Changning District of Shanghai pioneered in implementing Family Doctor and Medical Insurance Payment Coordination Reform. The survey aimed to assess the effect of the reform to provide a decision-making basis for ensuring the “gatekeeper” role of the family doctor. A cross-sectional survey was conducted using a self-designed questionnaire in Changning District of Shanghai during January and February in 2014. Multi-stage random cluster was applied and 3040 residents were selected. Comparisons were made with statistically test between the contracted and non-contracted residents in four policy targeted dimensions, doctor-visiting behavior, health management and status, medical cost control and satisfaction. Compared with the non-contracted residents, the contracted residents (72.9%) presented a higher prevalence rate of chronic diseases (32.6%), a higher proportion (51.9%) in first-contact in the community health service center and a higher proportion to refer to specialists as well (P < 0.001).The result showed that the average annual medical expense were significantly higher than non-contracted residents (P < 0.001), however, the difference disappeared after age, medical insurance and other socio-demographic variables were controlled. In terms of self-management of non-communicable diseases and complication prevention, the blood pressure control rate and blood glucose control rate for the contracted group were also higher than the counterparts, reaching up to 85.6 and 72.7% respectively. The preliminary analysis indicated that the contracted residents performed better in orderly doctor visiting behavior, health management behavior, health status and satisfaction. Follow up survey is necessary to further analyze the policy effect.

Studies globally have provided substantial evidence that PHC could conduct doctor-visiting behaviors, control medical expense, and improve population health. This study aimed to map how family doctor (FD) in Shanghai achieved gate-keeper goals including health management, medical expense control, and conducting ordered doctor-visiting behavior. A total of 2754 and 1995 valid questionnaires were collected in 2013 and 2016 respectively in Shanghai. The data were analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM). Invariance analysis was also performed for 2 waves of data. We found that the coefficient of cognition on health management (β₅ = 0.26, P < .05) was larger than that of signing with FD (β₄ = 0.06, P < .05). SEM model also showed that first-contact at community health service center (CHSC) had a positive effect on health management (β₆ = 0.30, P < .05), and the latter also affected health management results positively (β₈ = 0.39, P < .05), suggesting that the path for FD was through first-contact and health management. Besides, the gate-keeper role of medical expense control was significant through the first-contact (β₁₀ = −0.12, P < .05) mediation rather than health management (β₉ = 0.03, P > .05). The model fit was acceptable (RMSEA = 0.033). A “cognition-behavior-outcomes (health and medical expense)” path of FD’s gate-keeper role was found. It is necessary to consolidate FD contracted services rather than reimbursement discount the latter of which is proved to be unsustainable.