In recent years, the phenomenon of religious radicalism has become alarming, including the increasing number of youth involved in violence and terrorism. The university has now become a significant environment for the spreading of radical ideology. In Indonesia, for example, students at seven prominent public universities have been significantly exposed to radical groups. This article discusses religious radicalism among such Muslim students, on the basis of research at these seven universities. It refers to these educated youth who have been radicalized as ‘newbies’, not only because they recently embraced a radical viewpoint, but also because they were easily deradicalized, that is, they left behind their newly embraced ideology. The article underlines how these youth were deradicalized as a result of their rejection of the dogmatic ideologies and practices of absolutist Islamic groups. It argues that there is no direct connection between religious radicalism and violent terrorism, and that radicalized youth have an opportunity to question the impact of their involvement in the radical networks on themselves and others and deradicalize themselves without necessarily ascribing to the kind of religious understanding promoted by the state.

This article discusses a different side of two controversial fatwas — one against Muslims participating in Christmas celebrations and the other against pluralism, liberalism and secularism — issued by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Council of Indonesian Ulama). Most studies on MUI have emphasised the role that the Council's fatwas have played in inciting sectarian violence in Indonesia. Without denying the connections between violence and the MUI fatwas, this article argues that these controversial fatwas have also opened up room for more fruitful and constructive discussions among different religious groups in Indonesia. This article asks: What were the roots of the controversy over these intolerant fatwas? How did the state respond to them? And what does the controversy over these fatwas tell us about the nature of public debate on Islam in Indonesia? By answering these questions this article will shed light on aspects of contemporary Indonesian public debates about Islam that have been overlooked in current scholarship.

This article examines the radicalization of young adults in relation to internet access and the social media content produced and managed by radical groups in Indonesia. Some of the research problems that become the major concern of this article were how young people respond to the internet and social media that provide radical content, how they find out about and access the content, what their purposes are for accessing radical content, and what they do with the radical content. The data discussed in this article were obtained from surveys and interviews with 700 students from seven state universities in Indonesia who were allegedly exposed to radicalism, according to the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). The state universities that became research locations were the University of Indonesia (UI), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Bogor Agriculture University (IPB), Diponegoro University (Undip), the Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology (ITS), Universitas Airlangga (UNAIR), and the University of Brawijaya (UB). This study revealed that in addition to accessing and consuming various radical content, some students also acted as prosumers. That is, they did not only read, but also produced information related to radicalization, and then recirculated it via social media.

The term ulū’l-amr (those in authority) is central to the Muslim understanding of leadership, although it has been understood differently by different scholars. The term appears twice in the Qur’an, namely in verses 59 and 83 of chapter 4 (sūrat al-Nisā’), which serve as the cornerstone and starting point of the entire religious, social, and political structure of Islam. This article carefully examines early Muslim exegesis of the Qur’anic ulū’l-amr and how the two verses have become the locus classicus of intra-Muslim polemics. The main point of this article is to trace the early development of the meaning of ulū’l-amr in the exegetical works (tafsīr) of both Sunni and Shi‘i Qur’an commentators during the first 600 years of Islamic history. It will be argued that it is chiefly in the tafsīr tradition that the meaning and identity of ulū’l-amr is negotiated, promoted, and contested. The diversity of Muslim interpretations and the different trajectories of Sunni and Shi‘i exegesis, as well as the process of exegetical systematization, are highlighted. While Sunni exegetes seem to engage with one another internally, Shi‘i commentators tend to polemicize Sunni exegesis to uphold their version of ulū’l-amr as infallible imams (leaders).

This special issue navigates crucial concerns facing plural societies today. Pluralism constitutes an important feature of modern society and poses challenges that must be taken seriously and trans...