Civil religion as formulated in Robert Bellah’s seminal 1967 article, recalling Rousseau’s Social Contract, has recently been proposed to build shared values and bridge deep partisan divides. A competing approach to shared values, based on public reason, relies on overlapping consensus in the works of John Rawls. In this paper, we present an in-between strategy that recognizes the insuperable empirical and normative problems of civil religion while using university civic engagement programs to bring about a public square in which religious reasons are found alongside neutral ones, ultimately for the sake of public justification. Having documented recent polarization trends, we consider the last major attempt to defend civil religion from the perspective of democratic solidarity, Phil Gorski’s American Covenant, but believe it falls short: based on sociological work and Augustinian insights, we show the risk of domination that Gorski’s strategy still entails, not least because of the definitional indeterminacy of civil religion and its overlap with religious nationalism. Paradoxically, a late Rawlsian approach that allows for the initial use of religious reasons, with a generosity proviso of necessary translation into public reason at some point, can lead to a public square with more religious arguments than one theorized explicitly from the perspective of civil religion. This is especially important because, given the discussed polarization trends, universities have taken on an increasingly important civic engagement role even as some still rely on a civil religion approach. We insist on public justification in university civic engagement, and for the sake of doing so take as a starting point Ben Berger’s work in favoring civil engagement, which we define as combining moral, political, and social rather than exclusively political commitments. In proposing a novel university shared values mechanism, intended to expose learners to a maximum diversity of opinions and lived experiences, we offer a fresh approach to building trust in cohorts that increases the likelihood of true dialogue across difference.

I argue that Augustine can inform contemporary republicanism in a way that has not yet been considered: by means of the utility of “overlapping consensus.” I first unpack Philip Pettit’s theory of republicanism and demonstrate that his work contains a significant “blind-spot,” namely, more deliberation is required than Pettit allows to establish “arbitrary” interference in the lives of citizens for the sake of maximizing non-domination. But the deliberative settings leave an opening for domination through rhetoric. It is here that Augustine enters: although both the Confessions and City of God contain multiple striking examples of the use of rhetoric, they also provide evidence of a distrust of rhetoric given its potential for domination. It is only in Book IV of De Doctrina Christiana that Augustine lays out explicitly and theoretically a positive use of rhetoric. I then argue that, to minimize domination in the deliberative settings required to better understand the changing definition of “arbitrary” interference, Pettit may profitably look to Augustine’s explicit theoretical conceptualization of rhetoric. I end by pointing out that this does not require accepting Augustine’s ontology and metaphysics. Indeed, through an overlapping consensus, agreement may be reached on rhetorical practices that do not contribute to domination.

Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan presented a paradigm of the social contract that has proven foundational in Western political thought. A proper understanding of the philosopher’s thought is thus of paramount importance. I argue that today’s case for a religiously tolerant Hobbes has missed an important part of the historical record. I first consider an obscure but important document, the second edition of the Humble Proposals. It demonstrates that leading members of a seventeenth century Christian denomination, the Independents, considered a state-enforced confession of faith. Independents are generally seen as tolerant, and one of the arguments for Hobbesian toleration is that Hobbes endorsed them. But the second edition of the Humble Proposals aligns with the possibility in Hobbes that the civil sovereign will impose part III of Leviathan on the Universities and treat its contents as a legally required confession of faith – one that may be necessary for security, and the avoidance of civil war. Hobbes’s endorsement of Independency alone cannot be used to argue that his work leads to religious toleration. The evidence I present reinforces an earlier assessment and alongside other evidence points to the return of the intolerant Hobbes.

Recent legislation in Texas changes the legal civic engagement landscape. With Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion programs now prohibited on public university campuses, advocates of affirmative steps to reach historically underserved groups may face unexpected obstacles. And recent Supreme Court decisions, on the use of race as a factor in college admissions, further increase the challenges. Due to these shifts in the goals public universities can legally pursue, what are the most appropriate civic engagement policy steps to eliminate barriers to success and realize a diverse student body? Building on the Town Hall program at Tarleton State University, and the specific ways in which it leverages trust, we make three recommendations: (1) Institutions should maintain an openness to outreach, through the leadership of student groups and invited guest speakers and other initiatives, to those on campus who struggle with the burden of invisibility; (2) Town Hall and related civic engagement programs should fine-tune the selection of advanced peer leaders, making it easier for them to pursue expertise in the classroom, in turn facilitating their ability to attract speakers as recommended in (1); and (3) institutions should ensure an opening for representatives to travel to underserved parts of the state, with the effect if not University-wide intention of increasing inclusion. Building on the research of Eric Morrow, Boleslaw Z. Kabala, and Christine Hartness in 2023, we seek to leverage trust for the sake of a genuinely inclusive environment, consistent with current legal limitations on civic engagement in Texas.

What are the differences in how public and private institutions of higher education, with religious schools as a subset of private colleges and universities, approach on-campus protests in a framework of civic engagement? Unfortunately, public, private, and religious schools have all restricted opportunities of speech, assembly, and protest, despite in many cases state and federal courts ruling that this is against the law. With the goal of increasing the civic capacities of students at all institutions of higher education, we propose a mechanism of partial revocation of tax exemptions at universities that do not currently uphold a robust understanding of civic engagement opportunities for all students, which will apply to any college or university receiving federal funding, consistent with the constitutional tradition of free speech still exemplified by Brandenburg v. Ohio and the “national policy” test of Bob Jones University vs. United States. In doing so, we build on the critique of exemptions in the recent work of Vincent Phillip Munoz on religious liberty. By opting only for incentives and by not even incentivizing private institutions that continue to restrict civic engagement but that do not accept federal dollars, we affirm and support a mutually beneficial ongoing dialogue among public, private, and religious schools. This dialogue, as it is sharpened and maintained in place by our recommended policies, is also consistent with pluralism as conceptualized by Jacob Levy.

A Jeffersonian model of civic education supports robust civic engagement while differing in important respects from prevailing paradigms of community-embedded learning that prioritize activism. Rather than emphasizing participation alone, Jefferson’s approach to the development of civic awareness foregrounds reasoned speech, civil discourse, and the cultivation of practical judgment informed by theoretical understanding. Central to this model is Jefferson’s insistence that civic education is primarily a local and state responsibility, grounded in a broader commitment to self-government. Jefferson’s account reflects an appreciation for human reason as a universal capacity that makes consent and civic deliberation possible. Reason, so understood, provides the foundation for political equality and for an account of human flourishing articulated most clearly in the Declaration of Independence and consistent with core claims of the natural law tradition. This framework supports a conception grounded in metaphysical equality and civic friendship, best expressed within a federal political order, and capable of sustaining what classic sources and contemporary initiatives describe as a “pervasive commitment to diversity—as well as unity”. Further contributing to the novelty of our argument, we show that Jeffersonian natural-law-inflected civic engagement resonates well into the 20th century. Important judicial decisions, educational initiatives, and policy recommendations—including Cook v. McKee, Education for American Democracy (EAD), and the Truman Commission Report—draw upon related concepts of civic formation, consent, and reasoned participation. Jefferson’s emphasis on “reasons in speech,” understood as an essential element of self-government, thus remains a necessary and underappreciated contribution to contemporary debates over civic education and engagement.