This work investigates the impact that the ownership structure of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries exerts on the level of corporate carbon emissions, as well as the moderating effect of innovation on this relationship. Based on panel data from 32 OECD countries during 2015–2020, a pooled least-square panel model was developed for estimation. The results show that public, foreign, and institutional investors have a significant negative effect on carbon emissions. Conversely, strategic investors contribute to increasing carbon emissions. Moreover, findings provide evidence of mixed moderating effects of innovation on the relationship between types of owners and carbon emissions. Hence, strategic shareholders contribute to implementing environmental policies through innovation, while public and foreign investors incur Research and Development expenditures to boost firms’ economic activity, ignoring social and environmental commitments. Our results confirm the relationship between ownership structure and carbon emissions and the moderating effects of innovation on this association. Environmental innovation allows for improving worldwide firms’ competitiveness and long-term performance.

Purpose: This study investigates how bank competition affects financial stability and whether government intervention contributes to shaping this relationship in North African countries.Design/methodology/approach: A review of the literature on the subject was conducted, combined with an empirical analysis that used a two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) and a sample of 45 banks operating in North African countries over the period 2005–2019.Findings: The findings reveal a quadratic relationship between competition and banking stability in North African countries. Competition–stability view and competition–fragility view could be applied at the same time for North African banks. Additionally, in this context, results highlight a negative impact of government intervention on financial stability in a competitive financial sector. North African banks operating in a high government intervention quality environment tend to engage in high-risk investments. Robustness checks with alternative measures of competition and banking stability also show consistent results.Originality/value: To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that the North African context has been explored to determine the role of the quality of government intervention in the relationship between competition and banking system fragility. This paper seeks to cover the shadow field in existing literature through further new information. Thus, it contributes to the emerging market banking literature by showing that both high and low levels of competition can improve financial stability in North African countries. Moreover, it expands its contribution by displaying the moderator effect of intervention quality on the bank competition–stability relationship.

In this study, we explore climate justice with specific reference to vulnerability at the level of different sectors in 90 developing countries in Asia, Africa and Europe, over a period from 2010 to 2019. The paper seeks to advance the discussion on the idea that adaptation financing is allocated according to the level of need in the recipient country and sector. By considering five crucial sectors (food, water, health, infrastructure and habitat), we explore the linear and quadratic effect of the vulnerability of each sector on the allocated endowment. The study is based on a dynamic panel regression method based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in the system model. Our findings reveal that vulnerability is an important consideration in funding allocation. The results suggest that the relationship between adaptation funding and vulnerability is sector-dependent. We also observe that this relationship is non-linear, providing further evidence of distributive justice in terms of allocating more funding to the most vulnerable sectors. Climate justice begins to emerge when vulnerability reaches a certain threshold. However, it appears that the infrastructure sector is dysfunctional in terms of adaptation financing needs and investments undertaken. Overall, the regulations put in place should further integrate climate risk parameters into technical and procedural standards to make projects more effective and climate justice more widespread.