China is implementing increasing stringent command‐and‐control environmental regulations to achieve high‐quality development. However, we have limited understanding about whether such policies are effective. This study selects the policy of China’s National Environmental Protection “Eleventh Five‐Year Plan” as a quasi‐natural experiment and uses the difference‐in‐differences (DID) method to analyze the effect of stricter command‐controlled environmental regulations on total factor productivity from the enterprise level. Our results indicate that stricter command‐and‐control environmental regulation promotes TFP of enterprises throughout the country. This effect is even greater in long‐established, large‐scale, or low capital density enterprises. In addition, stricter command‐and‐control environmental regulation has a greater positive effect on the TFP of companies in industries with high pollution intensity and fierce competition. Furthermore, government transformation and market green preference will magnify the positive effect of stricter command‐and‐control environmental regulation on corporate TFP. Moreover, stricter command‐and‐control environmental regulation promotes the growth of enterprise TFP mainly by improving the efficiency of resource allocation within and between enterprises, rather than stimulating innovation. Local governments should refine pollution control policies, optimize the external environment, and enhance the innovation power of enterprises.

Most studies on supply chain coordination assume that consumers are rational. However, with the development of e-commerce, consumer-bounded rationality has become an important issue with respect to supply chain coordination. Based on the assumption that some consumers are loyal to the offline shop and others are reference-dependent, this article examines the mechanism of vertical restraints and their competitive effects. This research study found that compared with the assumption of rational consumers used in previous literature, vertical restraints help internalize the “channel price gap externality” when consumers are loss averse. When separately operating, the offline shop will set a higher price due to its consumers’ higher loyalty and willingness to pay. However, given the positive externality of this price to the online retail sales, the offline price is still lower than the level under vertical integration. When the upstream manufacturer achieves supply chain coordination with vertical restraint contracts, the channel price gap externality is internalized, and the channel price gap expands to stimulate loss-averse consumers’ purchasing decisions.