Home control system (HCS) helps to monitor and control the home appliances as well as security aspects of the digital home that is expected to be the standard for the future home. Chiefly, HCS is an integration of home appliance control systems (HACS) and home security systems (HSS). HACS enables the home-owner to control appliances such as stove, refrigerator, air-conditioner, and the like, remotely, while the HSS helps to monitor the status of various networked security devices in the home and control certain aspects of the devices. Monitoring and control may be done by a personal digital device such as a laptop, PDA, telephone, or even a cell phone. One of the technologies widely used by HCS to connect the home controller with the appliances, equipments, and devices, is the X10 protocol that uses power lines for data transmission. In this paper we analyze the performance of power lines for HCS and suggest recommendations that will help increase the performance of HCS.

This paper addresses the challenge of measuring security, understood as a system property, of cyberphysical systems, in the category of similar properties, such as safety and reliability. First, it attempts to define precisely what security, as a system property, really is. Then, an application context is presented, in terms of an attack surface in cyberphysical systems. Contemporary approaches related to the principles of measuring software properties are also discussed, with emphasis on building models. These concepts are illustrated in several case studies, based on previous work of the authors, to conduct experimental security measurements.

Homes of the future are expected to be "digital" homes wherein almost all aspects of a home could be controlled using advanced computer technology. One important component of the digital home is the home security system (HSS) that helps to monitor and control various elements related to home security. HSS may be classified into different types including passive systems (PS), phone based systems (PBS), web-based systems (WBS), and hardware-based systems (HBS), where each system differs in performance, controllability, security, and cost. For the success of an HSS the most important characteristics, or non-functional requirements, are performance and security - however, it is almost impossible to have both high security and high performance at the same time. In order to achieve both these non-functional requirements at the same time we adopted the concept of perimeter security from the fields of homeland security and network security to HSS wherein different areas of the house are divided into perimeters and each perimeter uses a different type of HSS to provide security. Preliminary results indicate that both high security and high performance can be achieved using the perimeter-based approach; however, this achievement comes at the cost of high price-tag for the development and maintenance of the system, and an increase in the overall complexity of the system.

The objective of this research is to shed light on the applicability of the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) Approach to the concept of control chains for the combined analysis of safety and security of SCADA systems and, more generally, to computer systems used in automation, including functional safety and security standards. The paper discusses the concept of control chains, presents an overview of the NFR Approach, and applies this approach to the safety and security analysis of control chains in a case study of the automatic control of the hydrocarbon tank pressure control system.

Digital homes are expected to be the standard in the near future when all aspects of the home can be monitored and controlled remotely by the home owner. For example, if the home owner is unsure whether she closed the garage door before leaving for work, she can view the status of the garage door on her portable computing device such as laptop, PDA or cell phone, and if the garage door is indeed open, she can close it remotely from the same device. A chief requirement for this eventuality is proper visualization of the status as well as ability to control remotely. Among the more important aspects to be visualized for the digital home is ldquohome safetyrdquo which lets the home owner know the current safety level of her home and reasons therefor. Current trends in home safety visualization provide separate interfaces for each device at home: home alarm system has its own Web interface different from that provided by a home security camera. Visualizing home safety based on the data from different devices is not only labor and time consuming, but the decision regarding safety also needs to be made by the home owner. Moreover, current systems are bandwidth intensive and require expertise on the part of the home owner for proper usage. We have developed a novel home safety visualization technique called SaViT (safety visualization technique) that not only provides an integrated safety view of the home but also automates safety computation and is extremely easy to use.

In the process of designing safety systems, an integrated approach in safety and cybersecurity analysis is necessary. The paper describes a new technique of increasing resilience through integrated analysis of functional safety and cybersecurity. It is a modeling methodology based on the combination of the multifactor method utilizing modified risk graphs, used previously for Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment, and the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) approach. The NFR approach, based on the analysis of graphical representation of conceptual and physical components of the system, contributes a technique to include cybersecurity through the Softgoal Interdependency Graph. The assessment methodology is outlined in detail and applied to a case study involving an industrial control system. The analysis turns out to be effective in both aspects: confirming the findings of the multifactor approach based on modified risk graphs and complementing the traditional analysis to increase resilience in discovering and mitigating security vulnerabilities for SIL assessment by the use of NFR.