Arthur Glenberg

Dr. Arthur Glenberg

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

51Years (1976-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2002 in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
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AGArthur Glenberg
Arthur Glenberg
MKMichael P. Kaschak
Michael P. Kaschak
We report a new phenomenon associated with language comprehension: theaction—sentence compatibility effect (ACE). Participants judged whether sentences were sensible by making a response that required moving toward or away from their bodies. When a sentence implied action in one direction (e.g., “Close the drawer” implies action away from the body), the participants had difficulty making a sensibility judgment requiring a response in the opposite direction. The ACE was demonstrated for three sentences types: imperative sentences, sentences describing the transfer of concrete objects, and sentences describing the transfer of abstract entities, such as “Liz told you the story.” These data are inconsistent with theories of language comprehension in which meaning is represented as a set of relations among nodes. Instead, the data support an embodied theory of meaning that relates the meaning of sentences to human action.

1 March 1997 in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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AGArthur Glenberg
Arthur Glenberg
Let's start from scratch in thinking about what memory is for, and consequently, how it works. Suppose that memory and conceptualization work in the service of perception and action. In this case, conceptualization is the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction with a three-dimensional world. These patterns are constrained by the structure of the environment, the structure of our bodies, and memory. Thus, how we perceive and conceive of the environment is determined by the types of bodies we have. Such a memory would not have associations. Instead, how concepts become related (and what it means to be related) is determined by how separate patterns of actions can be combined given the constraints of our bodies. I call this combination “mesh.” To avoid hallucination, conceptualization would normally be driven by the environment, and patterns of action from memory would play a supporting, but automatic, role. A significant human skill is learning to suppress the overriding contribution of the environment to conceptualization, thereby allowing memory to guide conceptualization. The effort used in suppressing input from the environment pays off by allowing prediction, recollective memory, and language comprehension. I review theoretical work in cognitive science and empirical work in memory and language comprehension that suggest that it may be possible to investigate connections between topics as disparate as infantile amnesia and mental-model theory.

1 October 2000 in Journal of Memory and Language
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AGArthur Glenberg
Arthur Glenberg
DRDavid A Robertson
David A Robertson

1 February 1987 in Journal of Memory and Language
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Journal Article
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AGArthur Glenberg
Arthur Glenberg
MMMarion Meyer
Marion Meyer
KLKaren Lindem
Karen Lindem

1 July 2012 in Cortex
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AGArthur Glenberg
Arthur Glenberg
VGVittorio Gallese
Vittorio Gallese

1 July 1978 in Memory & Cognition
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SSSteven M. Smith
Steven M. Smith
AGArthur Glenberg
Arthur Glenberg
RBRobert A. Bjork
Robert A. Bjork