Duc-Phong Le

Dr. Duc-Phong Le

FinTech Research, Bank of Canada, Ottawa, ON K1A 0G9, Canada

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 April 2022 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KNKeerthi Nelaturu
Keerthi Nelaturu
HDHan Du
Han Du
DLDuc-Phong Le
Duc-Phong Le
The primary purpose of this paper is to bridge the technology gap between Blockchain and Fintech applications. Blockchain technology is already being explored in a wide number of Fintech sectors. After creating a unique taxonomy for Fintech ecosystems, this paper outlines a number of implementation scenarios. For each of the industries in which blockchain is already in use and has established itself as a complementary technology to traditional systems, we give a taxonomy of use cases. In this procedure, we cover both public and private blockchains. Because it is still believed to be in its infancy, especially when it comes to financial use cases, blockchain has both positive and negative aspects. As a result, it is critical to be aware of all of the open research issues in this field. Our goal is to compile a list of open research challenges related to various aspects of the blockchain’s protocol and application layers. Finally, we will provide a clear understanding of the applications for which blockchain can be valuable, as well as the risks associated with its use in parallel.

1 July 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DLDuc-Phong Le
Duc-Phong Le
SYSze Ling Yeo
Sze Ling Yeo
KKKhoongming Khoo
Khoongming Khoo
Algebraic differential fault attack is an attack in which an attacker combines a differential fault attack and an algebraic technique to break a targeted cipher. In this paper, we present three attacks using three different algebraic techniques combined with a differential fault attack in the bit-flip fault model to break the SIMON ciphers. First, we introduce a new analytic method which is based on a differential trail between the correct and faulty ciphertexts. This method is able to recover the entire master key of any member of the SIMON family by injecting faults into a single round of the cipher. In our second attack, we present a simplified Grobner basis algorithm to solve the faulty system. We show that this method could totally break SIMON ciphers with only 3 to 5 faults injected. Our third attack combines a fault attack with a modern SAT solver. By guessing some key bits and with only a single fault injected at the round T-6, where T is the number of rounds of a SIMON cipher, this combined attack could manage to recover a master key of the cipher. For the last two attacks, we perform experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks.

1 January 2009 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
DLDuc-Phong Le
Duc-Phong Le
ABAlexis Bonnecaze
Alexis Bonnecaze
AGAlban Gabillon
Alban Gabillon

1 January 2010
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
JBJohn Boxall
John Boxall
NMNadia El Mrabet
Nadia El Mrabet
FLFabien Laguillaumie
Fabien Laguillaumie
DLDuc-Phong Le
Duc-Phong Le

7 November 2020 in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SYSze Ling Yeo
Sze Ling Yeo
DLDuc-Phong Le
Duc-Phong Le
KKKhoongming Khoo
Khoongming Khoo

24 October 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
DLDuc-Phong Le
Duc-Phong Le
CTChik How Tan
Chik How Tan
MTMichael Tunstall
Michael Tunstall
In this paper, we present novel randomized techniques to enhance Montgomery powering ladder. The proposed techniques increase the resistance against side-channel attacks and especially recently published correlation collision attacks in the horizontal setting. The first of these operates by randomly changing state such that the difference between registers varies, unpredictably, between two states. The second algorithm takes a random walk, albeit tightly bounded, along the possible addition chains required to compute an exponentiation. We also generalize the Montgomery powering ladder and present randomized (both left-to-right and right-to-left) m-ary exponentiation algorithms.