Roberto Metere

Mr. Roberto Metere

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 May 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AAAydin Abadi
Aydin Abadi
STSotirios Terzis
Sotirios Terzis
RMRoberto Metere
Roberto Metere
CDChangyu Dong
Changyu Dong
Private set intersection (PSI) is an essential cryptographic protocol that has many real world applications. As cloud computing power and popularity have been swiftly growing, it is now desirable to leverage the cloud to store private datasets and delegate PSI computation to it. Although a set of efficient PSI protocols have been designed, none support outsourcing of the datasets and the computation. In this paper, we propose two protocols for delegated PSI computation on outsourced private datasets. Our protocols have a unique combination of properties that make them particularly appealing for a cloud computing setting. Our first protocol, O-PSI, satisfies these properties by using additive homomorphic encryption and point-value polynomial representation of a set. Our second protocol, EO-PSI, is mainly based on a hash table and point-value polynomial representation and it does not require public key encryption; meanwhile, it retains all the desirable properties and is much more efficient than the first one. We also provide a formal security analysis of the two protocols in the semi-honest model and we analyze their performance utilizing prototype implementations we have developed. Our performance analysis shows that EO-PSI scales well and is also more efficient than similar state-of-the-art protocols for large set sizes.

1 July 2018 in Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TLTao Li
Tao Li
Brij GuptaBrij Gupta
Brij Gupta
RMRoberto Metere
Roberto Metere

6 August 2017
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
RMRoberto Metere
Roberto Metere
CDChangyu Dong
Changyu Dong
Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol, proving its security properties of correctness, perfect hiding, and computational binding. To formally verify the protocol, we extended the theory of EasyCrypt, a framework which allows for reasoning in the computational model, to support the discrete logarithm and an abstraction of commitment protocols. Commitments are building blocks of many cryptographic constructions, for example, verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting. Our work paves the way for the verification of those more complex constructions.

16 May 2022 in Applied Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Ricardo Melo CzeksterRicardo Melo Czekster
Ricardo Melo Czekster
RMRoberto Metere
Roberto Metere
CMCharles Morisset
Charles Morisset
Active buildings can be briefly described as smart buildings with distributed and renewable energy resources able to energise other premises in their neighbourhood. As their energy capacity is significant, they can provide ancillary services to the traditional power grid. As such, they can be a worthy target of cyber-attacks potentially more devastating than if targeting traditional smart buildings. Furthermore, to handshake energy transfers, they need additional communications that add up to their attack surface. In such a context, security analysis would benefit from collection of cyber threat intelligence (CTI). To facilitate the analysis, we provide a base active building model in STIX in the tool cyberaCTIve that handles complex models. Active buildings are expected to implement standard network security measures, such as intrusion-detection systems. However, to timely respond to incidents, real-time detection should promptly update CTI, as it would significantly speed up the understanding of the nature of incidents and, as such, allow for a more effective response. To fill this gap, we propose an extension to the tool cyberaCTIve with a web service able to accept (incursion) feeds in real-time and apply the necessary modifications to a STIX model of interest.

30 July 2020 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FHFeng Hao
Feng Hao
SWShen Wang
Shen Wang
SBSamiran Bag
Samiran Bag
RPRob Procter
Rob Procter
Siamak F. ShahandashtiSiamak F. Shahandashti
Siamak F. Shahandashti
LLLana Y.J. Liu
Lana Y.J. Liu

26 November 2024
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
KYKangfeng Ye
Kangfeng Ye
RMRoberto Metere
Roberto Metere
PYPoonam Yadav
Poonam Yadav