This paper examines the dual-channel supply chain in which the differentiation of the environmental sustainability of channels is considered. We analyze the influences of the level of environmental sustainability of channels on the pricing policies for the supply chain members in both centralized and decentralized models using the Stackelberg game model under inconsistent price policy. We obtain the optimal level of environmental sustainability of channels and pricing decisions for the players in the centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains. Results show that the influence mechanisms of the level of environmental sustainability of channels on the pricing decisions are different in the centralized and decentralized models. Furthermore, numerical analysis has been conducted to investigate the effects of the cross-environmental-sustainability sensitivity factor and the initial proportion of consumers who prefer the retail channel on the level of environmental sustainability of channels, pricing policies and players’ profits.

The paper explores the pricing policies and green strategies in a duopoly green supply chain with vertical and horizontal competition, which includes a green manufacturer, a traditional manufacturer and a common retailer. The purpose of the paper is to address the following research problems: (1) How manufacturers’ market power influences the pricing policies and green strategies of supply chain members in a green supply chain? (2) What conditions do first-mover advantage and green competitive advantage be effective simultaneously? We establish the linear demand functions of the duopoly green supply chain and obtain the players’ optimal decisions under channel members’ different market power. Further, we conduct sensitivity analysis and numerical examples of players’ optimal decisions about consumer’s environmental awareness and greening cost effector. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that green manufacturer would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of greening cost, which is contrary to the traditional manufacturer. Additionally, correlations of retailer’ optimal decisions and profits between consumer’s environmental awareness and greening cost effector are related to the manufacturers’ market power structures. Furthermore, we find that the green competitive advantage is more effective than first-mover advantage while first-mover advantage does not always effective in the duopoly green supply chain. Specially, traditional manufacturer always prefers to be the follower competing with the green manufacturer, no matter with the variety of consumer’s environmental awareness and greening cost effector, while green manufacturer would like to be the leader only when the consumer’s environmental awareness is relatively high or the greening cost effector is relatively low.

Considering the influence of the consumers’ perception of eco-quality (CPQ) on the dynamic strategies of the continuous agri-product supply chain, the paper examines a two-stage agri-product supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer, where the supplier invests in eco-quality improvement and the retailer invests in advertising. Taking the CPQ, eco-quality and goodwill as ternary state variables, the paper formulates joint decision-making models of a continuous agri-product supply chain based on differential game theory. The paper has analyzed equilibrium strategies in decentralized and centralized scenarios, respectively, and further developed an advertising–eco-quality investment cost-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, comparative and numerical analyses have been conducted. The analyses results reveal that consumers’ perceptions of eco-quality and their goodwill preference towards an agri-product encourage the supplier and retailer to improve the eco-quality of the agri-product and the level of advertising. Indeed, the greater the impact of goodwill on demand, the higher level of the supplier’s eco-quality investment and the retailer’s advertising effort, and the higher the profits of the supply chain. The paper also finds that the proposed cost-sharing contract can achieve a Pareto improvement in the continuous agri-product supply chain system. Furthermore, the higher the consumer goodwill preference, the more motivated suppliers and retailers are to cooperate.