The primary purpose of this paper is to bridge the technology gap between Blockchain and Fintech applications. Blockchain technology is already being explored in a wide number of Fintech sectors. After creating a unique taxonomy for Fintech ecosystems, this paper outlines a number of implementation scenarios. For each of the industries in which blockchain is already in use and has established itself as a complementary technology to traditional systems, we give a taxonomy of use cases. In this procedure, we cover both public and private blockchains. Because it is still believed to be in its infancy, especially when it comes to financial use cases, blockchain has both positive and negative aspects. As a result, it is critical to be aware of all of the open research issues in this field. Our goal is to compile a list of open research challenges related to various aspects of the blockchain’s protocol and application layers. Finally, we will provide a clear understanding of the applications for which blockchain can be valuable, as well as the risks associated with its use in parallel.
Algebraic differential fault attack is an attack in which an attacker combines a differential fault attack and an algebraic technique to break a targeted cipher. In this paper, we present three attacks using three different algebraic techniques combined with a differential fault attack in the bit-flip fault model to break the SIMON ciphers. First, we introduce a new analytic method which is based on a differential trail between the correct and faulty ciphertexts. This method is able to recover the entire master key of any member of the SIMON family by injecting faults into a single round of the cipher. In our second attack, we present a simplified Grobner basis algorithm to solve the faulty system. We show that this method could totally break SIMON ciphers with only 3 to 5 faults injected. Our third attack combines a fault attack with a modern SAT solver. By guessing some key bits and with only a single fault injected at the round T-6, where T is the number of rounds of a SIMON cipher, this combined attack could manage to recover a master key of the cipher. For the last two attacks, we perform experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks.
1 January 2009 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
In this paper, we present novel randomized techniques to enhance Montgomery powering ladder. The proposed techniques increase the resistance against side-channel attacks and especially recently published correlation collision attacks in the horizontal setting. The first of these operates by randomly changing state such that the difference between registers varies, unpredictably, between two states. The second algorithm takes a random walk, albeit tightly bounded, along the possible addition chains required to compute an exponentiation. We also generalize the Montgomery powering ladder and present randomized (both left-to-right and right-to-left) m-ary exponentiation algorithms.