The new energy vehicle (NEV) is emerging as an important alternative in the automobile industry in its potential to alleviate environmental pollution and contribute to carbon neutrality. The rapid growth of NEVs has been reflected in the scaling up of electric vehicle battery production. The dramatic increase of retired batteries, however, exposes the technological limitations in current recycling operations, which will ultimately impede the sustainable development of the NEV supply chain. Blockchain technology (BT) adoption provides a solution by contributing to the construction of an efficient recycling network. Our research investigates the influence of carbon reduction instruments on the uptake of BT. The key findings are as follows. Under a carbon tax system, (1) carbon emission reduction encourages the battery supplier to adopt BT; (2) BT adoption increases the profits of NEV supply chain stakeholders. Under carbon cap-and-trade regulations, (1) the unit outsourcing fee and the performance of the BT impact the investment decision of the manufacturer; (2) the profit of the third-party enterprise is increased by introducing the BT. Under both policies, improving the efficiency of BT helps to upgrade the traceability level and contribute to carbon neutrality in the NEV supply chain.

Industrial co-agglomeration plays a significant role in the moving up of the manufacturing industry in the value chain and in transforming China from a manufacturing giant into a world manufacturing power. This study establishes a co-aggregation index to explore spatio-temporal changes of the co-agglomeration between manufacturing and producer services in 30 provinces of China from 2004 to 2019. Furthermore, we use spatial Durbin model to analyze the impact of industrial co-agglomeration on air pollution reduction. We find that (1) the co-agglomeration index varies remarkably at spatio-temporal scale; (2) high co-agglomeration index is mainly distributed in eastern and central China, while low co-agglomeration index is mainly located in the western region; (3) the co-agglomeration index presents a cluster pattern among provinces, with the cluster of high value in eastern China and the cluster of low value in western China; and (4) the co-agglomeration between manufacturing and producer services is proven effetely to reduce air pollution, which is accompanied with spatial spillover effect. We also provided policy implications in line with diverse industries, multi hierarchies, and different regions, promoting the coordination of manufacturing and producer services and improving air quality.

Effectively managing fresh food supply chains (FFSCs) has long been a big challenge owing to the complexity in practice. Adoption of innovative technologies, blockchain traceability (BT), and cold-chain preservation (CP) technology to improve the efficiency of FFSC management has attracted much attention practically and academically. Distinct from existing studies, this paper provides a specific insight into the application of these two technologies by taking into account their functions in restraining misreporting behavior with BT technology due to its traceability and transparency and improving the freshness with CP technology based on the investment in fresh preservation equipment. With this in mind, this paper develops game theoretic models to identify the conditions under which technologies are the optimal selection for the supplier/retailer. It assumes that the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. The key findings show that: (1) with the foci to eliminate suppliers’ misreporting behavior and minimize the incentive fees, BT investment can increase prices and promote order quantities and demand; (2) only when the consumers demonstrate “appropriate” sensitivity to freshness, a win–win situation can be achieved without adoption of BT technology; and (3) suppliers are not keen to invest in BT or CP technology when the circulation time is short, while retailers prefer to invest in CP technology when the circulation time is long.

Trade-in strategy is a common mode of promotion for firms taking part in the circular economy because it encourages consumers to buy remanufactured products, via a “trade-old-for-remanufactured” framework. This paper studies trade-in strategy by developing game models for a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and two independent remanufacturers. The former is responsible for producing and selling new products and the latter two compete with each other for the collection of used products and the sales of remanufactured products. Unlike the extant literature, this paper focuses on the competition between two independent remanufacturers (IRs) and studies on how holder segment (whether or not to own used products) and competition affects the trade-in strategy. It finds that the proportion of holders on the remanufactured product prices of the IR1 and IR2 have a negative correlation. Conversely, the impact of the proportion of holders on the IR1’s and IR2’s demands (and on their profits) is the opposite. The trade-in strategy generates more benefits for the IR1 only when the proportion of holders is sufficiently high. In addition, when consumers experience a greater difference in durability between remanufactured products and original new products, trade-in strategy is more welcomed by consumers, which in turn, generates more benefits for the IR1.