The paper is concerned with the coordination of interaction between various types of consumers and a power company to manage electricity consumption by using the adverse selection model based on contract theory. There are several power companies competing in the electricity market according to the Bertrand model. A method is proposed for load curve optimization by different types of consumers and a power company. Moreover, the types of consumers are identified and distinguished. The utility functions constructed for them describe the real situation rather well, and allow the implementation of a system of incentives for load curve optimization (load shifting from a peak time of the day by bounded rational consumer). The prices in rates providing a separating equilibrium are determined.

Under study is some simulation model of an oligopolisticmarket in continuous time. For the suppliers (oligopolists) the two rules of behavior are defined by a system of ordinary differential equations. The scenario determines the strategy that is used by the supplier, including the possibility of changing it during the interaction. It is shown, that there are possible stationary states in the model when a supplier profitability can be tools to start using a new rule of his behavior. In result of changing strategy his profit rises as compared to the other participants.

This paper is concerned with the game theoretic mechanisms of interaction between a load serving entity and several types of power consumers (with elastic and inelastic demand). The main focus is on the bounded rational and fully rational consumers, and respective utility functions are defined for them. The demand-side management (DSM) principles are used to analyze the load at different times of the day for different types of consumers. The proposed statement allows the formulation of coordinated prices in rates for different types of consumers, and optimization of demand: peak load decreases relative to a daily average one. The problem is reduced to a convex optimization problem that has a unique solution in the presented form. The obtained result is in the form of a separating equilibrium (when different consumers choose different rates), which brings the retail market equilibrium closer to the maximum public welfare.

In this paper, we discuss the demand side management (DSM) problem: how to incentivize a consumer to equalize the load during the day through price-dependent demand. Traditionally, the retail market offers several electricity payment schemes. A scheme is effective when the different tariffs satisfy different consumers. At the same time, the existing and generally accepted retail pricing schemes can lead to an "adverse selection" problem when all consumers choose the same price, thereby, reducing the possible general welfare. We propose an optimal design of pricing mechanisms, taking into account the interests of the electricity supplier and different types of consumers. The results of our work are that the optimal mechanism is implemented simultaneously for several periods, including the case when the ratio of types of consumers in periods changes. In addition, the mechanism proposed by us, in contrast to the studies of other researchers, provides an equilibrium close to the socially optimal maximum. We describe the implementation algorithm of the mechanism and provide examples of its action in the electric power system with different types and numbers of consumers.

The technical complexity of organizing energy systems’ operation has recently been compounded by the complexity of reconciling the interests of individual entities involved in interactions. This study proposes a possible solution to the problem of modeling their relationships within a large system. Our solution takes into account multiple levels of interactions, imperfect information, and conflicting interests. We present a mathematical statement of the problem of optimal interactions between the centralized system and prosumers in the integrated energy system (IES) with due consideration of the layered architecture of the IES. The paper also contributes a model for arranging the interactions between centralized and distributed energy sources for cases when IES prosumers form coalitions. The implementation of this model is based on multi-agent techniques and cooperative game theory tools. In order to arrive at a rational arrangement of the interactions of prosumers in the IES, the model implements different approaches to the allocation of the coalition’s total payoff (the Shapley value, Modiclus, PreNucleolus solution concepts). Furthermore, we propose a criterion for deciding on the “best” imputation. We contribute a multi-agent system that implements the proposed model and use a test IES setup to validate the model by simulations. The results of the simulations ensure optimal interactions between the entities involved in the energy supply process within the IES and driven by their own interests. The results also elucidate the conditions that make it feasible for prosumers to form coalitions.