This study presents a methodology of a quantitative risk assessment for the scenario of an onboard hydrogen storage tank rupture and tunnel fire incident. The application of the methodology is demonstrated on a road tunnel. The consequence analysis is carried out for the rupture of a 70 MPa, 62.4-litre hydrogen storage tank in a fire, that has a thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD) failed or blocked during an incident. Scenarios with two states of charge (SoC) of the tank, i.e., SoC = 99% and SoC = 59%, are investigated. The risks in terms of fatalities per vehicle per year and the cost per incident are assessed. It is found that for the reduction in the risk with the hydrogen-powered vehicle in a road tunnel fire incident to the acceptable level of 10⁻⁵ fatality/vehicle/year, the fire-resistance rating (FRR) of the hydrogen storage tank should exceed 84 min. The FRR increase to this level reduces the societal risk to an acceptable level. The increase in the FRR to 91 min reduces the risk in terms of the cost of the incident to GBP 300, following the threshold cost of minor injury published by the UK Health and Safety Executive. The Frequency–Number (F–N) of the fatalities curve is developed to demonstrate the effect of mitigation measures on the risk reduction to socially acceptable levels. The performed sensitivity study confirms that with the broad range of input parameters, including the fire brigade response time, the risk of rupture of standard hydrogen tank-TPRD systems inside the road tunnel is unacceptable. One of the solutions enabling an inherently safer use of hydrogen-powered vehicles in tunnels is the implementation of breakthrough safety technology—the explosion free in a fire self-venting (TPRD-less) tanks.

The use of hydrogen storage tanks at 100% of nominal working pressure (NWP) is expected only after refuelling. Driving between refuellings is characterised by the state of charge SoC <100%. There is experimental evidence that Type IV tanks tested in a fire at initial pressures below 1/3 NWP, leaked without rupture. This paper aims at understanding this phenomenon. The numerical research has demonstrated that the heat transfer from fire through the composite overwrap at storage pressures below NWP/3 is sufficient to melt the polymer liner. This melting initiates hydrogen microleaks through the composite before it loses the load-bearing ability. The fire-resistance rating (FRR) is defined as the time to rupture in a fire of a tank without or with blocked thermally activated pressure relief device. The dependence of a FRR on the SoC is demonstrated for the tanks with defined material properties and volumes in the range of 36–244 L. A composite wall thickness variation is shown to cause a safety issue by reducing the tank’s FRR and is suggested to be addressed by tank manufacturers and OEMs. The effect of a tank’s burst pressure ratio on the FRR is investigated. Thermal parameters of the composite wall, i.e., decomposition heat and temperatures, are shown in simulations of a tank failure in a fire to play an important role in its FRR.

CFD modelling of compressed hydrogen fuelling provides information on the hydrogen and tank structure temperature dynamics required for onboard storage tank design and fuelling protocol development. This study compares five turbulence models to develop a strategy for cost-effective CFD simulations of hydrogen fuelling while maintaining a simulation accuracy acceptable for engineering analysis: RANS models k-ε and RSM; hybrid models SAS and DES; and LES model. Simulations were validated against the fuelling experiment of a Type IV 29 L tank available in the literature. For RANS with wall functions and blended models with near-wall treatment, the simulated average hydrogen temperatures deviated from the experiment by 1–3% with CFL ≈ 1–3 and dimensionless wall distance y⁺ ≈ 50–500 in the tank. To provide a similar simulation accuracy, the LES modelling approach with near-wall treatment requires mesh with wall distance y⁺ ≈ 2–10 and demonstrates the best-resolved flow field with larger velocity and temperature gradients. LES simulation on this mesh, however, implies a ca. 60 times longer CPU time compared to the RANS modelling approach and 9 times longer compared to the hybrid models due to the time step limit enforced by the CFL ≈ 1.0 criteria. In all cases, the simulated pressure histories and inlet mass flow rates have a difference within 1% while the average heat fluxes and maximum hydrogen temperature show a difference within 10%. Compared to LES, the k-ε model tends to underestimate and DES tends to overestimate the temperature gradient inside the tank. The results of RSM and SAS are close to those of LES albeit of 8–9 times faster simulations.