This page has only limited features, please log in for full access.
The development of a coherent and coordinated policy for the management of large socio-agricultural systems, such as the Mekong delta in southern Vietnam, is reliant on aligning the development, delivery, and implementation of policy on national to local scales. Effective decision making is linked to a coherent, broadly-shared vision of the strategic management of socio-agricultural systems. However, when policies are ambiguous, and at worst contradictory, long-term management and planning can consequently suffer. These potential adverse impacts may be compounded if stakeholders have divergent visions of the current and future states of socio-agricultural systems. Herein we used a transferable, scenario-based methodology which uses a standard quadrant matrix in order to explore both anticipated and idealized future states. Our case study was the Mekong delta. The scenario matrix was based upon two key strategic choices (axis) for the delta, derived from analysis of policy documents, literature, stakeholder engagement, and land use models. These are: (i) who will run agriculture in the future, agri-business or the established commune system; and (ii) to what degree sustainability will be incorporated into production. During a workshop meeting, stakeholders identified that agri-business will dominate future agricultural production in the delta but showed a clear concern that sustainability might consequently be undermined despite policy claims of the contrary. As such, our study highlights an important gap between national expectations and regional perspectives. Our results suggest that the new development plans for the Mekong delta (which comprise a new Master Plan and a new 5-year socio-economic development plan), which emphasize agro-business development, should adopt approaches that address concerns of sustainability as well as a more streamlined policy formulation and implementation that accounts for stakeholder concerns at both provincial and national levels.
Craig Hutton; Oliver Hensengerth; Tristan Berchoux; Van Tri; Thi Tong; Nghia Hung; Hal Voepel; Stephen Darby; Duong Bui; Thi Bui; Nguyen Huy; Daniel Parsons. Stakeholder Expectations of Future Policy Implementation Compared to Formal Policy Trajectories: Scenarios for Agricultural Food Systems in the Mekong Delta. Sustainability 2021, 13, 5534 .
AMA StyleCraig Hutton, Oliver Hensengerth, Tristan Berchoux, Van Tri, Thi Tong, Nghia Hung, Hal Voepel, Stephen Darby, Duong Bui, Thi Bui, Nguyen Huy, Daniel Parsons. Stakeholder Expectations of Future Policy Implementation Compared to Formal Policy Trajectories: Scenarios for Agricultural Food Systems in the Mekong Delta. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (10):5534.
Chicago/Turabian StyleCraig Hutton; Oliver Hensengerth; Tristan Berchoux; Van Tri; Thi Tong; Nghia Hung; Hal Voepel; Stephen Darby; Duong Bui; Thi Bui; Nguyen Huy; Daniel Parsons. 2021. "Stakeholder Expectations of Future Policy Implementation Compared to Formal Policy Trajectories: Scenarios for Agricultural Food Systems in the Mekong Delta." Sustainability 13, no. 10: 5534.
An evolving literature on the Water-Energy-Food (WEF) nexus argues that there is a need to better understand the conditions under which nexus coordination may occur. A case in point are hydropower investments on shared rivers which might impact the provision of energy, water and food security across borders. In international basins, governing the WEF nexus impacts of hydropower relies on voluntary negotiations between the respective countries involved. It has been argued that such negotiations may be facilitated by regional organizations, such as international river basin organizations (IRBOs), but this claim has hardly been investigated systematically. Drawing on regime theory in international relations and the literature on benefit sharing, this paper asks what role regional organizations may play in governing hydropower-related WEF nexus impacts. It compares three cases of hydropower planning on shared rivers. The Rusumo Falls and the Ruzizi III hydropower projects (HPPs) are joint investments in Africa's Great Lakes region facilitated by an IRBO and a regional energy organization, respectively. On the Mekong, Laos is constructing the Xayaburi dam despite reservations by the Mekong River Commission and downstream riparians. The paper finds IRBOs and regional energy organizations may play a role in facilitating cross-border nexus governance by supporting benefit-sharing arrangements and by fostering the application of environmental and social safeguards and international law principles. However, it also shows that the influence of regional organizations varies, and how successfully they support nexus governance also depends on whether the HPP is planned unilaterally or jointly; the availability and consensus on data on nexus impacts; and the presence or absence of donors and private sector capital and investors.
Ines Dombrowsky; Oliver Hensengerth. Governing the Water-Energy-Food Nexus Related to Hydropower on Shared Rivers—The Role of Regional Organizations. Frontiers in Environmental Science 2018, 6, 1 .
AMA StyleInes Dombrowsky, Oliver Hensengerth. Governing the Water-Energy-Food Nexus Related to Hydropower on Shared Rivers—The Role of Regional Organizations. Frontiers in Environmental Science. 2018; 6 ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleInes Dombrowsky; Oliver Hensengerth. 2018. "Governing the Water-Energy-Food Nexus Related to Hydropower on Shared Rivers—The Role of Regional Organizations." Frontiers in Environmental Science 6, no. : 1.
Oliver Hensengerth. South-South technology transfer: Who benefits? A case study of the Chinese-built Bui dam in Ghana. Energy Policy 2018, 114, 499 -507.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. South-South technology transfer: Who benefits? A case study of the Chinese-built Bui dam in Ghana. Energy Policy. 2018; 114 ():499-507.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2018. "South-South technology transfer: Who benefits? A case study of the Chinese-built Bui dam in Ghana." Energy Policy 114, no. : 499-507.
Chinese state reforms have resulted in both horizontal and vertical diffusion of actors in policy-making and policy implementation, leading to the creation of new collaborative institutions between government and non-government actors. At the non-governmental level, this has inter alia enabled the development of non-governmental organizations and the passage of a raft of legislation for public participation and access to information. However, the political and legal constraints imposed by the authoritarian system have meant that private citizens still find it hard to make their voice heard. Public participation legislation has suffered from an implementation gap, leading to the proliferation of environmental protests across China. For private citizens, therefore, protest outside of the formal-legal channels is a key tool to influence the policy process and demand public participation and better government accountability. There are indications that protests may result in the improvement and creation of local institutions that facilitate public participation, which in turn help to foster a new model of governance that contains features of Multi-Level Governance.
Oliver Hensengerth; Yiyi Lu. Emerging environmental Multi-Level Governance in China? Environmental protests, public participation and local institution-building. Public Policy and Administration 2018, 34, 121 -143.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth, Yiyi Lu. Emerging environmental Multi-Level Governance in China? Environmental protests, public participation and local institution-building. Public Policy and Administration. 2018; 34 (2):121-143.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth; Yiyi Lu. 2018. "Emerging environmental Multi-Level Governance in China? Environmental protests, public participation and local institution-building." Public Policy and Administration 34, no. 2: 121-143.
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) has been styled as a natural region drawn together by the Mekong River. However, the literature on regional identity has argued that regions are socially constructed phenomena. River basins in particular are historically evolved constructs of specific political and social relations. Drawing on concepts of regional identity and on the literature examining the links between culture and water, the article argues that the actors driving the GMS have exacerbated social tensions through hydropower programmes, thus failing to establish social coherence. These programmes focus on energy production for national economic growth and economic integration between GMS countries, but they ignore the need to govern water resources for the benefit of local communities, many of which are made up of ethnic minorities with specific cultural attachments to the river. This produces tensions around the type of development that takes place in the GMS, leading to value fragmentation rather than value convergence. The article explores these issues by focusing on the Chinese-built Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia.
Oliver Hensengerth. Regionalism, Identity, and Hydropower Dams: The Chinese-Built Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 2017, 46, 85 -118.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Regionalism, Identity, and Hydropower Dams: The Chinese-Built Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 2017; 46 (3):85-118.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2017. "Regionalism, Identity, and Hydropower Dams: The Chinese-Built Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 46, no. 3: 85-118.
Accounts of hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony provide state-based conceptions of power in international river basins. However, authority should be seen as transnationalized as small states develop coping strategies to augment their authority over decision-making processes. The article engages Rosenau’s spheres of authority concept to argue that hydro-hegemony is exercised by actors embedded in spheres of authority that reshape actor configurations as they emerge. These spheres consist of complex networks challenging customary notions of the local-global dichotomy and hydro-hegemony. Hydro-hegemony is therefore not fixed. The article examines these processes by analysing the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam in the Mekong Basin.
Oliver Hensengerth. Where is the power? Transnational networks, authority and the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream. Water International 2015, 40, 911 -928.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Where is the power? Transnational networks, authority and the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream. Water International. 2015; 40 (5-6):911-928.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2015. "Where is the power? Transnational networks, authority and the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream." Water International 40, no. 5-6: 911-928.
Oliver Hensengerth. Multi-Level Governance of Hydropower in China? The Problem of Transplanting a Western Concept into the Chinese Governance Context. Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management 2015, 295 -320.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Multi-Level Governance of Hydropower in China? The Problem of Transplanting a Western Concept into the Chinese Governance Context. Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management. 2015; ():295-320.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2015. "Multi-Level Governance of Hydropower in China? The Problem of Transplanting a Western Concept into the Chinese Governance Context." Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management , no. : 295-320.
This paper studies environmental norm contestation in Cambodia's hydropower sector, exemplified by the Kamchay Dam. In Cambodia we can observe different discourses in relation to hydropower. These stem directly from a local contest over the path of Cambodia's development, but use global norms as reference points: one emphasizes environmental protection, using environmental impact assessment (EIA) as point of reference; and one emphasizes the utility of the clean development mechanism (CDM) to attract large-scale investment into the energy sector while downplaying the need for environmental protection. While EIA and CDM are complementary, key actors present them as contradictory. This produces a normative fragmentation of the field of environmental protection. The paper argues that the norm diffusion literature, by presenting norm conflicts as hierarchical local–global conflicts, has paid insufficient attention to the fact that local actors actively draw on global norms to justify domestic development policies. More emphasis on this phenomenon will lead to a better understanding of the role of global norms in domestic politics and will enhance our knowledge of how domestic development policies are contested.
Oliver Hensengerth. Global norms in domestic politics: environmental norm contestation in Cambodia's hydropower sector. The Pacific Review 2015, 28, 505 -528.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Global norms in domestic politics: environmental norm contestation in Cambodia's hydropower sector. The Pacific Review. 2015; 28 (4):505-528.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2015. "Global norms in domestic politics: environmental norm contestation in Cambodia's hydropower sector." The Pacific Review 28, no. 4: 505-528.
No other infrastructure has attracted more criticism than large reservoir-based hydropower and multi-purpose dams. Their detrimental social and ecological effects make them especially contentious, with opponents and proponents often unable to reach compromise solutions. In December 2000, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) proposed a new framework for decision-making in its report of the same name (WCD 2000), and this has become a landmark for sustainable practices.
Waltina Scheumann; Oliver Hensengerth. Dams and Norms: Current Practices and the State of the Debate. Evolution of Dam Policies 2014, 1 -12.
AMA StyleWaltina Scheumann, Oliver Hensengerth. Dams and Norms: Current Practices and the State of the Debate. Evolution of Dam Policies. 2014; ():1-12.
Chicago/Turabian StyleWaltina Scheumann; Oliver Hensengerth. 2014. "Dams and Norms: Current Practices and the State of the Debate." Evolution of Dam Policies , no. : 1-12.
The study analyses the role of Chinese companies and financing institutions and Ghanaian governmental agencies in planning and constructing the Bui Dam. The analysis focuses on the division of responsibilities between Sinohydro and China Exim Bank on the one side and the Ghanaian government on the other side. The findings show that environmental and resettlement planning for Bui was commissioned and financed by the Government of Ghana without Sinohydro’s involvement. The obligation of the firm is to abide by the environmental regulations that are monitored by the regulatory authorities. The role of Sinohydro consists in building the dam, maintaining the construction site, contracting workers, and providing for workers’ health and safety. The firm has no role in resettlement, which is carried out by the Bui Power Authority. While there is clear evidence that the Bui Power Authority does not follow the recommendations of the Resettlement Planning Framework, Sinohydro appears to abide largely by the conditions set out in the Environmental Impact Assessment study whose implementation is monitored by the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency and the Ghanaian Water Resources Commission.
Oliver Hensengerth. Interaction of Chinese Institutions with Host Governments in Dam Construction: The Bui Dam in Ghana. Evolution of Dam Policies 2014, 229 -271.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Interaction of Chinese Institutions with Host Governments in Dam Construction: The Bui Dam in Ghana. Evolution of Dam Policies. 2014; ():229-271.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2014. "Interaction of Chinese Institutions with Host Governments in Dam Construction: The Bui Dam in Ghana." Evolution of Dam Policies , no. : 229-271.
This study considers Chinese hydropower investment in Cambodia, examining the degree to which Chinese companies adhere to international or national environmental and social standards and analysing the roles played by and the interactions between Chinese and Cambodian actors in the building of hydropower capacity in Cambodia. The example used is the Kamchay Dam, built by Sinohydro and financed by the China Export Import Bank (China Exim Bank). An analysis of the distribution of responsibilities enables us to take a close look at interactions, processes and conflicts between the two sides in the planning and implementation of hydroelectric dams. It also enables us to identify weak points in the environmental and social regulations and to direct criticism more precisely, thus avoiding general accusations against either the Cambodian government or Chinese companies. The legal and political situation in Cambodia is made difficult by a number of factors: a neo-patrimonial, authoritarian polity in combination with elite economic interests produces a legally problematic situation in which personal interests and perceptions outweigh abstract administrative processes. This explains the failure of environmental and social regulation in Cambodia.
Oliver Hensengerth. Hydropower Planning in Informal Institutional Settings: Chinese Institutions and the Failure of Environmental and Social Regulation in Cambodia. Evolution of Dam Policies 2014, 273 -306.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Hydropower Planning in Informal Institutional Settings: Chinese Institutions and the Failure of Environmental and Social Regulation in Cambodia. Evolution of Dam Policies. 2014; ():273-306.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2014. "Hydropower Planning in Informal Institutional Settings: Chinese Institutions and the Failure of Environmental and Social Regulation in Cambodia." Evolution of Dam Policies , no. : 273-306.
The chapters in this book are an in-depth examination of the processes of norm diffusion and contestation. They examine four emerging economies and their positioning in international norm production processes, the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the norms Chinese companies have to comply with in their operations abroad. As explained in the introduction, the origin of this book stems from a large research project that examined how global norms reach decision-makers in the emerging economies of Brazil, China, India and Turkey. While we have expanded this original focus considerably following the conclusion of the project, this chapter returns to the origins of this research and compares the findings of the four country case studies by using our original hypotheses
Waltina Scheumann; Oliver Hensengerth; Nirmalya Choudhury. Have International Sustainability Norms Reached the Emerging Economies? Evidence from Dams in Brazil, China, India and Turkey. Evolution of Dam Policies 2014, 329 -341.
AMA StyleWaltina Scheumann, Oliver Hensengerth, Nirmalya Choudhury. Have International Sustainability Norms Reached the Emerging Economies? Evidence from Dams in Brazil, China, India and Turkey. Evolution of Dam Policies. 2014; ():329-341.
Chicago/Turabian StyleWaltina Scheumann; Oliver Hensengerth; Nirmalya Choudhury. 2014. "Have International Sustainability Norms Reached the Emerging Economies? Evidence from Dams in Brazil, China, India and Turkey." Evolution of Dam Policies , no. : 329-341.
The paper examines the role of environmental norms in Chinese overseas investment in hydropower dams, exemplified by Sinohydro’s involvement in the Bui Dam in Ghana. While the investment of Western companies in hydropower dams in the global South is decreasing owing to changing notions of sustainability in the West, the investment of Chinese companies in hydro dams in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America is accelerating at great speed. The emergence of Chinese companies in international markets in the context of China’s Going Abroad strategy has sparked a debate on whether China can be considered a norm-changer in international development. The paper considers this question in the context of the status of environmental norms in Sinohydro’s investment in Ghana’s Bui Dam. The paper argues that the role of international norms in Chinese investment is dependent on two factors: the contractual arrangements under which Chinese companies operate abroad and the political institutions of host countries.
Oliver Hensengerth. Chinese hydropower companies and environmental norms in countries of the global South: the involvement of Sinohydro in Ghana’s Bui Dam. Environment, Development and Sustainability 2012, 15, 285 -300.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Chinese hydropower companies and environmental norms in countries of the global South: the involvement of Sinohydro in Ghana’s Bui Dam. Environment, Development and Sustainability. 2012; 15 (2):285-300.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2012. "Chinese hydropower companies and environmental norms in countries of the global South: the involvement of Sinohydro in Ghana’s Bui Dam." Environment, Development and Sustainability 15, no. 2: 285-300.
It is generally considered difficult to resolve negative unidirectional externalities within hydro-hegemonic basins in which the upstream powerful riparian has the incentive to unilaterally develop the river without regard to downstream consequences. Weaker downstream riparian states can resort to issue linkages and side payments to coerce a change in the upstream hydro-hegemon’s behavior, but the success of these tools depends on the specific political and economic situation in the basin and on the preferences of the hydro-hegemonic state for cooperation. Neglected in the literature is another possibility. Through a consideration of the sanctioned discourse of watershed management at the domestic levels, this article shows that domestic environmental non-governmental organizations and policy entrepreneurs—through the application of a range of tools—can work to change the domestic water management discourse from a state-hydraulic paradigm to a more sustainable water management paradigm. When these efforts are successful, we can find that these non-state actors can perform a crucial function in cleaning up domestic stretches of international rivers, which produces positive externalities downstream. In the process, they are able of achieving what often years of international negotiations failed to accomplish. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, India’s policies on water quality in the national stretches of Ganges Basin and China’s policies on biodiversity in the national stretches of the Mekong Basin are used to make this argument.
Neda A. Zawahri; Oliver Hensengerth. Domestic environmental activists and the governance of the Ganges and Mekong Rivers in India and China. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2012, 12, 269 -298.
AMA StyleNeda A. Zawahri, Oliver Hensengerth. Domestic environmental activists and the governance of the Ganges and Mekong Rivers in India and China. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 2012; 12 (3):269-298.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNeda A. Zawahri; Oliver Hensengerth. 2012. "Domestic environmental activists and the governance of the Ganges and Mekong Rivers in India and China." International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 12, no. 3: 269-298.
Oliver Hensengerth. Transboundary River Cooperation and the Regional Public Good: The Case of the Mekong River. Contemporary Southeast Asia 2009, 31, 326 .
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Transboundary River Cooperation and the Regional Public Good: The Case of the Mekong River. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 2009; 31 (2):326.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2009. "Transboundary River Cooperation and the Regional Public Good: The Case of the Mekong River." Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2: 326.
The paper examines Vietnam's foreign policy as it translates into strategies toward subregional cooperation in the Mekong Basin. Using transboundary water cooperation as an example, the article argues that Vietnam's prime motivation in Mekong River cooperation is economic development for performance legitimacy. Environmental issues are raised, but only in relation to powerful upstream countries, while Vietnam itself poses similar challenges to less powerful downstream countries. The need for performance legitimacy thus conveys all relevance to the economically oriented Greater Mekong Subregion, while the Mekong River Commission, a basin organization with a mandate to combine economic development with environmental considerations, is sidelined.
Oliver Hensengerth. Vietnam's Security Objectives in Mekong Basin Governance. Journal of Vietnamese Studies 2008, 3, 101 -127.
AMA StyleOliver Hensengerth. Vietnam's Security Objectives in Mekong Basin Governance. Journal of Vietnamese Studies. 2008; 3 (2):101-127.
Chicago/Turabian StyleOliver Hensengerth. 2008. "Vietnam's Security Objectives in Mekong Basin Governance." Journal of Vietnamese Studies 3, no. 2: 101-127.
The paper analyses the security dimension of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) by taking into account traditional as well as non-traditional security issues. The Greater Mekong Subregion, which was established in 1992 at the initiative of the ADB, emerged after the Cold War in the wake of the so-called new regionalism as one of the growth triangles within ASEAN. Participating countries/regions are China's Yunnan province, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The article places the discussion of the Greater Mekong Subregion within the debate on post-Cold War sub-regionalism and sets out to discuss the development of regionalism in the Mekong Basin. The article shows how economic cooperation is followed in the pursuit of security and stability in a formerly conflict-ridden area and assesses the relevance of the GMS towards the issue of conflict reduction in the Mekong Basin.
Jörn Dosch; Oliver Hensengerth. Sub-Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Mekong Basin. European Journal of East Asian Studies 2005, 4, 263 -286.
AMA StyleJörn Dosch, Oliver Hensengerth. Sub-Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Mekong Basin. European Journal of East Asian Studies. 2005; 4 (2):263-286.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJörn Dosch; Oliver Hensengerth. 2005. "Sub-Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Mekong Basin." European Journal of East Asian Studies 4, no. 2: 263-286.