will affect long-term welfare, including future generations. However, only the present generation is able to participate in such decision-making processes. In this study, we invited “Imaginary Future Generations” (IFGs), as participants in a discussion who take on the role of members of future generations to argue on behalf of their future interests to engage in present-day deliberations among residents of a Japanese town. Through analysis, it was seen that the deliberations among IFGs rose interest in issues that are related to common fundamental needs across generations. While the cognitive aspects of interpersonal reactivity, which measure the reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of another, were seen as useful in arguing for the interests of future generations, it was suggested that the environment for deliberation had a significant impact on the ability to effectively take on the role of members of future generations. Finally, this paper positioned IFGs within the broad context of general rules for good decision-making, based on an analysis of these deliberations and in light of philosophical arguments such as the veil of ignorance by John Rawls.

With the increase of human power, intergenerational conflicts of interest have emerged as new problems, particularly in terms of environmental and financial sustainability. This study examined the role of moral principles in inducing people to act, taking into account the interests of future generations. A survey was conducted among a representative sample of Japanese citizens to investigate the function of eight moral principles in resolving conflicts in terms of participants’ assessment of the appropriateness of the principles and their willingness to follow them. With respect to the absolute level of the function of moral principles, the results offer some, albeit cautious, promise of a strategy to resolve conflicts through moral principles. Overall, participants responded positively to these principles. Furthermore, the survey revealed that older and more educated individuals responded better. Given their leading roles in society, this finding supports the use of the principles. However, it also suggests that reaching out to those who did not respond to the strategy is challenging. The study revealed that a non-negligible proportion of respondents had only weak responses to any of the principles and that they either needed to be exposed to different principles or provided with different resources to develop sensitivity to moral ideas. The survey also revealed the relative order of principles. Egalitarianism and utilitarianism scored lower, but some principles, including Mill’s harm principle and Scheffler’s argument that the survival of humanity and the world itself has value, scored higher.

There is a disparity between luck egalitarianism and social reality, as illustrated by widening inequality. This paper argues for the implementation of luck egalitarianism to resolve this disparity, showing that its implementation should incorporate critiques from relational egalitarianism. First, by examining luck egalitarianism under resource constraints, the promising nature of the equality of resources (an equality of goods and leisure) is demonstrated. Equality of resources is a promising choice for those who want to live in a free and equal society in which the relational aspects between people are considered with full regard for human dignity. The idea of a hypothetical insurance market, separate from luck egalitarianism, should be abandoned. Furthermore, three practical challenges in social implementation—the distinction between option and brute luck, the harshness objection, and tensions with the private sphere—are discussed. To resolve these challenges, luck egalitarianism should be implemented relationally, guided by the idea of dignity and embodied in reasonable standards within social institutions.