Australia has many environmental regulations intended to alter the behaviour of rural landholders. One key issue relates to managing invasive plants and animals, where effective action requires sustained (and largely voluntary) action and sustained investment. Eliciting high levels of compliance is a difficult problem, because different landholders have widely different attitudes and motivations. What works with one group of people may not work with another, and indeed may be counterproductive. This study demonstrates the use of contemporary psychological methods to identify groups of landholders who demonstrate different attitudes and behaviours in relation to weed control. It shows that identifiable segments do respond differently to different mixes of regulation, incentives and community action. It suggests that some commonly promoted interventions may actually be counterproductive in encouraging desirable action with some groups. The study shows that behavioural precision is important in creating effective compliance strategies in weeds management, and it demonstrates some of the methods that may be used to achieve that precision.
Although the Sydney Catchment Authority (SCA) largely controls the quality of water entering the Sydney catchments, it has limited jurisdiction over the majority of activities undertaken on private land, where much of the non-point source pollution originates. The current governance model reflects a traditional ‘command and control’, government-centred philosophy limiting the economic opportunities for landholders. Using six case studies from other jurisdictions we explore the potential for market-based schemes to better enable the SCA to meet its statutory objectives. A contemporary payments for watershed services scheme could better address issues of non-point pollution in more efficient and fairer ways than the present model. Under such a scheme, the SCA would rely more upon negotiated service arrangements pursuing a ‘least cost of supply’ for a defined water quality output, with the costs of these arrangements being reflected in the price of water to consumers. Funds are likely to be applied more strategically to secure water quality outcomes at the least public and private cost while maximizing the value of non-water ecological services from the same lands. These findings are relevant and can be applied to many other drinking water catchments within Australian and other jurisdictions.
There has been an explosion of innovation in agricultural technologies, but whether the anticipated benefits are fully realised depends partly upon with the institutional structures are supportive. Many types of law will shape what innovations are viable and the scale of the economic returns. Australia does not have a coherent strategy for future rural regulation that will both minimise the public risks and increase the private opportunities from future agricultural innovation. This paper addresses these issues. It considers the diverse legal issues that will affect these opportunities, and it looks particularly at agricultural robotics as an example of the many ways in which legal issues will shape opportunities from innovation. It proposes that an integrated strategy, based on a careful analysis of future issues, would be a significant contributor to Australia’s agricultural sector and to its innovating industries.