In this paper an N -pursuer vs. M -evader team conflict is studied. This work extends classical differential game theory to simultaneously address weapon assignments and multi- player pursuit-evasion scenarios. Saddle-point strategies that provide guaranteed performance for each team regardless of the actual strategies implemented by the opponent are devised. The players' optimal strategies require the co-design of cooperative optimal assignments and optimal guidance laws. A representative measure of performance is employed and the Value function of the attendant game is obtained. It is shown that the Value function is continuously differentiable and that it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation — the curse of dimensionality is overcome and the optimal strategies are obtained. The cases of N = M and N > M are considered. In the latter case, cooperative guidance strategies are also developed in order for the pursuers to exploit their numerical advantage. This work provides a foundation to formally analyze complex and high- dimensional conflicts between teams of N pursuers and M evaders by means of differential game theory.
2 January 2019 in Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems
In this paper, the problem of guarding a circular target wherein the Defender(s) is constrained to move along its perimeter is posed and solved using a differential game theoretic approach. Both the one-Defender and two-Defender scenarios are analyzed and solved. The mobile Attacker seeks to reach the perimeter of the circular target, whereas the Defender(s) seeks to align itself with the Attacker, thereby ending the game. In the former case, the Attacker wins, and the Attacker and Defender play a zero-sum differential game where the payoff/cost is the terminal angular separation. In the latter case, the Defender(s) wins, and the Attacker and Defender play a zero-sum differential game where the cost/payoff is the Attacker's terminal distance to the target. This formulation is representative of a scenario in which the Attacker inflicts damage on the target as a function of its terminal distance. The state-feedback equilibrium strategies and Value functions for the Attacker-win and Defender(s)-win scenarios are derived for both the one- and two-Defender cases, thus providing a solution to the Game of Degree. Analytic expressions for the separating surfaces between the various terminal scenarios are derived, thus providing a solution to the Game of Kind. An alternative game is formulated and solved in the case of Attacker win wherein the Attacker seeks to minimize time to reach the target.
1 August 2020 in Journal of Aerospace Information Systems
Ensuring border security against potential threats has been a long-standing problem, and it becomes much more challenging for international borders due to their massive physical extent coupled with...
In this paper, we extend the well-studied results of the two-pursuer, single-evader differential game to any number of pursuers. The main objective of this investigation is to exploit the benefits of cooperation amongst the pursuers in order to reduce the capture time of the evader. Computational complexity is a chief concern as this problem would need to be solved in an online fashion, e.g., in the case of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. A new geometric approach to solving the game is introduced and analyzed, which changes the problem of optimizing over continuous domains to a discrete combinatoric optimization. While past efforts at solving multiple pursuer problems have suffered from the curse of dimensionality, the geometric algorithms put forth here are shown to be scalable. Categorization and removal of redundant pursuers is the primary means by which scalability is achieved. The solution of this problem serves as a stepping stone to more complex problems such as the M-pursuer N-evader differential game.