Neural variability in responding to identical repeated stimuli has been related to trial-by-trial fluctuations in ongoing activity, yet the neural and perceptual consequences of these fluctuations remain poorly understood. Using functional neuroimaging, we recorded brain activity in subjects who reported perceptual decisions on an ambiguous figure, Rubin's vase-faces picture, which was briefly presented at variable intervals of ≥20 s. Prestimulus activity in the fusiform face area, a cortical region preferentially responding to faces, was higher when subjects subsequently perceived faces instead of the vase. This finding suggests that endogenous variations in prestimulus neuronal activity biased subsequent perceptual inference. Furnishing evidence that evoked sensory responses, we then went on to show that the pre- and poststimulus activity interact in a nonlinear way and the ensuing perceptual decisions depend upon the prestimulus context in which they occur.
Recent studies have shown that ongoing activity fluctuations influence trial-by-trial perception of identical stimuli. Some brain systems seem to bias toward better perceptual performance and others toward worse. We tested whether these observations generalize to another as of yet unassessed sensory modality, audition, and a nonspatial but memory-dependent paradigm. In a sparse event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging design, we investigated detection of auditory near-threshold stimuli as a function of prestimulus baseline activity in early auditory cortex as well as several distributed networks that were defined on the basis of resting state functional connectivity. In accord with previous studies, hits were associated with higher prestimulus activity in related early sensory cortex as well as in a system comprising anterior insula, anterior cingulate, and thalamus, which other studies have related to processing salience and maintaining task set. In contrast to previous studies, however, higher prestimulus activity in the so-called dorsal attention system of frontal and parietal cortex biased toward misses, whereas higher activity in the so-called default mode network that includes posterior cingulate and precuneus biased toward hits. These results contradict a simple dichotomic view on the function of these two latter brain systems where higher ongoing activity in the dorsal attention network would facilitate perceptual performance, and higher activity in the default mode network would deteriorate perceptual performance. Instead, we show that the way in which ongoing activity fluctuations impact on perception depends on the specific sensory (i.e., nonspatial) and cognitive (i.e., mnemonic) context that is relevant.
We have recently shown that intrinsic fluctuations of ongoing activity during baseline have an impact on perceptual decisions reported for an ambiguous visual stimulus (Hesselmann et al., 2008). To test whether this result generalizes from the visual object domain to other perceptual and neural systems, the current study investigated the effect of ongoing signal fluctuations in motion-sensitive brain regions on the perception of coherent visual motion. We determined motion coherence thresholds individually for each subject using a dynamic random dot display. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), brief events of subliminal, supraliminal, and periliminal coherent motion were presented with long and variable interstimulus intervals between them. On each trial, subjects reported whether they had perceived “coherent” or “random” motion, and fMRI signal time courses were analyzed separately as a function of stimulus and percept type. In the right motion-sensitive occipito-temporal cortex (hMT+), coherent percepts of periliminal stimuli yielded a larger stimulus-evoked response than random percepts. Prestimulus baseline activity in this region was also significantly higher in these coherent trials than in random trials. As in our previous study, however, the relation between ongoing and evoked activity was not additive but interacted with perceptual outcome. Our data thus suggest that endogenous fluctuations in baseline activity have a generic effect on subsequent perceptual decisions. Although mainstream analytical techniques used in functional neuroimaging do not capture this nonadditive effect of baseline on evoked response, it is in accord with postulates from theoretical frameworks as, for instance, predictive coding.
When dissimilar stimuli are presented to the two eyes, only one stimulus dominates at a time while the other stimulus is invisible due to interocular suppression. When both stimuli are equally potent in competing for awareness, perception alternates spontaneously between the two stimuli, a phenomenon called binocular rivalry. However, when one stimulus is much stronger, e.g., due to higher contrast, the weaker stimulus can be suppressed for prolonged periods of time. A technique that has recently become very popular for the investigation of unconscious visual processing is continuous flash suppression (CFS): High-contrast dynamic patterns shown to one eye can render a low-contrast stimulus shown to the other eye invisible for up to minutes. Studies using CFS have produced new insights but also controversies regarding the types of visual information that can be processed unconsciously as well as the neural sites and the relevance of such unconscious processing. Here, we review the current state of knowledge in regard to neural processing of interocularly suppressed information. Focusing on recent neuroimaging findings, we discuss whether and to what degree such suppressed visual information is processed at early and more advanced levels of the visual processing hierarchy. We review controversial findings related to the influence of attention on early visual processing under interocular suppression, the putative differential roles of dorsal and ventral areas in unconscious object processing, and evidence suggesting privileged unconscious processing of emotional and other socially relevant information. On a more general note, we discuss methodological and conceptual issues, from practical issues of how unawareness of a stimulus is assessed to the overarching question of what constitutes an adequate operational definition of unawareness. Finally, we propose approaches for future research to resolve current controversies in this exciting research area.
In bistable vision, subjective perception wavers between two interpretations of a constant ambiguous stimulus. This dissociation between conscious perception and sensory stimulation has motivated various empirical studies on the neural correlates of bistable perception, but the neurocomputational mechanism behind endogenous perceptual transitions has remained elusive. Here, we recurred to a generic Bayesian framework of predictive coding and devised a model that casts endogenous perceptual transitions as a consequence of prediction errors emerging from residual evidence for the suppressed percept. Data simulations revealed close similarities between the model’s predictions and key temporal characteristics of perceptual bistability, indicating that the model was able to reproduce bistable perception. Fitting the predictive coding model to behavioural data from an fMRI-experiment on bistable perception, we found a correlation across participants between the model parameter encoding perceptual stabilization and the behaviourally measured frequency of perceptual transitions, corroborating that the model successfully accounted for participants’ perception. Formal model comparison with established models of bistable perception based on mutual inhibition and adaptation, noise or a combination of adaptation and noise was used for the validation of the predictive coding model against the established models. Most importantly, model-based analyses of the fMRI data revealed that prediction error time-courses derived from the predictive coding model correlated with neural signal time-courses in bilateral inferior frontal gyri and anterior insulae. Voxel-wise model selection indicated a superiority of the predictive coding model over conventional analysis approaches in explaining neural activity in these frontal areas, suggesting that frontal cortex encodes prediction errors that mediate endogenous perceptual transitions in bistable perception. Taken together, our current work provides a theoretical framework that allows for the analysis of behavioural and neural data using a predictive coding perspective on bistable perception. In this, our approach posits a crucial role of prediction error signalling for the resolution of perceptual ambiguities. In bistable vision, perception spontaneously alternates between two different interpretations of a constant ambiguous stimulus. Here, we show that such spontaneous perceptual transitions can be parsimoniously described by a Bayesian predictive coding model. Using simulated, behavioural and fMRI data, we provide evidence that prediction errors stemming from the suppressed stimulus interpretation mediate perceptual transitions and correlate with neural activity in inferior frontal gyrus and insula. Our findings empirically corroborate theorizations on the relevance of prediction errors for spontaneous perceptual transitions and substantially contribute to a longstanding debate on the role of frontal activity in bistable vision. Therefore, our current work fundamentally advances our mechanistic understanding of perceptual inference in the human brain.
Perceptual decisions can be made when sensory input affords an inference about what generated that input. Here, we report findings from two independent perceptual experiments conducted during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a sparse event-related design. The first experiment, in the visual modality, involved forced-choice discrimination of coherence in random dot kinematograms that contained either subliminal or periliminal motion coherence. The second experiment, in the auditory domain, involved free response detection of (non-semantic) near-threshold acoustic stimuli. We analysed fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, as indexed by fMRI, and found that neuronal activity in sensory areas (extrastriate visual and early auditory cortex) biases perceptual decisions towards correct inference and not towards a specific percept. Hits (detection of near-threshold stimuli) were preceded by significantly higher activity than both misses of identical stimuli or false alarms, in which percepts arise in the absence of appropriate sensory input. In accord with predictive coding models and the free-energy principle, this observation suggests that cortical activity in sensory brain areas reflects the precision of prediction errors and not just the sensory evidence or prediction errors per se.