The selection of parameters that offer best possible performance while simultaneously guaranteeing a well-defined level of security is one of the most challenging tasks in cryptographic system design. In order to ensure that the chosen parameters offer a certain level of security an estimation of the computational complexity of the underlying hard problem is required. To date, those estimations are often performed in an ad-hoc manner. This led to a scattered landscape of available estimation scripts, with multiple scripts for the same problem with varying outputs. In this work we present the first open-source software library entirely dedicated to cryptographic hardness estimation, the CryptographicEstimators library. In contrast to most previous estimators, this library follows a modern object-oriented software architecture, which provides a wide variety of features. Overall the design is optimized to ease extending existing estimators by new algorithms and makes it simple to integrate completely new estimators. We then showcase the functionality of the library by presenting estimates for selected candidates of the NIST PQC first round digital signature standardization effort. In this work we further specify the algorithmic cost model underlying the estimators. We then survey the state-of-the-art of concrete complexity estimation on six different hardness assumptions, including the syndrome decoding problem, the multivariate quadratic problem, the code equivalence problem, the permuted kernel problem and different flavors thereof. In this process we gathered and integrated estimators for all these assumptions, to provide a solid starting point for the project. Additionally, we normalized all estimates to fit into the cost model and to measure the same unit operations.
It is notably challenging to design an efficient and secure signature scheme based on error-correcting codes. An approach to build such signature schemes is to derive it from an identification protocol through the Fiat-Shamir transform. All such protocols based on codes must be run several rounds, since each run of the protocol allows a cheating probability of either 2/3 or 1/2. The resulting signature size is proportional to the number of rounds, thus making the 1/2 cheating probability version more attractive. We present a signature scheme based on double circulant codes in the rank metric, derived from an identification protocol with cheating probability of 2/3. We reduced this probability to almost 1/2 to obtain the smallest signature among code-based signature schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, around 22 KBytes for 128 bit security level. Furthermore, among all code-based signature schemes, our proposal has the lowest value of signature plus public key size, and the smallest secret and public key sizes. We provide a security proof in the Random Oracle Model, implementation performances, and a comparison with the parameters of similar signature schemes.
16 June 2023 in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
In this paper, we present an improved differential-linear cryptanalysis of the ChaCha stream cipher. Our main contributions are new differential-linear distinguishers that we were able to build thanks to the following improvements: a) we considered a larger search space, including 2-bit differences (besides 1-bit differences) for the difference at the beginning of the differential part of the differential-linear trail; b) a better choice of mask between the differential and linear parts; c) a carefully crafted MILP tool that finds linear trails with higher correlation for the linear part. We eventually obtain a new distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds that requires 2166.89 computations, improving the previous record (ASIACRYPT 2022) by a factor of 247. Also, we obtain a distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds that requires 2251.4 computations, being the first time of a distinguisher against ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds. Using our MILP tool, we also found a 5-round differential-linear distinguisher. When combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB) framework, we obtain a key-recovery attack on ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds with a computational complexity of 2206.8, improving by a factor 214.2 upon the recent result published at EUROCRYPT 2022.
We present the implementation of Grover’s algorithm in a quantum simulator to perform a quantum search for preimages of two scaled hash functions, whose design only uses modular addition, word rotation and bitwise exclusive or. Our implementation provides the means to assess with precision the scaling of the number of gates and depth of a full-fledged quantum circuit designed to find the preimages of a given hash digest. The detailed construction of the quantum oracle shows that the presence of AND gates, OR gates, shifts of bits and the reuse of the initial state along the computation require extra quantum resources as compared with other hash functions based on modular additions, XOR gates and rotations. We also track the entanglement entropy present in the quantum register at every step along the computation, showing that it becomes maximal at the inner core of the first action of the quantum oracle, which implies that no classical simulation based on tensor networks would be of relevance. Finally, we show that strategies that suggest a shortcut based on sampling the quantum register after a few steps of Grover’s algorithm can only provide some marginal practical advantage in terms of error mitigation.