Arnold Polanski

Dr. Arnold Polanski


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 May 2013 in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
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Journal Article
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DMDuncan McVicar
Duncan McVicar
APArnold Polanski
Arnold Polanski

12 December 2022 in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
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Journal Article
Open access
ESEvarist Stoja
Evarist Stoja
APArnold Polanski
Arnold Polanski
LNLinh H. Nguyen
Linh H. Nguyen
APAleksandr Pereverzin
Aleksandr Pereverzin

21 June 2012 in Social Choice and Welfare
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Journal Article
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DCDaniel Cardona
Daniel Cardona
APArnold Polanski
Arnold Polanski

11 February 2013 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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APArnold Polanski
Arnold Polanski
FVFernando Vega-Redondo
Fernando Vega-Redondo
The paper proposes an intertemporal model of bargaining among heterogeneous buyers and sellers placed on a bipartite network. First, it characterizes conditions on the network under which its trading restrictions are inessential and the outcome is arbitrage-free. Instead, when the system is segmented in different trading components, we show how these come about and how prices are determined in each of them. Second, we turn to the issue of network endogeneity, focusing on those networks that are Pairwise Stable. Such networks are shown to always exist and be arbitrage-free. In the latter respect, therefore, they satisfy one of the key properties displayed by frictionless markets. We identify, however, a sharp contrast regarding another key feature: Pairwise-Stable networks are generically inefficient if the matching process is genuinely decentralized. This uncovers a fundamental incompatibility between individual incentives and social welfare in endogenous trading networks. We explain that such incompatibility is not only due to buyer/seller heterogeneity but is also caused by the incentives underlying network formation in a trading context.

24 March 2010 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
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Journal Article
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APArnold Polanski
Arnold Polanski
EWEyal Winter
Eyal Winter
We consider homogeneous two-sided markets, in which connected buyer-seller pairs bargain and trade repeatedly. In this infinite market game with exogenous matching probabilities and a common discount factor, we prove the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies. The equilibrium payoffs are given implicitly as a solution to a system of linear equations. Then, we endogenize the matching mechanism in a link formation stage that precedes the market game. When agents are sufficiently patient and link costs are low, we provide an algorithm to construct minimally connected networks that are pairwise stable with respect to the expected payoffs in the trading stage. The constructed networks are essentially efficient and consist of components with a constant buyer-seller ratio. The latter ratio increases (decreases) for a buyer (seller) that deletes one of her links in a pairwise stable component.

25 July 2017 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
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Journal Article
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APArnold Polanski
Arnold Polanski
FVFernando Vega-Redondo
Fernando Vega-Redondo
In the canonical model of frictionless markets, arbitrage is usually taken to force all trades of homogeneous goods to occur at essentially the same price. In the real world, however, arbitrage possibilities are often severely restricted and this may lead to substantial price heterogeneity. Here we focus on frictions that can be modeled as the bargaining constraints induced by an incomplete trading network. In this context, the interplay among the architecture of the trading network, the buyers’ valuations, and the sellers’ costs shapes the effective arbitrage possibilities of the economy. We characterize the configurations that, at an intertemporal bargaining equilibrium, lead to a uniform price. Conceptually, this characterization involves studying how the network positions and valuations/costs of any given set of buyers and sellers affect their collective bargaining power relative to a notional or benchmark situation in which the connectivity is complete. Mathematically, the characterizing conditions can be understood as price-based counterparts of those identified by the celebrated Marriage Theorem in matching theory.