Christiana Chamon

Ms. Christiana Chamon

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 December 2023 in arXiv
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SFSarah A. Flanery
Sarah A. Flanery
KMKamalesh Mohanasundar
Kamalesh Mohanasundar
CCChristiana Chamon
Christiana Chamon
SKSrujan Kotikela
Srujan Kotikela
FQFrancis K. Quek
Francis K. Quek
With the natural evolution of the web, the need for decentralization has rendered the current centralized education system out of date. The student does not "own" their credentials, as the only way their accomplishments are directly linked to their person and considered valuable is by verification through a stamp of an expensive, prestigious institution. However, going to a university is no longer the only way to acquire an education; open-source learning material is widely available and accessible through the internet. However, our society does not deem these methods of education as verifiable if they do not include a degree or certificate. Additionally, a valid certificate for the vast majority of open-source courses costs a few hundred dollars to obtain. The centralized nature of education inadvertently places students in underprivileged communities at a disadvantage in comparison to students in economically advantaged communities, thus a decentralized approach to education would eliminate the vast majority of such discrepancies. In the present paper, we integrate Decentralized Identity (DID) with Web 3.0 to upload credentials linked directly to the user. Each credential is appended to an Ethereum blockchain that, by design, cannot be altered once uploaded. We include DID document based access controls to display the candidate's upload and verification history. Finally, we utilize TLS protocols to provide a secure connection to the internet for ensuring non-fungibility of credentials and authentication of users.

21 May 2020 in arXiv
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CCChristiana Chamon
Christiana Chamon
SFShahriar Ferdous
Shahriar Ferdous
Laszlo KishLaszlo Kish
Laszlo Kish
This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.

28 December 2023 in arXiv
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CCChristiana Chamon
Christiana Chamon
KMKamalesh Mohanasundar
Kamalesh Mohanasundar
SFSarah A. Flanery
Sarah A. Flanery
FQFrancis K. Quek
Francis K. Quek
This paper presents a statistical physical generation of random keys for a decentralized identity ecosystem that uses Web 3.0 protocols. Web 3.0 is driven by secure keys, typically represented in hexadecimal, that are pseudo-randomly generated by an initialization vector and complex computational algorithms. We demonstrate that the statistical physical Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme eliminates the additional computational power by naturally generating truly random binary keys to drive the creation of decentralized identifiers (DIDs) that are appended to an Ethereum blockchain.

9 October 2020 in arXiv
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SFShahriar Ferdous
Shahriar Ferdous
CCChristiana Chamon
Christiana Chamon
Laszlo KishLaszlo Kish
Laszlo Kish
In (Nature) Science Report 5 (2015) 13653, Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl (VMG) introduce a new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger that operates with 4 arbitrary resistors (instead of 2 arbitrary resistance values forming 2 identical resistor pairs in the original system). They state that in this new, VMG-KLJN, non-equilibrium system with nonzero power flow, the security during the exchange of the two (HL and LH) bit values is as strong as in the original KLJN scheme. Moreover, they claim that, at practical conditions, their VMG-KLJN protocol "supports more robust protection against attacks". First, we investigate the power flow and thermal equilibrium issues of the VMG-KLJN system with 4 arbitrary resistors. Then we introduce a new KLJN protocol that allows the arbitrary choice of 3 resistors from the 4, while it still operates with zero power flow during the exchange of single bits by utilizing a specific value of the 4th resistor and a binary temperature set for the exchanged (HL and LH) bit values. Then we show that, in general, the KLJN schemes with more than 2 arbitrary resistors (including our new protocol mentioned above) are prone to 4 new passive attacks utilizing the parasitic capacitance and inductance in the cable, while the original KLJN scheme is naturally immune against these new attacks. The core of the security vulnerability exploited by these attacks is the different line resistances in the HL and LH cases. Therefore, on the contrary of the statement and claim cited above, the practical VMG-KLJN system is less secure than the original KLJN scheme. We introduce another 2, modified, non-equilibrium KLJN systems to eliminate the vulnerability against some - but not all - of these attacks. However the price for that is the loss of arbitrariness of the selection of the 4th resistor and the information leak still remains greater than zero.

13 November 2022 in arXiv
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SFShahriar Ferdous
Shahriar Ferdous
CCChristiana Chamon
Christiana Chamon
Laszlo KishLaszlo Kish
Laszlo Kish
In this paper, the vulnerability of the Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl (VMG)- Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Key Exchanger (Nature, Science Report 5 (2015) 13653) against two active attacks is demonstrated. The security vulnerability arises from the fact that the effective driving impedances are different between the HL and LH cases for the VMG-KLJN scheme; whereas for the ideal KLJN scheme they are same. Two defense schemes are shown against these attacks but each of them can protect against only one of the attack types; but not against the two attacks simultaneously. The theoretical results are confirmed by computer simulations.

22 May 2020 in arXiv
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MMMutaz Melhem
Mutaz Melhem
CCChristiana Chamon
Christiana Chamon
SFShahriar Ferdous
Shahriar Ferdous
LKLaszlo B. Kish
Laszlo B. Kish
A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise(KLJN) secure key exchange scheme is introduced. The attack exploits a parasitic (periodic) AC voltage-source at either Alice or Bob ends. Such situations exist due to AC ground loops and electromagnetic interference (EMI). In the low-frequency case, the procedure is the generalized form of the former DC ground loop based attack. In the high-frequency case, the power spectrum of the wire voltage is utilized. The attack is demonstrated in both the low and the high-frequency situations. Defense protocols against the attack are also discussed.