We have attempted to theorize and empirically demonstrate the moderating effects of three external monitors (institutional investors, securities analysts, and external auditors) on the relationship between tax planning and firm performance. We propose that these monitors can affect either the form or the strength of that relationship. Data cover 73 companies listed in the Euronext 100 index for the period from 2008 to 2012. Empirical analyses are conducted using various statistical tools to identify the presence of moderator variables. Most importantly, results showed that institutional investors, securities analysts and external auditors moderate the form of the tax planning-performance relationship; it appears they involve themselves directly in the firms’ tax decisions. Interestingly, we find evidence that these external monitors moderate the strength of the tax planning-performance relationship; that is, they may indirectly influence the effectiveness of firm tax strategic. Our results are insensitive to alternative measures of firm performance, to additional control variables and to alternative specifications. Our paper offers two contributions to corporate governance research. First, against a backdrop of increased attention on firms’ tax planning, it provides empirical evidences concerning the nature and significance of the potential moderating effects of select external monitors on the relationship between tax planning and firm performance. Second, there is little attention about external monitors in research studies. In fact, this issue is not addressed in the literature within a European context using recent data.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of board structure on the performance of French firms in the presence of several monitoring committees. We studied 80 publicly listed French firms spanning from 2001 to 2013. We concluded that large board size has a negative effect on market performance. While large board size in combination with the existence of at least three committees enhances accounting performance and does not have any impact on market performance, the existence of a board dominated by independent directors with the presence of at least three committees seems to have only a negative impact on accounting performance. Our findings indicate that monitoring committees are beneficial for shareholders only for corporations with a large board size.

The aim of our research is to investigate whether good governance is associated with higher credit rating in Japanese firms. Mainly, this research seeks for the examination of the effect of governance attributes namely those related to the board and ownership structure also quality of information on credit ratings. Empirical analyses are conducted from a sample of 75 Japanese firms listed on Topix 100, over the period 2006- 2013 using Ordered Probit regression. The study shows that good governance is associated with higher credit rating and suggests that active monitoring by independent directors and better disclosure mitigate agency conflicts and protect the interests of debtholders.