It is commonly believed that race is perceived through another's facial features, such as skin color. In the present research, we demonstrate that cues to social status that often surround a face systematically change the perception of its race. Participants categorized the race of faces that varied along White–Black morph continua and that were presented with high-status or low-status attire. Low-status attire increased the likelihood of categorization as Black, whereas high-status attire increased the likelihood of categorization as White; and this influence grew stronger as race became more ambiguous (Experiment 1). When faces with high-status attire were categorized as Black or faces with low-status attire were categorized as White, participants' hand movements nevertheless revealed a simultaneous attraction to select the other race-category response (stereotypically tied to the status cue) before arriving at a final categorization. Further, this attraction effect grew as race became more ambiguous (Experiment 2). Computational simulations then demonstrated that these effects may be accounted for by a neurally plausible person categorization system, in which contextual cues come to trigger stereotypes that in turn influence race perception. Together, the findings show how stereotypes interact with physical cues to shape person categorization, and suggest that social and contextual factors guide the perception of race.

The uncanny valley has become synonymous with the uneasy feeling of viewing an animated character or robot that looks imperfectly human. Although previous uncanny valley experiments have focused on relations among a character's visual elements, the current experiment examines whether a mismatch in the human realism of a character's face and voice causes it to be evaluated as eerie. The results support this hypothesis.

Moral norms play an essential role in regulating human interaction. With the growing sophistication and proliferation of robots, it is important to understand how ordinary people apply moral norms to robot agents and make moral judgments about their behavior. We report the first comparison of people's moral judgments (of permissibility, wrongness, and blame) about human and robot agents. Two online experiments (total N = 316) found that robots, compared with human agents, were more strongly expected to take an action that sacrifices one person for the good of many (a "utilitarian" choice), and they were blamed more than their human counterparts when they did not make that choice. Though the utilitarian sacrifice was generally seen as permissible for human agents, they were blamed more for choosing this option than for doing nothing. These results provide a first step toward a new field of Moral HRI, which is well placed to help guide the design of social robots.

We present the broad outlines of a roadmap toward human‐level artificial general intelligence (henceforth, AGI). We begin by discussing AGI in general, adopting a pragmatic goal for its attainment and a necessary foundation of characteristics and requirements. An initial capability landscape will be presented, drawing on major themes from developmental psychology and illuminated by mathematical, physiological, and information‐processing perspectives. The challenge of identifying appropriate tasks and environments for measuring AGI will be addressed, and seven scenarios will be presented as milestones suggesting a roadmap across the AGI landscape along with directions for future research and collaboration.