Seongmin Kim

Prof. Seongmin Kim

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 September 2018 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SKSeongmin Kim
Seongmin Kim
JHJuhyeng Han
Juhyeng Han
JHJaehyeong Ha
Jaehyeong Ha
TKTaesoo Kim
Taesoo Kim
DHDongsu Han
Dongsu Han
With Tor being a popular anonymity network, many attacks have been proposed to break its anonymity or leak information of a private communication on Tor. However, guaranteeing complete privacy in the face of an adversary on Tor is especially difficult, because Tor relays are under complete control of world-wide volunteers. Currently, one can gain private information, such as circuit identifiers and hidden service identifiers, by running Tor relays and can even modify their behaviors with malicious intent. This paper presents a practical approach to effectively enhancing the security and privacy of Tor by utilizing Intel SGX, a commodity trusted execution environment. We present a design and implementation of Tor, called SGX-Tor, that prevents code modification and limits the information exposed to untrusted parties. We demonstrate that our approach is practical and effectively reduces the power of an adversary to a traditional network-level adversary. Finally, SGX-Tor incurs moderate performance overhead; the end-to-end latency and throughput overheads for HTTP connections are 3.9% and 11.9%, respectively.

28 February 2024 in Future Internet
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HKHaedam Kim
Haedam Kim
SPSuhyun Park
Suhyun Park
혜홍혜민 홍
혜민 홍
JPJiEun Park
JiEun Park
SKSeongmin Kim
Seongmin Kim
As the size of the IoT solutions and services market proliferates, industrial fields utilizing IoT devices are also diversifying. However, the proliferation of IoT devices, often intertwined with users’ personal information and privacy, has led to a continuous surge in attacks targeting these devices. However, conventional network-level intrusion detection systems with pre-defined rulesets are gradually losing their efficacy due to the heterogeneous environments of IoT ecosystems. To address such security concerns, researchers have utilized ML-based network-level intrusion detection techniques. Specifically, transfer learning has been dedicated to identifying unforeseen malicious traffic in IoT environments based on knowledge distillation from the rich source domain data sets. Nevertheless, since most IoT devices operate in heterogeneous but small-scale environments, such as home networks, selecting adequate source domains for learning proves challenging. This paper introduces a framework designed to tackle this issue. In instances where assessing an adequate data set through pre-learning using transfer learning is non-trivial, our proposed framework advocates the selection of a data set as the source domain for transfer learning. This selection process aims to determine the appropriateness of implementing transfer learning, offering the best practice in such scenarios. Our evaluation demonstrates that the proposed framework successfully chooses a fitting source domain data set, delivering the highest accuracy.

24 August 2020 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JHJuhyeng Han
Juhyeng Han
SKSeongmin Kim
Seongmin Kim
DCDaeyang Cho
Daeyang Cho
BCByungkwon Choi
Byungkwon Choi
JHJaehyeong Ha
Jaehyeong Ha
DHDongsu Han
Dongsu Han
Network middleboxes provide the first line of defense for enterprise networks. Many of them typically inspect packet payload to filter malicious attack patterns. However, the widespread use of end-to-end cryptographic protocols designed to promote security and privacy, either inhibits deep packet inspection in the network or forces enterprises to use solutions that are not secure. This article introduces a complete framework for building secure and practical network middleboxes, called EVE, which enables visibility over encrypted traffic. EVE securely processes encrypted traffic using a combination of hardware-based trusted execution and software security technology. For enhanced programmability and security, EVE provides a high-level programming interface based on the Rust language. The high-level APIs of EVE provide security and significantly ease the development effort by hiding the details of cryptographic operations, enclave processing, TCP reassembly, and out-of-band key sharing. Our evaluation shows EVE supports diverse use cases with multiple encryption protocols in a secure fashion while delivering high performance.

19 March 2025 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RKRiyeong Kim
Riyeong Kim
JRJeongeun Ryu
Jeongeun Ryu
SKSumin Kim
Sumin Kim
SLSoomin Lee
Soomin Lee
SKSeongmin Kim
Seongmin Kim
As the use of containers has become mainstream in the cloud environment, various security threats targeting containers have also been increasing. Among them, a notable malicious activity is a cryptojacking attack that steals resources without the consent of an instance owner to mine cryptocurrency. However, detecting such anomalies in a containerized environment is more complex because containers share the host kernel, making it challenging to pinpoint resource usage and anomalies at the container granularity without introducing significant overhead. To this end, this study proposes a runtime detection framework for identifying malicious mining behaviors in the cloud-native environment. By leveraging Tetragon, a runtime security tool based on the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF), we capture system call traces and flow-level information of cryptojacking containers to extract rich feature representations for training and evaluating various machine learning models. As a result of the experiment, our framework delivers up to 99.75% classification accuracy with moderate runtime monitoring overhead.

17 November 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JHJuhyeng Han
Juhyeng Han
IYInsu Yun
Insu Yun
SKSeongmin Kim
Seongmin Kim
TKTaesoo Kim
Taesoo Kim
SSSooel Son
Sooel Son
DHDongsu Han
Dongsu Han
Hardware security modules (HSMs) have been utilized as a trustworthy foundation for cloud services. Unfortunately, existing systems using HSMs fail to meet multi-tenant scalability arising from the emerging trends such as microservices, which utilize frequent cryptographic operations. As an alternative, cloud vendors provide HSMs as a service. However, such cloud-managed HSM usage models raise security concerns due to their untrusted and shared operating environment. We propose ScaleTrust, a scalable and secure system for key management. ScaleTrust allows us to scale the number of virtual HSM partitions, each of which is isolated with respect to each other and is robust against cloud insider attacks, while preserving physical isolation of the root of trust. To enable this, ScaleTrust uses Intel SGX and multiple HSM features, such as restricting key usage by controlling key attributes of in-HSM keys and establishing a secure channel using only HSM commands. Finally, we apply ScaleTrust to four real-world systems: Keyless SSL for TLS private key offloading, JSON Web Token authentication for microservices, key provisioning, and encryption in database systems. Our evaluation shows that ScaleTrust achieves multi-tenancy in a scalable way by providing multiple virtual HSMs with legacy HSM devices that are designed to support a single tenant. ScaleTrust provides security against insider threats while incurring 11.9% and 39.0% of end-to-end throughput and latency overhead for Keyless SSL compared to stand-alone HSMs.

23 September 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DKDaeun Kim
Daeun Kim
YPYuji Park
Yuji Park
SKSeongmin Kim
Seongmin Kim
Due to the anonymous nature of the DarkWeb, perpetrators utilize it combined with cryptocurrencies to hide their online activities and identities. Moreover, recent criminals abuse coin-mixing services to obfuscate financial transactions, dramatically hindering traceability and transparency. Recent studies have elaborated on demystifying the DarkWeb ecosystem by analyzing real-world data acquired from well-known underground marketplaces and forums. However, previous assessments are less effective in understanding the most up-to-date trends and interrelationships between illegal activities because they do not efficiently deal with the ever-changing status of the Tor hidden services and cryptocurrencies, such as uniform resource locator (URL) policy updates and diverse Bitcoin address types. To this end, we propose a Dark Web data collection framework that automatically gathers .onion addresses operated by suspicious vendors and the corresponding Bitcoin addresses based on criminal-related keywords. Our framework aims to understand the interrelationship between illicit activities by analyzing the dependency between the keywords based on the seed .onions that appear in common. We also explore the tendency of .onion domains’ life cycle for each keyword. To demonstrate the versatility of our framework, we provide various case studies to achieve potential clues for dark vendor profiling and alias attribution and how to discriminate mixed Bitcoin addresses from the universal Bitcoin usage patterns.