Location information is one of the most vital information required to achieve intelligent and context-aware capability for various applications such as driverless cars. However, related security and privacy threats are a major holdback. With increasing focus on using Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for autonomous navigation and related applications, it is important to provide robust navigation solutions, yet signal spoofing for illegal or covert transportation and misleading receiver timing is increasing and now frequent. Hence, detection and mitigation of spoofing attacks has become an important topic. Several contributions on spoofing detection have been made, focusing on different layers of a GNSS receiver. This paper focuses on spoofing detection utilizing self-contained sensors, namely inertial measurement units (IMUs) and vehicle odometer outputs. A spoofing detection approach based on a consistency check between GNSS and IMU/odometer mechanization is proposed. To detect a spoofing attack, the method analyses GNSS and IMU/odometer measurements independently during a pre-selected observation window and cross checks the solutions provided by GNSS and inertial navigation solution (INS)/odometer mechanization. The performance of the proposed method is verified in real vehicular environments. Mean spoofing detection time and detection performance in terms of receiver operation characteristics (ROC) in sub-urban and dense urban environments are evaluated.
The performance of Signal Quality Monitoring (SQM) techniques under different multipath scenarios is analyzed. First, SQM variation profiles are investigated as critical requirements in evaluating the theoretical performance of SQM metrics. The sensitivity and effectiveness of SQM approaches for multipath detection and mitigation are then defined and analyzed by comparing SQM profiles and multipath error envelopes for different discriminators. Analytical discussions includes two discriminator strategies, namely narrow and high resolution correlator techniques for BPSK(1), and BOC(1,1) signaling schemes. Data analysis is also carried out for static and kinematic scenarios to validate the SQM profiles and examine SQM performance in actual multipath environments. Results show that although SQM is sensitive to medium and long-delay multipath, its effectiveness in mitigating these ranges of multipath errors varies based on tracking strategy and signaling scheme. For short-delay multipath scenarios, the multipath effect on pseudorange measurements remains mostly undetected due to the low sensitivity of SQM metrics.
Various measurement monitoring techniques are investigated to mitigate the effect of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) code multipath through error correction, stochastic weighting of measurements and detection and exclusion (or de-weighting) of affected measurements. Following a comprehensive review of each approach, the paper focuses on detection/exclusion and detection/de-weighting techniques where several single and dual-frequency monitoring metrics are employed in a combination with time-averaging and the M of N detection strategy. A new Geometry-Free (GF) detection metric is proposed given its capability to be combined with a preceding Code-Minus-Carrier (CMC)-based error correction to reduce the number of excluded or de-weighted measurements and thus preserve the measurement geometry. Three geometry-based algorithms, namely measurement subset testing, consecutive exclusion and iterative change of measurement weights are investigated to address multipath scenarios with multiple simultaneously affected measurements. Experimental results are provided using GPS L1, L2C and L5 data collected in multipath environments for static and kinematic scenarios. For GPS L1, the proposed combined method shows more than 38% improvement over a conventional Carrier-to-Noise-density ratio (C/N0)-based Least-Squares (LS) solution in all but deep urban canyons. Lower performance was observed for L2C and L5 frequencies with a limited number of satellites in view.