With each new technology generation, the available resources on Field Programmable Gate Arrays increase, making them more attractive for partial access from multiple users. They get increasingly adopted as accelerators in various application domains, embedded in shared Systems on Chip or remote cloud services. Thus, some recent works have already explored Denial-of-Service and side-channel attacks, where an FPGA fabric is shared among multiple users. In this work, we show how fault attacks can be launched within an FPGA, through software-provided bitstreams alone. Excessive voltage drops can be generated from legitimate logic mapped into the FPGA to cause timing faults, reaching from spatially and logically isolated partitions of one to another user of the FPGA fabric. To cause this voltage drop, we first show how specific patterns to activate Ring Oscillators can cause timing failures in simple test designs on various FPGA boards. Subsequently, we analyze and adapt an existing fault model for the Advanced Encryption Standard to match the accuracy of our fault attack. In the same multi-user scenario, we show as a proof-of-concept how a successful Differential Fault Analysis attack on an AES module can be launched. We perform experiments on three FPGA boards of the same model and confirm that the attack adapts to all systems and is successful under process variation, but with different susceptibility to faults. The paper is concluded by validating the attack on another platform, and analyzing the vulnerability based on a timing analysis, proving the applicability to different devices.
A rising trend is the use of multi-tenant FPGAs, particularly in cloud environments, where partial access to the hardware is given to multiple third parties. This leads to new types of attacks in FPGAs, which operate not only on the logic level, but also on the electrical level through the common power delivery network. Since FPGAs are configured from the software-side, attackers are enabled to launch hardware attacks from software, impacting the security of an entire system. In this article, we show the first attempt of a countermeasure against attacks on the electrical level, which is based on a bitstream checking methodology. Bitstreams are translated back into flat technology mapped netlists, which are then checked for properties that indicate potential malicious runtime behavior of FPGA logic. Our approach can provide a metric of potential risk of the FPGA bitstream being used in active fault or passive side-channel attacks against other users of the FPGA fabric or the entire SoC platform.
Dynamic and partial reconfiguration together with hardware parallelism make FPGAs attractive as virtualized accelerators. However, recently it has been shown that multi-tenant FPGAs are vulnerable to remote side-channel attacks (SCA) from malicious users, allowing them to extract secret keys without a logical connection to the victim core. Typical mitigations against such attacks are hiding and masking schemes, to increase attackers' efforts in terms of side-channel measurements. However, they require significant efforts and tailoring for a specific algorithm, hardware implementation and mapping. In this paper, we show a hiding countermeasure against voltage-based SCA that can be integrated into any implementation, without requiring modifications or tailoring to the protected module. We place a properly mapped Active Fence of ring oscillators between victim and attacker circuit, enabled as a feedback of an FPGA-based sensor, leading to reduced side-channel leakage. Our experimental results based on a Lattice ECP5 FPGA and an AES-128 module show that two orders of magnitude more traces are needed for a successful key recovery, while no modifications to the underlying cryptographic module are necessary.
As FPGAs are used in cloud applications they reveal new challenges in cloud security, in which the FPGA-mapped design can compromise the security of other FPGA tenants. In this work, we show that programmable resources of an FPGA can be utilized to perform side channel attacks. More precisely, we develop internal sensors which are based on programmable primitives, and transfer the internally-measured side-channel leakages outside. These are distributed and calibrated delay sensors which can indirectly measure voltage fluctuations due to power consumption. By means of a cryptographic core as a case study, we present different settings and parameters for our employed sensors. Using their side-channel measurements, we further exhibit practical keyrecovery attacks confirming the applicability of the underlying measurement methodology. This opens a new door to integrate hardware Trojans in a) applications where the FPGA is remotely accessible, such as in the cloud and b) multi-tenant FPGAs, where the reconfigurable resources are shared among different users. This type of attack is highly difficult to detect, since there is no signal connection between targeted (cryptographic) core and the internally-deployed sensors.