Cletus Famous Nwankwo

Mr. Cletus Famous Nwankwo

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications


1 June 2017 in International Development Planning Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CEChristian C. Ezeibe
Christian C. Ezeibe
TNThaddeus C. Nzeadibe
Thaddeus C. Nzeadibe
AAAlphonsus Ali
Alphonsus Ali
CUCelestine U. Udeogu
Celestine U. Udeogu
CNCletus Famous Nwankwo
Cletus Famous Nwankwo
COChinedu Ogbodo
Chinedu Ogbodo
This article examines the political economy of collective organising in the motorcycle taxi economy of Nigerian cities. Using the mixed-methods approach, this study demonstrates the nature and problems of collective organising in the motorcycle taxi economy. It notes that implementation of a neo-liberal development policy in Nigeria in the 1980s gave rise to job losses and catalysed the creation of a motorcycle taxi sub-system as a livelihood. While collective organising in the motorcycle taxi sub-system is sometimes exploited to advance the ambition of some politicians, the informal economy is often paradoxically victimised through the initiation and implementation of hostile urban policies, such as banning motorcycle taxis, soon after electoral mandates are secured. This paper, however, argues that despite the challenges, collective organising represents a struggle to influence urban policy and could present an opportunity for a new form of engagement between the state and the informal economy in develo...



1 September 2018 in Open Political Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CNCletus Famous Nwankwo
Cletus Famous Nwankwo
This paper aims to comment on the manifestation of vote buying regarding voter turnout and voter choices in the 2018 Ekiti governorship election in Nigeria and its implications. The article notes that vote-buying might not have significantly influenced voter turnout, but it changed voters’ choices as the two major political parties in the election resorted to a massive monetary inducement for electoral support at the poll. Even though the election was decided by secret balloting, the advent of “see and buy” shows that politicians are stepping up their games to manipulate elections. The paper thus argues for institutional electoral reform and strengthening the enforcement of the law.