Nikolay Korgin

Dr. Nikolay Korgin

V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, 65, Profsoyuznaya, 117997 Moscow, Russia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2021 in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ACAndrey Churkin
Andrey Churkin
JBJanusz Bialek
Janusz Bialek
DPDavid Pozo
David Pozo
ESEnzo Sauma
Enzo Sauma
NKNikolay Korgin
Nikolay Korgin

1 January 2014
Verified
Book
Closed access
DGDmitry Gubanov
Dmitry Gubanov
NKNikolay Korgin
Nikolay Korgin
DNDmitry Novikov
Dmitry Novikov
Aleksandr RaikovAleksandr Raikov
Aleksandr Raikov

4 November 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ACAndrey Churkin
Andrey Churkin
ESEnzo Sauma
Enzo Sauma
DPDavid Pozo
David Pozo
JBJanusz Bialek
Janusz Bialek
NKNikolay Korgin
Nikolay Korgin
Cooperative Game Theory has recently attracted attention in power systems research as a tool for expansion planning analysis. However, this analysis is usually performed in an ex-post manner, i.e., planning and operation decisions are separated from the allocation mechanisms themselves. The existing paradigm implies selecting an allocation rule (say, the Shapley value) to share the value of cooperation and verifying its rationality (e.g., by checking the Core of the cooperative game). Additional metrics of coalitional stability are omitted. Such an ex-post approach could lead to coalitional stability issues, which may hamper the establishment of cooperation. For example, there could be a severe imbalance in players’ positions, and the contribution of some players could be underestimated in the grand coalition. This paper proposes a bilevel optimization framework for explicitly incorporating Cooperative Game Theory principles into transmission expansion planning problems. Using a simple 4-system case study and a real-world case of cross-border power interconnections in Northeast Asia, we demonstrate that it is possible to make planning decisions in an anticipatory manner subject to the stability of coalitions. The identified expansion plans with enhanced coalitional stability indicate the ways of making parties more equally involved in electricity trading. Finally, we discuss the applicability of the bilevel TEP model, the properties of resulting cooperative games, and the compromise between coalitional stability and economic efficiency in transmission expansion planning.

25 November 2010 in Automation and Remote Control
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
IBI. N. Barabanov
I. N. Barabanov
NKNikolay Korgin
Nikolay Korgin
DNDmitry Novikov
Dmitry Novikov
ACA. G. Chkhartishvili
A. G. Chkhartishvili
The dynamic models of informational control in social networks were considered. The problems of analysis and design of the optimal controls were posed and examined.

1 July 2021 in Automation and Remote Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
VBV. N. Burkov
V. N. Burkov
AEA. K. Enaleev
A. K. Enaleev
NKNikolay Korgin
Nikolay Korgin
We describe prerequisites for the emergence of the key concept of incentive compatibility in the theory of active systems and mechanism design and give a survey of approaches to this problem, which have led to stating the fair play and revelation principles, and of current trends in this branch of scientific knowledge. Potential difficulties and development prospects are discussed.