Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) has attracted considerable attention and developed rapidly due to its ability to surpass the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD. However, the device imperfections may compromise its practical implementations. The goal of this paper is to make it robust against the state preparation flaws (SPFs) and side channels at the light source. We adopt the sending or not-sending (SNS) TF-QKD protocol to accommodate the SPFs and multiple optical modes in the emitted states. We analyze that the flaws of the phase modulation can be overcome by regarding the deviation of the phase as phase noise and eliminating it with the post-selection of phase. To overcome the side channels, we extend the generalized loss-tolerant (GLT) method to the four-intensity decoy-state SNS protocol. Remarkably, by decomposing of the two-mode single-photon states, the phase error rate can be estimated with only four parameters. The practical security of the SNS protocol with flawed and leaky source can be guaranteed. Our results might constitute a crucial step towards guaranteeing the practical implementation of the SNS protocol.
The twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) protocol and its variations have been proposed to overcome the linear Pirandola–Laurenza–Ottaviani–Banchi (PLOB) bound. One variation called phase-matching QKD (PM-QKD) protocol employs discrete phase randomization and the phase post-compensation technique to improve the key rate quadratically. However, the discrete phase randomization opens a loophole to threaten the actual security. In this paper, we first introduce the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurement and the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against PM-QKD with imperfect phase randomization. Then, we prove the rigorous security of decoy state PM-QKD with discrete phase randomization. Simulation results show that, considering the intrinsic bit error rate and sifting factor, there is an optimal discrete phase randomization value to guarantee security and performance. Furthermore, as the number of discrete phase randomization increases, the key rate of adopting vacuum and one decoy state approaches infinite decoy states, the key rate between discrete phase randomization and continuous phase randomization is almost the same.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted much attention due to its unconditional security. High-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) is a brand-new type of QKD protocol that has many excellent advantages. Nonetheless, practical imperfections in realistic devices that are not considered in the theoretical security proof may have an impact on the practical security of realistic HD-QKD systems. In this paper, we research the influence of a realistic intensity modulator on the practical security of HD-QKD systems with the decoy-state method and finite-key effects. We demonstrate that there is a certain impact in the secret key rate and the transmission distance when taking practical factors into security analysis.
The twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) and its variants can overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD. However, their physical implementations with the side channels remain the subject of further research. We test the side channel of a type of external intensity modulation that applies a Mach–Zehnder-type electro-optical intensity modulator, which shows the distinguishability of the signal and decoy states in the frequency domain. Based on this security loophole, we propose a side-channel attack, named the passive frequency-shift attack, on the imperfect implementation of the sending or not-sending (SNS) TF-QKD protocol. We analyze the performance of the SNS protocol with the actively odd-parity pairing (AOPP) method under the side-channel attack by giving the formula of the upper bound of the real secret key rate and comparing it with the lower bound of the secret key rate under Alice and Bob’s estimation. The simulation results quantitatively show the effectiveness of the attack on the imperfect devices at a long distance. Our results emphasize the importance of practical security at the light source and might provide a valuable reference for device selection in the practical implementation of the SNS protocol.
The decoy state quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is proven to be an effective strategy against the photon number splitting attack. It was shown that the 1-decoy state protocol, easier to implement in the practical QKD system, outperforms the 2-decoy state protocol for block sizes of up to bits. How intensity fluctuations influence the performance of the 1-decoy state protocol with finite resources remains a pending issue. In this paper, we present a finite-key analysis of the 1-decoy state protocol with intensity fluctuations and obtain the secret key rate formula about intensity fluctuations. Our numerical simulation results show that the stronger the intensity fluctuations, the lower the secret key rate for a small data block size of a few bits. Our research can provide theoretical implications for the selection of data size in the QKD system with intensity fluctuations.
Compared with traditional networks, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers the ultimate resources, allowing two remote users to share secret symmetric keys regardless of the capabilities of eavesdroppers. However, the widespread application of commercial QKD is still challenging due to the low photon detection efficiency and the extremely high transmission loss. Here we demonstrate a fully commercial phase-encoding QKD system using a signal extraction model and advantage distillation technology to suppress detector noise and perform real-time pre-error correction. 1.89 × 10−10 in the asymptotic case and 7.43 × 10−12 in the nonasymptotic case secret key bits per pulse are achieved with a total loss of 70.05 dB. This method not only increases the transmission loss tolerance but also provides a more realistic deployment of quantum communication.