To better understand the different effects of the myopic and far-sighted behaviors on the advertising coordination in dynamic supply chain, this paper takes the reference price effect into consideration and formulates four differential game models for the two-level supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer in the situation of Stackelberg game. In our models, the market demand is assumed to be affected by the goodwill, reference price, and the advertising investment, in which the advertising investment can promote the construction of goodwill and such goodwill can further enhance the reference price. The results show that the participating members in the supply chain should invest more in advertisement to improve the goodwill and the relative reference price reflected in the minds of consumers. A far-sighted manufacturer will invest more in the advertisement and charge a higher wholesale price regardless of the behavior choice of the retailer. However, such kind of ignorance leads to different results on the retail pricing strategies of the retailer. The numerical analyses are given in the end to verify the effectiveness of the conclusions which provide the theoretical support to the dynamic supply chain coordination in practice.

We examine whether managers' narcissism explains the difficulty of the performance targets that they set for their subordinate employees and the resulting dysfunctional behaviors of these employees. Utilizing a field‐based data set and a government policy change that imposes higher performance standards, we document both direct and indirect associations between manager narcissism and employee dysfunctional behavior. In particular, we find that managers with a higher degree of narcissism respond to the higher performance standards by setting more difficult targets for their subordinates, which in turn lead to more employee dysfunctional behaviors. Furthermore, after controlling for the effect of target difficulty, we find that manager narcissism also has a direct positive association with employee dysfunctional behavior. Our findings contribute to the management accounting literature by documenting that narcissism, a personality trait that is ubiquitous among managers, plays an important role in affecting managers' control choices and the dysfunctional behaviors of lower‐level employees.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study enterprise innovation in the perspective of external supplier relationship. On this purpose, this paper examines the impact of supplier change on enterprise innovation with the moderating role of market competition.Design/methodology/approach: Using 2012–2020 empirical data of Chinese listed manufacturing enterprises, this paper investigates the relationship among supplier change, market competition and enterprise innovation through a two-way interaction model.Findings: The results show that supplier change has a negative impact on enterprise innovation. And market competition intensifies the negative relationship between supplier change and enterprise innovation. Additional analyses indicate that the main effect and the moderating effect are more significant when the enterprise is non-state-owned or has lower ownership concentration.Originality/value: This paper studies enterprise innovation from the perspective of external stakeholders. It focuses on supplier relationship in a dynamic variation view, instead of the traditional static ones. Moreover, this paper explores the contingency effect of market competition and gives practical implications for managers to adjust innovation strategy flexibly.

Increasing consumers’ environmental awareness has drawn more firms’ attention to low-carbon production. CO2 emission management control is a critical factor in the process of low-carbon production in a supply chain. Such kind of inter-organizational control includes two different strategies: the emission control and emission reduction. Those two strategies have different influences on the performance of the supply chain. This paper uses the differential method to study the Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a supplier in four situations: (1) the non-cooperative situation where no coordination is considered; (2) the weak incentive situation where the emission control incentive is considered; (3) the strong incentive situation where both the emission control incentive and the emission reduction incentive are considered; (4) the cooperative situation where the cooperation is considered. Optimal inter-organizational control of the emission control efforts, emission reduction efforts and cost subsidy are solved and discussed. The results show that although the emission control cost lower, its positive effect on the supply chain performance is still limited. Both the supplier and the manufacturer have the Pareto improvements from the non-cooperative situation to the cooperative situation in sequence. Finally, the simulations and sensitivity analyses are conducted to support the models. Our study provides theoretical insights to the optimal control of low-carbon production in an inter-organizational setting.