Konrad Talmont-Kamiński

Prof. Konrad Talmont-Kamiński

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Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 October 2014
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KTKonrad Talmont-Kamiński
Konrad Talmont-Kamiński
'Religion as Magical Ideology' examines the relationship between rationality and supernatural beliefs arguing that such beliefs are products of evolution, cognition and culture. The book does not offer a false rapprochement between reason and religion; instead, it explores their interrelationship as a series of complex adaptations between cognitive and cultural processes. Exploring the nature of the tension between religious traditions and reason, 'Religion as Magical Ideology' develops a dual inheritance theory of religion - which combines the cognitive byproduct and prosocial adaptation accounts - and analyses the connection between the function of a belief and the degree of protection it gets from potential counter-evidence. With discussion ranging from individual cognitive mechanisms, general functional considerations, to the limits of evolutionary and cognitive processes, the book offers readers a systematic account of how cognition shapes religious beliefs and practices.

14 October 2022 in Journal of Religion and Demography
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IPIvan Puga-Gonzalez
Ivan Puga-Gonzalez
DVDavid Voas
David Voas
ŁKŁukasz Kiszkiel
Łukasz Kiszkiel
RBRachel J. Bacon
Rachel J. Bacon
Wesley WildmanWesley Wildman
Wesley Wildman
F. LeRon ShultsF. LeRon Shults
F. LeRon Shults
This article presents a microsimulation that explores age, period, and cohort effects in the decline of religiosity in contemporary societies. The model implements a well-known and previously empirically validated theory of secularization that highlights the role of “fuzzy fidelity,” i.e., the percentage of a population whose religiosity is moderate (Voas 2009). Validation of the model involved comparing its simulation results to shifts in religiosity over 9 waves of the European Social Survey. Simulation experiments suggest that a cohort effect, based on weakened transmission of religiosity as a function of the social environment, appears to be the best explanation for secularization in the societies studied, both for the population as a whole and for the proportions of religious, fuzzy, and secular people.

4 May 2020 in Journal of Cognition and Culture
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KTKonrad Talmont-Kamiński
Konrad Talmont-Kamiński
Both science and religion are human endeavours that recruit and modify pre-existing human capacity to engage in epistemic vigilance. However, while science relies upon a focus on content vigilance, religion focusses on source vigilance. This difference is due, in turn, to the function of religious claims not being connected to their accuracy – unlike the function of scientific claims. Understanding this difference helps to understand many aspects of scientific and religious institutions.

1 January 2013
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KTKonrad Talmont-Kamiński
Konrad Talmont-Kamiński
This chapter explores the noncognitive functions of superempirical beliefs and analyzes the different attitudes of science and pseudoscience toward intuitive beliefs. It addresses the following questions: Why are pseudoscientific (as well as supernatural) beliefs so hard to eliminate? What is the difference between supernatural and pseudoscientific beliefs? What is the difference between pseudoscientific and scientific beliefs?

30 June 2022 in Slovenský národopis / Slovak Ethnology
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VBVladimír Bahna
Vladimír Bahna
KTKonrad Talmont-Kamiński
Konrad Talmont-Kamiński

13 October 2016 in Frontiers in Psychology
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KTKonrad Talmont-Kamiński
Konrad Talmont-Kamiński
A commentary on Religious credence is not factual belief by Van Leeuwen, N. (2014). Cognition 133, 698–715. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.015 Van Leeuwen (2014) claims religious credences are not factual beliefs. He holds that while factual beliefs alone (i) guide behavior in all relevant practical settings, (ii) support inferences between religious credences and (iii) are evidentially vulnerable; religious credences instead (a) have a perceived normative orientation, (b) are open to free elaboration and (c) are vulnerable to special authority. However, it is relatively easy to think of potential counterexamples to that seemingly neat dichotomy, as Van Leeuwen allows. Thus, rituals—such as rain dances—often have purported mundane effects that render beliefs regarding them evidentially vulnerable. The beliefs regarding such rituals must support inferences between factual claims about the details of the ritual to be performed and its efficacy, and certainly do guide ritual behavior in the relevant practical setting. The literature on ritual failure seems to bear out such a more heterogenous view of religious beliefs (Hüsken, 2007). Yet, it is not easy to judge the significance of such examples. Van Leeuwen is right to point out, after all, that claims normally deemed to be religious may have the traits of factual claims and vice versa. But, while undoubtedly true, this view has much scope for abuse along the lines of the no-true-Scotsman objection and, therefore, must be used advisedly when dealing with potential counterexamples. More importantly, Van Leeuwen does not really provide any evidence that the triplets of traits he identifies do regularly co-occur in the property space occupied by various propositional attitudes. He merely provides suggestions as to why some of the traits may co-occur. To show that a relatively clear distinction does exist—that factual beliefs and religious credences are clearly separable attractor positions in this space—it would be necessary to plot a representative sample of propositional attitudes in the property space and see whether they do cluster. What is more, such a study would need to be done cross-culturally, to avoid the possibility that the distinction is a WEIRD, post-secularization phenomenon (Henrich et al., 2010). To better appreciate the distinctions among propositional attitudes, however, I would suggest that it would be better to consider the underlying reasons for any differences in how people think about mundane claims (I will use the term “mundane” as it does not beg the question that religious claims are not factual) as opposed to religious claims, and ideologies in general. These differences are systematic, maintained by social and cultural institutions and exist for a very good reason. In evaluating claims made by others, people practice epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). This vigilance can focus on the content of the claim (as per iii) as well as the source (as per c). Thus, when someone tells us where a petrol station is, we can consider whether the location they name is plausible as well as whether they are likely to know it. Which factors are considered depends as much on the social and epistemic context of the claim as its content. Scientific institutions such as blind review tend to promote content vigilance, religious ones such as the notion of the sacred promote source vigilance, while everyday strategies tend to use a mix. Why should this be the case? A belief tradition that eschews content vigilance may maintain beliefs independently of their truth since they will be judged to be plausible simply because they are believed by others. This is important in the case of religions. Unlike most mundane beliefs, and similarly to ideologies, the function of religious beliefs (and ideological beliefs in general) appears to be to promote prosocial attitudes, at least in the case of the so-called “big god” religions (Norenzayan et al., 2016). However, prosocial functionality is not tied to the truth of belief, unlike the functionality of beliefs that directly guide behavior (Talmont-Kaminski, 2013). You get the benefit of finding a store only if you had accurate directions. But the benefits (reputation, future cooperation, etc.) from helping someone else find a store are accrued even if what motivated you to do it was false (belief in a vengeful god, for example). So, the threat of supernatural punishment can work independently of the existence of the supernatural (Johnson and Krüger, 2004). But, for it to work, it must be believed in—in the sense that people have to consider the punishment a real possibility. Yet, since prosocial functionality is not tied to truth, many prosocial beliefs will be false. This means two things: prosocial beliefs have to be protected against potential counterevidence; and people who are epistemically vigilant have to be provided with reasons to accept the beliefs. This is achieved by promoting source vigilance over content vigilance in the case of prosocial beliefs. The differences Van Leeuwen notes largely follow from this. Most obviously, focus on source vigilance makes prosocial beliefs, including religious beliefs, particularly vulnerable to authorities (c) and less so to evidence regarding the content (iii). Also, given their prosocial function, religious beliefs have a perceived normative orientation (a) and do not have the function to directly guide behavior (i). Finally, since logic is a major tool for content vigilance, drawing inferences (ii) is de-emphasized while, since the truth value of the claims is irrelevant to their function, elaboration upon them needn't be constrained (b). Does this mean that Van Leeuwen is right? Yes and no. He is pointing to a significant distinction. However, I would argue that it is less straight-forward than he'd like to think. More importantly, putting it in terms of a distinction between types of propositional attitudes makes it sound purely psychological, and ignores underlying social and epistemological differences. The terminological question of beliefs vs. credences is secondary to identifying those causes. However, as already noted, religious claims have to be firmly believed in, in order to motivate prosocial behavior. So, “credences” cannot be too different from ‘beliefs’, a conclusion also reached by Boudry and Coyne (2016) on the basis of a different argument. The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and approved it for publication. The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Boudry, M., and Coyne, J. (2016). Disbelief in belief: on the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs. Philos. Psychol. 29, 601–615. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1110852 CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar Henrich, J., Heine, S., and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 61–132. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X PubMed Abstract | CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar Hüsken, U. (2007). When Rituals Go Wrong: Mistakes, Failure, and the Dynamics of Ritual. Leiden: Brill. Google Scholar Johnson, D., and Krüger, O. (2004). The good of wrath. Polit. Theol. 5, 159–176. doi: 10.1558/poth.2004.5.2.159 CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., et al. (2016). The cultural evolution of prosocial religions. Behav. Brain Sci. 39, e1. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X14001356 PubMed Abstract | CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., et al. (2010). Epistemic vigilance. Mind Lang. 25, 359–393. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar Talmont-Kaminski, K. (2013). For God and country, not necessarily for truth. Monist 96, 447–461. doi: 10.5840/monist201396320 CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar Van Leeuwen, N. (2014). Religious credence is not factual belief. Cognition 133, 698–715. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.015 PubMed Abstract | CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar Keywords: religious credence, religious belief, prosocial belief, prosocial religion, science-religion distinction Citation: Talmont-Kaminski K (2016) Commentary: Religious credence is not factual belief. Front. Psychol. 7:1544. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01544 Received: 12 August 2016; Accepted: 22 September 2016; Published: 13 October 2016. Edited by: Reviewed by: Copyright © 2016 Talmont-Kaminski. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. *Correspondence: Konrad Talmont-Kaminski, k.talmontkaminski@gmail.com