Background: In Latin America, total sales of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) continue to rise at an alarming rate. Consumption of added sugar is a leading cause of diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Coalitions of stakeholders have formed in several countries in the region to address this public health challenge including participation of civil society organizations and transnational corporations. Little is currently known about these coalitions – what interests they represent, what goals they pursue and how they operate. Ensuring the primacy of public health goals is a particular governance challenge. This paper comparatively analyses governance challenges involved in the adoption of taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages in Mexico, Chile and Colombia. The three countries have similar political and economic systems, institutional arrangements and regulatory instruments but differing policy outcomes.Methods: We analysed the political economy of SSB taxation based on a qualitative synthesis of existing empirical evidence. We identify the key stakeholders involved in the policy process, identified their interests, and assess how they influenced adoption and implementation of the tax.Results: Coalitions for and against the SSB taxation formed the basis of policy debates in all three countries. Intergovernmental support was critical to framing the SSB tax aims, benefits and implementation; and for countries to adopt it. A major constraint to implementation was the strong influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the policy process. A lack of transparency during agenda setting was notably enhanced by the powerful presence of TNCs.Conclusion: NCDs prevention policies need to be supported across government, alongside grassroots organizations, policy champions and civil society groups to enhance their success. However, governance arrangements involving coalitions between public and private sector actors need to recognize power asymmetries among different actors and mitigate their potentially negative consequences. Such arrangements should include clear mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of all partners, and prevent undue influence by industry interests associated with unhealthy products.

Objective: To analyse the implementation of front-of-pack nutrition labelling (FOPNL) in Mexico.Design: Review of publicly accessible documents, including legislative websites, news sources, and government, intergovernmental, and advocacy reports. Usage of the policy cycle model to analyse the implementation and evaluation stages of Mexico’s General Health Law, amended with FOPNL (2019–2022).Results: In October 2019, the government published a draft modification of the Norma Oficial Mexicana (Official Mexican Standard) to regulate and enforce a new FOPNL warning label system. A 60-d public consultation period followed (October–December 2019), and the regulation was published in March 2020 and implementation began in October 2020. An analysis of nine key provisions of the Standard revealed that the food and beverage industry and its allies weakened some original provisions including health claims, warnings for added sweeteners and display areas. On the other hand, local and international public health groups maintained key regulations including the ban on cartoon character advertisements, standardised portions and nutrient criteria following international best practices. Early implementation appears to have high compliance and helped contribute to reformulating unhealthy products. Continued barriers to implementation include industry efforts to create double fronts and market their cartoon characters on social media and through digitalised marketing.Conclusion: Early success in implementing the new FOPNL system in Mexico was the result of an inclusive and participatory regulatory process dedicated to maintaining public health advances, local and international health advocacy support, and continued monitoring. Other countries proposing and enacting FOPNL should learn from the Mexican experience to maintain scientifically proven best practices, counter industry barriers and minimise delays in implementation.

Mexico is the largest soft drink market in the world, with high rates of obesity and type 2 diabetes. Due to strains on the nation’s productivity and healthcare spending, Mexican lawmakers implemented one of the world’s first public health taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in 2014. Because Mexico’s tax was designed to reduce SSB consumption, it faced strong opposition from transnational food and beverage corporations. We analysed previously secret internal industry documents from major corporations in the University of California San Francisco’s Food Industry Documents Archive that shed light on the industry response to the Mexican soda tax. We also reviewed all available studies of the Mexican soda tax’s effectiveness, contrasting the results of industry-funded and non-industry-funded studies. We found that food and beverage industry trade organisations and front groups paid scientists to produce research suggesting that the tax failed to achieve health benefits while harming the economy. These results were disseminated before non-industry-funded studies could be finalized in peer review. Mexico still provided a real-world context for the first independent peer-reviewed studies documenting the effectiveness of soda taxation—studies that were ultimately promoted by the global health community. We conclude that the case of the Mexican soda tax shows that industry resistance can persist well after new policies have become law as vested interests seek to roll back legislation, and to stall or prevent policy diffusion. It also underscores the decisive role that conflict-of-interest-free, peer-reviewed research can play in implementing health policy innovations.

Objectives: To measure incidence of conflicts of interest (COI) with food and pharmaceutical industry actors on the advisory committee for the 2020–2025 US Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA) and assess the adequacy of current mechanisms to disclose and manage COI among the committee’s members. Design: We compiled longitudinal data from archival sources on connections between members of the DGA’s advisory committee and actors. We hypothesised that these committee members, who oversee the science for the most influential dietary policy in the USA, might have significant COI that would be relevant to their decision making. Disclosure of COI on this committee was recommended in 2017 by the National Academies of Sciences in order to increase transparency and manage bias, but public disclosure of the committee’s COI does not appear to have taken place. Setting: The committee was composed of twenty experts. Participants: None. Results: Our analysis found that 95 % of the committee members had COI with the food and/or pharmaceutical industries and that particular actors, including Kellogg, Abbott, Kraft, Mead Johnson, General Mills, Dannon and the International Life Sciences, had connections with multiple members. Research funding and membership of an advisory/executive board jointly accounted for more than 60 % of the total number of COI documented. Conclusions: Trustworthy dietary guidelines result from a transparent, objective and science-based, process. Our analysis has shown that the significant and widespread COI on the committee prevent the DGA from achieving the recommended standard for transparency without mechanisms in place to make this information publicly available.

In January 2014, Mexico introduced a soda tax of 1 Mexican Peso (MXP) per litre. The aim of this paper is to examine the political context out of which this policy emerged, the main drivers for the policy change, and the role of stakeholders in setting the policy agenda and shaping the policy design and outcomes. Thirty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders, and 145 documents, including peer-reviewed papers, policy briefs, press releases, industry, government, and CSO reports, were analysed. An iterative thematic analysis was conducted based on relevant theories of the policy process using a complementary approach, including Stages Heuristic Model, Policy Triangle Framework, and Multiple Streams Model. Results showed that a major motivation was the new administration seeking funds as they entered government. The soda tax was supported by a key group of legislators, civil society actors and by academics promoting evidence on health effects. However, the policy measure was challenged by the food and beverage industries (F&BI). Non-state actors were both formally and informally involved in setting the agenda, regardless of some of them having opposing interests on the soda tax policy. Approaches used by non-state actors to influence the agenda included: calls for action, marketing strategies, coalition building, challenging evidence, and engaging in public–private partnerships (PPPs). The effectiveness of the soda tax was highly debated and resulted in public polarization, although the framing of the outcomes was instrumental in influencing fiscal policies elsewhere. This study contributes to the debate around implementing fiscal policies for health and how power is exercised and framed in the agenda-setting phase of policy development. The article examines how the F&BI sought to influence the national strategy for obesity prevention. It argues that the experience of the soda tax campaign empowered policy advocates, strengthening national and international civil society networks.